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Abstract
This thesis explores the geometric description of animal colour vision. It examines the
relationship of colour spaces to behavior and to physiology. I provide a derivation of, and
explore the limits of, geometric spaces derived from the notion of risk and uncertainty
aversion as well as the geometric objects that enumerate the variety of achievable colours.
Using these principles I go on to explore evolutionary questions concerning colourfulness,
such as aposematism, mimicry and the idea of aesthetic preference.
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Technical Terms
Throughout this thesis I have tried to avoid specialist technical terms as much as possible,
and to define them when I do use them. However, sometimes the definitions lie a long
way from a given usage. It is also fairly difficult to avoid technical terms in mathematics.
The following is a table of terms which I feel might aid the reading of this document. It
is not complete, but I hope that it helps.
10
Term Definition
Geometrising Transform (coined) A transformation of a divergence to make it
obey geometric axioms
n-chromat (coined) An organism with n functioning photorecep-
tor cell classes i.e. the number cone cell types in day-
light or rod cell types at night.
Colourfulness (re-appropriated) A property of a colour similar to its
saturation but defined in terms of the colour solid.
This is different to the existing formal interpretation
of the term. Colour science has formal meanings for all
terms that might well describe this dimension making
it necessary to ‘overload’ some or other term. This
one is chosen as the existing meaning is least relevant
for this work.
Monochromat An organism that has only one functioning photore-
ceptor cell class.
Dichromat An organism with two functioning photoreceptor cell
classes.
Achromatic Vector A vector that points in the direction from black to
white
Metamer Something that has the same colour as something else
but a different visible spectrum.
Quantum Catch The number or rate of photoisomerisation events
within a photoreceptor cell.
Aposematism Colours whose purpose is to warn an organisms preda-
tors of its toxicity.
Structural Colour Colours formed by the microscopic structure of a sur-
face, not directly by absorbance of light.
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Preface
This thesis is about the geometry of colour, how it arises, what it means and what its
consequences are. Specifically, it concerns an animal’s colour vision as a factor in its
behaviour and the evolution of their species.
Geometry is a tool for intuiting abstract concepts and structures.1 But it is not merely
a tool for providing intuition; it is also a tool for description which provides a methodology
that can be used to provide concrete results. It is a practical and quantitative narrative.
This thesis is split into three parts. In the first part I look at traditional ideas of
colour. First focusing on the history of colour theory then moving on to a generalisation
of some well established concepts in colour theory. In the second part I examine the
idea of perceptual spaces - of which colour spaces are a particular example. I develop a
behaviourally justified information theoretic approach to colour space and use it to both
examine existing spaces and derive my own. In the last part I consider evolutionary
scenarios, firstly I ask why the signals found in the animal kingdom should be strongly
coloured, and secondly, I enquire into the effect of structural colours on the evolution of
warning signals.
Along with the geometric theme that runs though this thesis, there is also a focus
on judgement. Here I take the attitude that this is something we are forced to consider
when we ask questions concerning the behaviour of animals, and, that considering the
basis of our judgements allows us to better understand what it is that we are discussing,
illuminating the foundations upon which our theories stand.
1In the present case, the structures defined by information theory and physics.
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P.1 Colour and Geometry
The first part of this thesis focuses on establishing the basic ideas of colour theory and on
the large scale structure of colour spaces.
P.1.1 A Brief History of Colour Space
In this first chapter I outline the history of colour theory. I use this chapter to introduce
the concepts of colour spaces and psychophysics.
P.1.2 The Shape of Colour Spaces
Much of what people consider to be the defining properties of colour spaces is their shape.
The overall shape of a colour space is defined by the overlap of photoreceptor responses
(making some signals impossible) and by the constraints of the class of spectra that we
choose to consider. This chapter explores the properties of this shape.
P.2 Colour and Measurement
In the second major part I take the notion of behaviour as a goal directed process as
the basis of a formal derivation of models describing experiments in colour. This part is
focused on behaviour, neurophysiology, discrimination and judgement.
P.2.1 Measuring Living Things
In this chapter I aim to elucidate the meaning of information measures in terms of goal
directed action. I provide a basis upon which we can ground beliefs, goals and actions
in physical measurements. Eventually, this allows us to examine existing information
theoretic quantities and decide upon their relevance to the understanding of behaviour
and perception.
P.2.2 Geometry from Information
Beginning with the notion of a binary risk as a quantified representation of an agents
goal I derive the general form of colour distances to which any particular colour based
choice depends. These represent optimal2 decision making processes under uncertainty.
The resulting distances are information divergences and have some general properties that
2The optimality does not mean that they cannot be representative of heuristic processes. Indeed, in
some cases they definitely are.
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distinguish them from distances as usually conceived, this makes them a much broader
class of measurement. I outline the various sub classes of these distances and note that
when it is definable they all induce the same local metric on the colour space up to a
multiplicative constant - this metric is the Fisher metric. From this we can see that the
same metric occurs in all behavioural experiments for which the goal can be expressed
as a binary risk. However, where finite colour distances are desired there is no uniquely
defined measure of distance. But, even without knowing this, something can be said
about what properties these distances should have and new behavioural predictions about
generalisations can be made.
P.2.3 Local Models of Colour Vision
This chapter focuses on the correspondence between the model I propose in the previous
section and those that currently exist. In a number of cases maximum entropy distributions
can be used to show the correspondence between the theory and existing models (such
as Chittka, 1992; Maxwell, 1860; Schro¨dinger, 1920; Vorobyev and Osorio, 1998). I also
examine a case where uncertainty is removed (a deterministic limit) showing that the
topology of the space induced by the metric is not what we would require from a colour
space that matches either our notions of colour or physical plausibility. I claim that
non-statistical spaces such as the Honeybee-Hexagon space of Chittka (1992) either make
implicit assumptions or are otherwise unfounded. To remedy this I calculate the metric
corresponding to a saturating photoreceptor from basic statistical principles. To finish
with, I examine some general properties of the models discussed and observe that all have
minimum discrimination information around the achromatic point. I also classify colour
spaces by their ability to saturate, noting that most existing models do not have this
property and that of those who do, excepting the model I provide, none are based on
physical properties.
P.3 Colour in Nature
The last part of this thesis is about colour as a factor in evolution, particularly in animal
communication.
P.3.1 The Colourfulness of Signals in Animal Communication
In this chapter I discuss the reasons why animal signals should be colourful. I argue that
colourfulness should be valued in a similar way by all organisms on the basis of its ability
14
to inform. I argue that the degree of colourfulness allows us to judge the affordance of
a given object. I present a number of cases where this is important, and argue that this
kind of judgement – one that is made by all organisms in the same way – is a reason why
we should think that Darwin is justified in using the word beauty in his works.
P.3.2 Structural Colours in Batesian Mimicry
The physical basis of structural colours is rather different to that of pigments. Humans
observe this difference as the physical parameters affecting only the hue of a colour. This
property serves as a source of non-linearity in evolutionary processes. Here, I visualise
this in a simple model of structural colours and discuss the implications for mimicry and
the formation of waring colours.
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Part I
Colour and Geometry
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Chapter 1
A Brief History of Colour Space
“Theres logic of colour, damn it all! The painter owes allegiance to that alone.
Never to the logic of the brain.”
Paul Ce´zanne
(Ce´zanne: a memoir with conversations, Joachim Gasquet)
1.1 Aristotle
Probably the most general definition of a colour space is “a geometric representation of
colour”. In this sense, colour spaces have a long history, dating back at least as far as
ancient Greece. Aristotle provides us with one of the earliest examples by describing an
ordering relationship for colours:1
[...] colour has specific differences: therefore blackening and whitening differ specifi-
cally; but at all events every whitening will be specifically the same with every other
whitening and every blackening with every other blackening. But white is not further
subdivided by specific differences: hence any whitening is specifically one with any
other whitening. Where it happens that the genus is at the same time a species,
it is clear that the motion will then in a sense be one specifically though not in an
unqualified sense [...]
Aristotle
Physics (∼350BC)
Book V, Part IV
See: Hardie and Gaye (1994)
1Although an ordering may be considered pre-geometric, he then goes on to associate colours with
rational and irrational numbers.
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He considered there to be a scale of colours, with a unique white at one end and one
unique black at the other. These being related by processes which have been translated
as “blackening” and “whitening”. The exact nature of these processes were a matter of
debate during his time, as was the nature of colour itself.
The notion of a colour space was not explicitly discussed by Aristotle, but he did
approach the subject of colour in a manner which allows one to be defined.
This being the true nature of mixture, it is plain that when bodies are mixed their
colours also are necessarily mixed at the same time.
Aristotle
On Sense and Sensible Objects (∼350BC)
Part 4
See: Beare (1994)
Here he mentions what we now may consider to be the defining property of colour spaces
(and psychophysical spaces in general) - a relationship between something physical and
something perceived. Aristotle uses the physical processes of mixing to provide a process
that changes objects in some quantifiable way2 and then states that colours change in way
which reflects this. The exploration of a physical parameter with an apparent quantity
is explicit, therefore it seems reasonable to interpret Aristotle’s “On Sense and Sensible
Objects” as an investigation into the nature and consequence of this relationship, making
him a very early pioneer of colour spaces.
1.2 The Renaissance
From the end of Classical Greece3 to the beginning of the modern period there are few
known descriptions of colour spaces.4 Though there are exceptions, such as the space of
2Mixing is thoroughly explored by Aristotle. In his philosophy, in which all things are constituted by a
finite number of atoms, mixable things may be mixed in integer ratios of their constituent parts. Degrees of
mixing may be quantified by a rational number between zero and one. This approach to mixing is evident
throughout “On Sense and Sensible Objects” (Beare, 1994). It is not unreasonable then, given that he
describes elsewhere that certain colours correspond to irrational numbers, that we could construct a colour
space with axes corresponding to the rational contributions of each fundamental (irrational) colour i.e. a
space isomorphic to {1...ni}m : ∑i ni = N for some number of unique colours m. This is contrary to the
popular belief that he thought colours to be a ‘product’ of black and white.
3Alexander the Great, whose death is often taken to be the end of the Greek Classical period, died in
323 BC and Aristotle in 322 BC.
4Whether this is due to a general bias in scholarship towards the classical and modern periods, or
genuinely reflects the evolution of colour theory is for someone more versed in history to decide.
18
Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1170-1253) which has recently drawn attention (Smithson et al.,
2012).
Although geometry as a tool for understanding nature had existed since early Classical
Greece, in the Renaissance it found a new role in perspective theory. Using geometrical
theory the objective laws of the three dimensional space that people inhabit and can
measure were transformed into egocentric laws on a two dimensional plane.5 The laws of
perspective found a central role in the painting of the time (Ackerman, 1980) and formed
the basis for (at least one) architectural theory (Argan and Robb, 1946; Wittkower, 1953).
It is probably not unfair to cite perspective as the oldest example of a geometric and
psychophysical law.
It was in the mid 15th century Leon Battista Alberti published his well known colour
system.67 This system used four highly saturated ‘primaries’ whose combination was
desaturated either with black or white depending on whether the current portion of a
paintings subject was in light or shade (Bomford, 1995). The dislike that the Quattro-
centos8 had of dull painting lead Alberti to design this system in such a way to optimise
the vividness of colour: “we all by nature love things that are open and bright; so we
must the more firmly block the way in which it is easier to go wrong” (Ackerman, 1980).
White and black were known to make colours less vivid, so they were added at the latest
possible point. This leads us to naturally identify the first mixing (before addition of
black or white) with the plane that in modern colour spaces that we would now describe
as containing the colours of highest saturation. This system allows identification with
features of many of the reflectance based colour spaces that are used today: a (hyper)
plane consisting of the colours formed by the optimally saturated primaries provides a
base for a bipyramid with the unique black and white points lying at the tips - the colours
desaturating, and their variety decreasing, the nearer one moves to them.
The system of Alberti was still procedural, retaining in many ways the ‘blackening’
and ‘whitening’ of Aristotelian tradition (as Aristotle was the only work available at the
5It has been theorised that the subjective laws of perspective were favoured as a basis for architecture
and painting, as it was thought that æsthetic value is bought about by the subject and that ‘simulating’
the subject, or at least, drafting or painting in a way that reflects qualities of subjective experience, results
in a work of greater value (Argan and Robb, 1946).
6I use ‘system’ in the original sense of a method by which one adds coloured paint to a canvas, as
opposed to the more scientific interpretation as a systematic arrangement of colour.
7He was, of course, not the only one to publish a colour system, but for the sake of brevity it will be
the only system I discuss here.
815th century Italian artists.
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Mixing of
Primaries Desaturation
Figure 1.1: The colour system of Alberti. This shows the mixing of a lilac type colour (the star).
First, the purest possible colour was mixed from four primaries, represented here in a tetrahedron.
This colour is then desaturated by mixing black or white (white in this example). The tetrahedron
from the first mixing is shown projected onto a line bisecting pure white and pure black with the
body of the bipyramid containing all mixable colours being projected onto a diamond.
time Ackerman, 1980). It is not until after the Renaissance that we begin to see explicitly
geometric colour spaces. However, it is good to remember that it was this period that
saw the first use of geometry as a means to understand visual perception as well as the
accurate documentation of gross features of colour spaces (in the form of colour systems).
1.3 The Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution
1.3.1 Newton and Goethe
Issac Newton is well known for his studies on light and a large part of his work was
the study of the colour formed by thin films and prisms. Newton described light as a
continuum of vibrations, using his study of the phenomena of thin film interference and
dispersion to describe the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum (Newton, 1665).
This physical understanding of light proves an indispensable tool for the description of
colour. One can even consider the representation of the electromagnetic spectrum in figure
1.2 to be a colour space of kinds - in the sense that it maps a physical parameter to colour.
Of course, this space does not pretend to represent the entirety of the colours which can be
seen. Any light reflected from or transmitted through an object has a spectral composition
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(an intensity value at every wavelength) which is determined by its physical properties and
the spectral composition of the light incident upon it.
Dispersion, the phenomenon that Newton is most well known for investigating, provides
a way of spatially separating wavelengths of light so that the intensity of each wavelength
can be seen in isolation, the wavelength dependent nature of the intensity can then be
observed spatially, for example in the thin dark (absorbance) bands seen in a sufficiently
resolved spectrum of solar radiation. Colour is represented in space.
Wavelength
Figure 1.2: The visible spectrum. This representation can be seen as a mapping from the physical
parameter (wavelength) to colours.
In a story about colour one cannot talk about the work of Newton without dis-
cussing the work of his ‘opponent’ Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe (although Goethe lived
much later). Whereas Newton’s understanding was physical and (arguably) reductionist,
Goethe’s understanding was at the phenomenological level; for example, where Newton
considered darkness to be simply an absence of light, Goethe considered darkness to be a
phenomenon of equal stature to - and with the same primacy as - lightness (Duck, 1988),
see figures 1.3 and 1.4. Whilst this ‘reification’ of darkness was a major point of contention,
what really separated the two was their modes of explanation. Goethe described many
qualities of colour where on its own the Newtonian understanding of light was insufficient
and a more holistic approach must be taken (such as phosphenes and the reddening of
the visual field in hypoxic conditions; Theory of Colours, Eastlake trans. 1967). In many
ways, the two were interested in very different things.
Unlike in the Renaissance, where the scientific understanding of perspective provided
a harmony to the relationship between nature and personal experience (Argan and Robb,
1946), the conflict between the ideas of Newton and Goethe reflects as dissonance be-
tween the physical and the mental. Goethe’s attack on Newton’s ideas stemmed from his
awareness of the phenomenological complexity of colour - a complexity that we are far
from explaining even today. Nonetheless it is Newton’s work, not Goethe’s, that forms
the basis of the modern scientific understanding of colour. The work of Goethe simply
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Dark
Dark
Dark
Dark
Figure 1.3: A representation of Goethe’s argument against Newton’s theory of colour. Here I
have represented the dispersion of three light sources illuminating a prism from the right: short
wavelength (blue), long wavelength (red) and a mixture of the two (purple). In the case of the
mixture, pure red and pure blue are only seen in the areas which are not illuminated by the other
wavelength. When considering a white light source, such as daylight, this has the consequence
that colour is only observed in the ‘dark fringes’ of the transmitted beam. It is because of this
that colour can be seen to occur where light and dark interact, see figure 1.4.
Fig. 1. PLATE IV
Figure 1.4: Figure from Theory of Colours (Eastlake, 1967) showing how colour occurs in the
dark fringes of a transmitted beam. This is similar figure 1.3 but applied refraction of sunlight.
[public domain image]
stands as a reminder that our scientific understanding of colour accounts for only a small
part of our experience of it.
During the 17th and 18th there were a number of geometric conceptualisations of colour
(see Shmid, 1948, for a concise account of the spaces of this period). Both Newton and
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Goethe created colour spaces where hues were arranged in a circle, and a number of other
geometric orderings of colours arose at this time. All of these were orderings of colour by
empirical or procedural9 similarity, rather than being based specifically on physiological
knowledge. It is not until the development of trichromacy do we begin to see any significant
physiological contributions to the geometry of colour spaces.
1.3.2 Trichromacy
In the 19th century, Thomas Young, and later Hermann von Helmholtz developed what
is now known as the Young-Helmholtz theory of trichromacy. In this theory a colour is
described by a triple of numbers determined by the relative intensity of light in different
parts of the visual spectrum. After discussing Newton’s theory of resonating particles
in the retina10, Young explained colour as the resonance of three types of particles with
greater or lesser tendency to resonate with light of particular frequencies:
[As] it is almost impossible to conceive each sensitive point of the retina to contain
an infinite number of particles, each capable of vibrating in perfect unison with every
possible undulation, it becomes necessary to consider the number limited, for instance,
to three principal colours, red, yellow and blue, of which the number of undulations
are related in magnitude nearly as the numbers 8,7,6; and that each of the particles
is capable of being put in motion less or more forcibly [...]
The Bakerian Lecture: On the Theory of Light and Colours
See: Young (1802)
von Helmholtz (1896) took this idea further and provided a description of the sensitivity
of each class of particle (now known to be opsin molecules) as a function of wavelength.
The currently favoured choice of these functions are shown in figure 1.5. These functions
correspond to the classes of cone cells within the human retina each of which contain only
a single type of opsin. The degree to which each cell is activated for a given spectrum is
9Such as the process of pigment mixing used in the tetrahedral space (Farben-Pyramide) of Lambert
(1772).
10My terminology. Newton originally conceived of rays of light as inducing superluminal vibrations
in the æther. He then abandoned the vibrations of the æther in favour of vibrations of the medium in
which they were travelling, i.e. light caused vibrations in whatever it was passing through. Newtons final
understanding of light, however, was that instead of the vibration of the medium that it - or the medium
in which it was travelling in - fell into ‘fits’ (periodic tendencies named after recurring fevers - paroxysma
- of certain diseases especially malaria) which determined the ease of reflection or transmission (Shapiro,
1993, chap 3).
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given by the summation of the intensity of light at each wavelength after multiplication
by the sensitivity of each cell type to that wavelength. Formally, we write this as:
qi =
∫
Λ
wi(λ)s(λ)dλ (1.3.1)
where i indexes the cone type (for humans long, medium or short). The triple of numbers
(vector) q is known as the quantum catch and can be thought of as a physical description of
the colour. w is a weighting function (cone fundamental, see figure 1.5), s is the spectral
composition (or just “spectrum”: a positive real number at each value of λ). λ is a
particular wavelength and Λ is the set of all wavelengths where the functions w and s
are defined. This can also be written in terms of wavenumber, or frequency by change of
the measure dλ. Generally, it is expedient to take wi to be dimensionless and s to be in
units of photons per time per wavelength. With a vector representing colour, we have the
necessary starting point for a physiologically based geometric account of colour.
Equation 1.3.1 is fundamental to any relationship between physical parameters and
colour. It is minimal. It relates the most physical thing that one might reasonably accept
as colour (the quantum catches) and the most colour like thing that one might reasonably
accept as purely physical (spectra)11.
Towards the end of the 19th century we have a theory of colour which is defined
in terms of the physical and physiological understanding of the day. With this, we see
the continuation of a trend that began with Newton. As the physical basis of colour
became more and more understood, theories of colour became theories of physics, and the
representations of colours became the representations favoured by physicists.
The colour space of James Clerk Maxwell sums up the progress made by 19th century
understanding of colour. He maps colour to plane by normalising quantum catches by the
sum of quantum catches (Maxwell, 1860), visualised in 1.6:
ci =
qi∑
i
qi
(1.3.2)
This projects all colours onto a triangle, which can then be viewed in two dimensions.
In the colour space of Maxwell the spectrum (which can be thought of as a one-
dimensional colour space) is a one dimensional locus - known as the spectral line, or,
monochromatic locus. This defines a boundary in which all colours lie12.
11Of course, the physics/colour dichotomy is not well defined, I use these terms more descriptively than
with any rigour. If pushed I would have to admit that this is not, in the sense described, as minimal as
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Figure 1.5: Modern functions used to determine the long wavelength (red), mid wavelength
(green) and short wavelength (blue) coordinates of certain human colour spaces. These curves are
psychophysically determined and thus do no correspond directly to quantum catch other than as
a rough approximation. Shown here are the 2o cone fundamentals of Stockman and Sharpe (2000)
in units of photons per wavelength.
1.3.3 The Rise of Psychophysical Theory
Around the same time as Helmholtz, Ernst Heinrich Weber and Gustav Fechner were start-
ing a new branch of psychology: psychophysics. Their goal of was to measure perceived
difference as it relates to physical difference. The most well known results are Weber’s and
Fechner’s laws13, which have been shown to occur in multiple modalities and tasks. The
general form of both their laws, the Weber-Fechner law has been implicated in everything
one might hope.
12All spectra can be thought of as convex combinations of monochromatic lights. As all quantum
catches are linear projections of spectra, colours are convex combinations of the colours corresponding to
monochromatic lights. Before projection, all colours lie within a “cone” with a boundary of monochromatic
lights at various intensities. When further projected using a perspective transform, they are found to lie
within the the convex hull of the monochromatic locus (spectral line). See chapter 2 for a derivation
13Often just called the Weber-Fechner law
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Figure 1.6: Illustration of the formation of Maxwell’s triangle. The normalisation by the sum of
quantum catches (q) moves them onto a (subset of a) triangle with corners at (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and
(0, 0, 1). The points in this triangle corresponding to a particular q are labelled c. They are also
given by the intersection of the triangle with a line from q to the origin.
from numerical cognition (Dehaene, 2007) to cell signalling (Cope, 1976). It has even been
suggested that it is a general property of neurons14(Deco and Rolls, 2006). One can state
Weber’s law as “the ability to discriminate stimuli is proportional to their magnitude”
and Fechner’s law as “the perceptual distance between two stimuli is proportional to their
magnitude”. They both admit the same formal representation, differing only in the as-
sertions made about the domain of its applicability. A common form of the Weber and
Fechner laws is:
∆x = kx (1.3.3)
Where ∆x is a physical difference between any equally discriminable (or perceptually dif-
ferent) quantities with (mean) magnitude x and where k is a constant of proportionality.
Although both Weber’s and Fechner’s laws are very similar, they are none the less very
different in their application, one is about discrimination - the ability to tell two things
apart - the other is about perceptual distance - a judgement of difference. Discrimination
can be used to great effect and its description with Weber’s law is rather robust. Contrary
to this, Fechner’s law is more difficult to find or apply. In the theory of colour, there has
14There is obviously no reason to believe this.
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Figure 1.7: Maxwell’s triangle. The large triangle represents all possible positive quantum catches,
not restricted by what is achievable by actual spectra. The curve with marked wavelengths is
the spectral line, this contains all colours made by monochromatic lights - some wavelengths are
marked. The line shown in purple is known as the purple line (as it bounds the area containing
pinks and purples), this is a boundary too, but no monochromatic light corresponds to it - it is
defined by the convex combinations of the two points flanking the concavity in the spectral line
between the short and long loci.
been much success in the application of discrimination based measures, but, little success
in finding long distance measures. The subject of chapters 3, 4 and 5 is the characteri-
sation, formalisation and application of both discriminative (Weberian) and judgemental
(Fechnerian) psychophysical theory by applying information theory to a general model of
agency.
1.4 20th (and 21st) Century - Differential Geometry
Beginning with von Helmholtz (1896) and Schro¨dinger (1920) colour was described using
the mathematics of differential geometry, specifically Riemannian geometry - a framework
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which at the same time found central importance in the field theories of physics (a famous
example of which is Einstein). Using Riemannian geometry, a fairly general (but not
completely general!) relationship between a physical parameter and the perception of
colour is described. This found a niche when describing perceptual distance: one could
get some data about discrimination and then transform a space so that instead of the
physical parameter being uniformly spaced, the perceptual space is uniform; euclidean;
flat15. Doing this may or may not lead to a closed form equation that allows one to
express the psychological space in terms of the physical space, but regardless of whether
it can be easily written down, such a relationship will always exist.
The Riemannian approach has been the basis for many modern models of colour, most
notably the empirical CIE L*u*v*colour space (industry standard: referenced as CIE,
1976) and has (fairly) recently been used outside of human colour vision by Vorobyev and
Osorio (1998). However, there are still some problems with these spaces. Riemannian
geometry is especially good at describing small changes in colour, but when it comes
to larger changes such models are found lacking - optimal long range metrics are non-
Riemannian (see Backhaus et al. (1984) or even Von der Emde and Ronacher (1994)).
Distance between colours are not the standard geodesics of Riemannian geometry, even
though geodesics seems to have some relevance (Schro¨dinger, 1920; Wyszecki and Stiles,
2000).
Yet, Riemannian geometry is only one of many geometries and its use up to now has
been more of an empirically tested postulate than theory driven application. It is the
purpose of chapter 4 to show where Riemannian geometry is, and is not, a natural form
for colour spaces to have.
15Flat meaning affine, not meaning without intrinsic curvature. Colour spaces are usually flat in the
intrinsic sense
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Chapter 2
The Shape of Colour Spaces
“Would it be conceivable for someone to see as black everything that we see as
white, and vice versa?”
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Remarks on Colour, McAlister and Scha¨ttle trans.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First of all, this chapter is intended to give
a background to the mathematics that will be used in the later chapters. Colour science
has various formalisations for many of the quantities that it uses, being explicit about the
formalisation is used is a necessity, especially as the formalisation here is non-standard
in some places. Research in colour vision has a human bias, not surprisingly: The impli-
cations for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind are of great concern and Homo
sapien is the ‘model species’ in these fields. Here I define quantities that avoid this human
bias. The aim here is to provide geometric models without reliance upon any particular
photoreceptor absorbances or their number. Some of the work here is part of the day
to day business of colour scientists and has been thoroughly studied in humans. The
generalisations of these concepts, whilst fairly simple, is either ignored or mistaken.
The second purpose of this chapter is to investigate the similarity between the colour
vision of various organisms. This of course relies on the existence of measures which can
be equally applied to all organisms. I wish to highlight one similarity in particular – the
similarity between ‘colourfulness’ in various organisms. This concept will be of use later
on in this thesis.
The focus here is the large scale geometry of colour spaces. Because the spectral
sensitivities of photoreceptors overlap the locus of possible signals is non-trivial - we cannot
excite one type of photoreceptor without exciting another, making some values of responses
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are impossible to achieve. This chapter explores the geometry of the possible signals and
problems related to this geometry.
2.1 Definitions
This section outlines some notation, C for the convex closure of a set (elsewhere called the
hull) and H for the minimal set of points which when closed is equal to a given convex set
(which, in line with usage in computer science, I will call the convex hull). It also explains
the inner product notation 〈·, ·〉, which is completely conventional and can be found in
many places (e.g. Amari and Nagaoka, 2000). Those familiar with these may wish to skip
to section 2.2.
2.1.1 Convexity
The concept of convexity is fundamental to the proceeding chapter. A subset of a vector
space is said to be convex if for any two points (vectors) in the set that are chosen every
point in between them is also in the set. More formally, a convex set S has the property:
x,y ∈ S =⇒ (1− k)x + ky ∈ S (∀x,y ∈ Rn, ∀k ∈ [0, 1]) (2.1.1)
The use of convexity in this chapter is of a set (in a vector space) and different to the
convexity of a function used in chapter 41. A convex function is simply a one-to-one
function where the set of points above the curve is convex.
Figure 2.1: Convex constructions: a) A set in R2 b) The minimal convex covering of the set c)
The points in the convex hull.
The definition of convexity naturally leads to the idea of a (minimal) convex covering,
also known as the convex closure of a set of vectors. The convex covering can be defined
1Formally, f is a convex function iff for some domain X, ∀x, y ∈ X, k ∈ [0, 1] : f(kx + (1 − k)y) ≤
kf(x) + (1− k)f(y), it is said to be strictly convex if the inequality is strict (< instead of ≤)
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for all sets of points. This is created by the inclusion of all the convex combinations of
points that were not in the original set. The convex covering of S, C(S), can be written
as
C(S) =
{∑
x∈S
kix :
∑
i
ki = 1, ki ∈ [0, 1]
}
(2.1.2)
In mathematics, this is often called the convex hull, however, in computer science where
one must use effecient representations there is another meaning of this term, which is the
one I will use here. The convex hull of a set is the set of all points in the convex covering
of that set which are not convex combinations of other points. My usage here differs from
the usual usage, where the convex closure and the hull are one and the same; here I use
‘hull’ and ‘closure’ or ‘covering’ to make the distinction between the set of points needed to
describe a convex set and that set itself. The points of the convex hull are the ‘extremities’
of the set. The convex hull H(S) of a set S (in the computer science sense of a minimal
representation) is therefore defined as
H(S) = {x ∈ C (S) : x 6∈ C (S \ {x})} (2.1.3)
it is possible to show, though I shall not do so here, that
C(S) = C(H(S)) (2.1.4)
and that:
H(S) = H(C(S)) (2.1.5)
H(S) = H(H(S)) (2.1.6)
C(S) = C(C(S)) (2.1.7)
With equations 2.1.4 though 2.1.7 we can see that any composition of the functions C and
H is equal to the outermost function.
2.1.2 Inner Products
There are two intimately connected mathematical representations of the spectra of light.
One is as a function of wavelength, the other is as a vector containing the intensity at
particular wavelengths. If the vector were infinite then the two would be (at least infor-
mally) the same. In this spirit, we say that spectra belong to the positive half of an infinite
dimensional vector space, informally [0,∞)∞ = R∞+ .
The two representations are valid because they are both inner product spaces. It is
the inner product that really matters. For this reason I shall only use notation for the
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inner product, and avoid specific sum/integral representation whenever possible. The
inner product between two vectors is given by:
〈A,B〉 =
∑
i
AiBi (2.1.8)
There is an integral equivalent. Spectra can be described as functions of wavelength, more
specifically, they are densities with respect to a Lebesgue measure dλ. All the functions of
wavelength discussed here are, in this sense, spectra. For this reason we define the inner
product as:
〈a, b〉 = 〈a(λ), b(λ)〉 =
∫
Λ
a(λ)b(λ)dλ (2.1.9)
In this form, the quantum catches [qi] for a particular incident spectrum are given by
qi =
〈
wi, s
〉
(2.1.10)
can be thought of a linear projection from the infinite dimensional space of spectra to the
lower dimensional quantum catch space. This projection is not in general orthogonal as
the response functions wi are not (they overlap to some extent):
kij =
〈
wi, wj
〉 6= 0 (2.1.11)
For this reason, quantum catches for an n-chromat inhabit a subspace of Rn+. This subspace
is cone-like with its apex lying on the origin (the ‘black point’).
2.2 The Spectral Line and Chromaticity Spaces
Before I move on to the main topic of this chapter – the properties of colour solids – I will
briefly describe the properties of the more standard notion of chromaticity spaces, and
their formulation for a general observer with n photoreceptor classes.
The spectral line is a fundamental object in the study of colour. If we are treating
the space of spectra as a vector space it is formed from the projection of basis vectors
corresponding to Dirac deltas. Here, I shall write it as the parametric curve (γ(λ), λ ∈ Λ)
given by the inner product:
γi(λ′) =
〈
wi(λ), δ(λ′ − λ)〉 = wi(λ′) (2.2.1)
where δ is the Dirac delta. I include this step to show the trivial relationship between
the spectral line and the response functions, which are equal formally, but have different
meanings.
32
Figure 2.2: The relationship between the quantum catch space and the chromaticity space.
The spectral line can be thought of as the locus of all monochromatic spectra with
unit intensity2. If we allow arbitrary intensity then the surface:
ui(λ, µ) = µγi(λ), µ ∈ R+ (2.2.2)
contains all such spectra. Further, we can demonstrate that convex closure of this surface
is equivalent to the set of quantum catches associated with every possible spectrum. The
quantum catch of a convex combination of the monochromatic spectra of unit integrated
intensity3 can be written:
qi =
〈
γi(λ), s¯(λ)
〉
(2.2.3)
with s¯ being a member of the collection of normalised spectra, i.e. spectra such that
〈s¯(λ), 1(λ)〉 = 1 (2.2.4)
Now, if we let spectrum s, of arbitrary intensity, be given by:
s(λ) = νs¯(λ) (2.2.5)
2Though, like the Dirac delta, a completely monochromatic light is only an idealisation
3i.e.
∫
Λ
s¯(λ) = 1.
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it will have a quantum catch of:
qi =
〈
wi(λ), s(λ)
〉
(2.2.6)
which we decompose into ‘intensity’ ν and a normalised spectrum s¯
=
〈
wi(λ), νs¯(λ)
〉
(2.2.7)
which is trivially related to the spectral line through equation 2.2.1:
=
〈
γi(λ), νs¯(λ)
〉
=
〈
νγi(λ), s¯(λ)
〉
(2.2.8)
which allows us to define a vector valued function u of wavelength and intensity. u defines
the cone in 2.2.
=
〈
ui(λ, ν), s¯(λ)
〉
(2.2.9)
Now, the operation 〈·, s¯〉 denotes a convex combination in the sense that each value in s¯
can be thought of as a weight in a weighted sum of the values of u and where
∑
s¯ = 1. In
other words in set notation we have
{q} =
 ∑
x∈{u}
six :
∑
si = 1, s ∈ [0, 1]
 (2.2.10)
corresponding to the definition of a convex covering of the set of all values of u (equation
2.1.1). So, we see the quantum catch for every spectrum can be written as a convex
combination of points on the surface u (as required).
2.2.1 Chromaticity Space Projection
The cone given by u(λ, ν) is a fundamental object in colour spaces, the projection of it
through it’s apex gives a class of spaces that describe chromaticity (colour in directions
other than its intensity).
Instead of normalising with respect to a uniform spectrum (1). We can uniquely write
a spectrum in the form normalised with respect to any spectrum l(λ) > 0:
s(λ) = νs¯(λ), 〈s¯(λ), l(λ)〉 = 1 (2.2.11)
. Which implies that
〈s, l〉 = ν (2.2.12)
We can then consider l(λ) to be a generalised measure of luminance. We can also, given
the photoreceptor responses, relate l(λ) as a luminance vector in quantum catch space
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(i.e. as a vector of ‘colours’, not respresenting a spectrum), b = [bi], so that b is a solution
to
〈w(λ), b〉 = l(λ) (2.2.13)
Note that b does not uniquely define a given l. A corollary of this is that
ν = 〈s, l〉 = 〈s, 〈b, w〉〉 = 〈〈s, w〉 , b〉 = 〈q, b〉 (2.2.14)
so:
〈s¯, l〉 =
〈 s
ν
, l
〉
=
〈 s
ν
, 〈b, w〉
〉
=
〈〈 s
ν
, wi
〉
, bi
〉
=
〈 q
ν
, b
〉
=
〈
q
〈q, b〉 , b
〉
(2.2.15)
The coordinates
[
qi
〈q,b〉
]
found on the left hand side of the last inner product are what I
will call embedded chromaticity coordinates,4 these have the property that:〈
q
〈q, b〉 , b
〉
=
〈q, b〉
〈q, b〉 = 1 (2.2.16)
Which implies that they describe points within a plane in the quantum catch space. Given
that all quantum catches are positive, we can say that not only are they in a plane, but
in a simplex of dimension n − 1. In the case where b = 1 this is the unit simplex. The
representation of all colours fall within this simplex, in fact they lie within the subset of
the simplex
q
〈q, b〉 ∈ C
({〈γ(λ), w〉
〈γ(λ), b〉 : λ ∈ Λ
})
⊆ C ({[biδij] : j = 1, 2 . . . n− 1})
= Simplex (b) (2.2.17)
This states, importantly, that all points in the chromaticity space lie within the convex
closure of the chromaticities of the spectral line.
2.2.2 Reducing the Dimension
The embedded chromaticity coordinates are usually projected into a (n− 1)-dimensional
space for efficiency of representation.
I shall call the new coordinates c = [ci]. So we have
c = 〈Pn, q〉 (2.2.18)
4I use the term embedded chromaticity coordinates as at this point we are still working in an n dimen-
sional space for an n-chromat. We have projected into a plane so have a redundant dimension which is yet
to be removed.
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where Pn is a n-by-(n − 1) projection matrix. In the commonly used CIE xy space, this
is not an isometric projection. The projection is the 2-by-3 matrix:
P3 =

1 0
0 1
0 0
 (2.2.19)
When comparing different visual systems an isometric transformation is better. Distances
and angles are important and isometric projections are well behaved and simply defined for
all dimensionalities. This is not a necessity, but ‘good practice’. Such transformations are
uniquely defined up to rotation. For this, we can choose any matrix that can be expressed
as:
P = PnK (2.2.20)
where K is a orthogonal transformation which transforms the luminance vector b to the
last basis vector, en, so:
1K = en (2.2.21)
and Pn is a n-by-(n− 1) projection matrix:
Pn =
 Id
0
 (2.2.22)
so that Pnen = 0. In other words, we transform quantum catch coordinates so that the
luminance is only in a particular direction and then ignore the corresponding dimension.
2.2.3 The Interpretation of Chromaticity Spaces
Chromaticity spaces are commonplace in colour science and as such are often used as a
basis for comparative arguments. It is an unfortunate property of geometric representa-
tions of colour that their provision of an intuitive visualisation is also a means by which
one may forget that ultimately we require a justification beyond the geometry, and, that
the power of a geometric representation is exactly that of the motivation used to produce
it.
I mention this because of a widespread misconception in comparative colour vision.
This concerns spectral and non spectral colours. We know (very) approximately, that the
spectral line traverses the corners of an (n − 1)-simplex, for example, in human colour
vision, it travels approximately from red to blue via green (see figure 1.6), leaving one
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edge (red-blue) mostly unvisited. We see similar features in a a tetrachomatic space; in
which case there are three unvisited edges, a pentachromatic space where there are six
and in an n-chromatic space there are 12(n − 1)(n − 2) unvisited lines. The spectral line
would follow these edges of a tetrahedron perfectly if the photoreceptor response functions
overlapped only with those neighbouring them in the wavelength domain.
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Figure 2.3: Photoreceptor response curves used to make the chromaticity space in figure 2.4.
This quality has lead to an unusual mythology concerning colour spaces, an example
of which is found in Thompson (1995, chap 4.) and the references therein. In particular I
take issue with numerological statements such as:
While in a man’s chromaticity diagram there is only one intermediate colour [...]
namely purple, in tetrachomatic vision there would be three.
Burkhardt and Maier (1989)
See: Thompson (1995)
A clarification of ‘how many’ non spectral colours there are on the outside of a colour
space is needed.
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Figure 2.4: The chromaticity space corresponding to the curves in figure 2.3. The green area
corresponds to a two dimensional surface of the chromaticity space, just as the curves and lines do
in figure 1.6.
The spectral line is always a one dimensional line. The dimensionality of the surface
of the n-chromat chromaticity space is always n − 2 as it is the surface of a bounded,
convex volume within a n− 1 dimensional simplex. It is pretty clear from this that there
will be, informally, no non-spectral colours for and dichromats, the same ordinality for
trichromats (n − 2 = 1), and infinitely more non-spectral colours than spectral lying on
the surface when n ≥ 4. Also, we can see in figure 2.3, that there is no reason to assume
that the spectral line will lie on the surface of the chromaticity space in its entirety -
the line between blue and purple is non-spectral. The distinction between spectral and
non-spectral colours is rather artificial, and is only made so that we can calculate the form
of the chromaticity space so that later we can look at where within it spectra lie.
The attraction to thinking about spectral an non-spectral colours is motivated by
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human colour vision, where the purple line (the non-spectral locus for trichromats) has
special significance - there is a qualitative similarity5 between it and the spectral line.
However, this similarity does not exist for non-trichromatic organisms. I will not use
chromaticity spaces in the rest of this thesis, I include them here as they are the most
widespread representation of colour and the geometry of their construction reflects much
of the geometry in this chapter.
2.3 Colour Solids
The colour solid, or object colour solid, is the collection of quantum catch vectors possible
under a constant observer and illumination (Wyszecki and Stiles, 2000).6
The quantum catch for a surface with reflectance7 r(λ) under illumination l(λ) is given
by:
qi = ki
〈
wi, rl
〉
= ki
〈
r, wil
〉
=
〈
r, kiwil
〉
(2.3.1)
where each ki is a normalisation constant equal to 1/
〈
wi, l
〉
.
The definition of the colour solid is then given by:
S (w) def= {〈r, kiwil〉 : r ∈ R} (2.3.2)
where R = [0, 1]∞ is the space of all reflectance spectra. This is effectively the
linear projection of a hypercube of infinite dimension. It is possible to write R as convex
combinations of points in {0, 1}∞ = T. In other words, T is the set of all spectra with
either complete or zero reflectance at any given wavelength, from which all reflectances
can be produced by convex combination (a weighted and normalised sum). T can be
interpreted as the set of all vertices of the infinite dimensional hypercube containing all
reflectances, R. The geometric interpretation of R and T should make it clear that R is
the convex covering of T:
R = C (T) (2.3.3)
and that T is the convex hull of the reflectances:
T = H (R) (2.3.4)
5We can use the same Lebesgue measure.
6Here, for simplicity, the colour solid of an n-chromat is normalised to lie within the unit n-cube.
7Reflectance spectra are bounded above and below, so r ∈ [0, 1]∞.
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Figure 2.5: Various views of the honeybee colour solid. It is coloured according to the direc-
tion of vectors normal to the surface, not by actual colour, although there is some qualitative
correspondence. Here, like in the rest of this section, I assume that the illumination spectrum is
uniform.
Before I continue, I need to mention the action of projections upon convexity. As men-
tioned above, a point b is convex combination of a and c iff b = ka + (1− k)c, k ∈ [0, 1].
Now, if we take the linear projection under P of b we see that:
Pb = P (ka + (1− k)c) = k(Pa) + (1− k)(Pc) (2.3.5)
in other words, the projections of convex combinations of points are the convex combina-
tion of their projections. This means that we have the following relations for the convex
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n = 2 n = 3 n = 4
n = 5 n = 6 n = 7
Figure 2.6: Projections of hypercubes of increasing dimension. With the appropriate projection,
the outer boundary forms a colour solid. n is the dimensionality of the hypercube. As we in-
crease the dimension of the cube our projection becomes increasingly similar to a colour solid in
appearance.
covering and hull:
{Py : y ∈ C (X )} = C ({Px : x ∈ X}) (2.3.6)
{Py : y ∈ H (X )} = H ({Px : x ∈ X}) (2.3.7)
From the definition in equation 2.3.2 we see that this implies that the colour solid for a
given set of photoreceptor responses w and illumination S (w, l):
S (w, l) = {〈r, kiwil〉 : r ∈ C (T)}
= C ({〈t, kiwil〉 : t ∈ T})
= C (H ({〈t, kiwil〉 : t ∈ T})) (2.3.8)
so also
H (S (w)) = H ({〈t, kiwil〉 : t ∈ T}) (2.3.9)
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The latter is better to work with as H (S (w)) is approximated numerically as a finite
collection of points, whereas the corresponding solid (S (w)) is, except from some patho-
logical cases8, infinite – even when its hull is finite. We work with the hull of the colour
solid, as it is a unique representation of the solid which is numerically tractable.
2.3.1 Extreme Spectra
Often the colour solid is calculated using a set of so called ‘extreme spectra’ (Logvinenko,
2009; Vorobyev, 2003). I shall call the set of these spectra X(n). A particular extreme
spectrum is parametrised by n − 1 real values, which I will call λi and a binary value
κ ∈ {−1, 1}.
η(λ;λ1 . . . λn−1, κ) def= 12 +
κ
2
n−1∏
i=1
Φ
(
λ− λi) (2.3.10)
where Φ(x) = 1− 2Θ (x) and Θ (·) is the step function defined by:
Θ (x)
def
=
 0, x < 01, otherwise (2.3.11)
The entire set of these is:
X(n)
def
=
{
η(λ;λ1 . . . λn−1, κ) : λi ∈ Λ, λi > λi+1, κ ∈ {−1, 1}} (2.3.12)
λ0 λ1 λ2
λ
0
1
η(
λ
;λ
i
,κ
)
Figure 2.7: An example of an extreme spectrum for a tetrachromat. In this case there are three
step changes, at λ1, λ2 and λ3. Changing κ has the result of reflecting the spectrum through the
line where η = 0.5.
The colour solid for humans can be calculated from the extreme spectra. The two
values of κ define two (n−1)-dimensional surfaces. Such calculations are correct when the
8Only when the hull is a single point is the convex covering finite
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spectral line in the chromaticity space belongs entirely to its convex hull (Luther, 1927;
Nyberg, 1928). When this is not the case, other techniques must be used.
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Figure 2.8: Examples of colour solids calculated with three different methods. The extreme
spectrum method produces a concave shape. Taking the convex hull remedies this somewhat, but
still does not calculate the exact result.
We can see the deficiency of the extreme spectra method in figure 2.8. In this simple
case, the actual colour solid extends far beyond the boundary as calculated using the ex-
treme spectra. This can be problematic in two ways, firstly the resulting solid formed by
extreme spectra calculations may not be convex, leading to problems for any result that
requires convexity. Secondly, the extreme spectrum method works best when the sensitiv-
ity functions are uni-modal, so if this method is used to compare uni-modal sensitivities
with non-uni-modal sensitivities a distorted comparison is made. This is a problem in the
comparative work, such as Vorobyev (2003), where the presence of pigmented oil droplets
causes the spectra to narrow, causing an increase in the volume of the colour solid (used
as a measure of the ‘number of colours that can be distinguished’), but also an accom-
panying decrease in the underestimate of made by the extreme spectrum method. It is a
systematic error which overestimates the value of filtering. Thus, we can be certain that
the numerical results of Vorobyev (2003) are an overestimate of the benefit (in terms of
discrimination) of coloured oil droplets.
The numerical calculation of the full colour solid without resorting to extreme spectra
or linear programming can be found in appendix E.3.
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2.3.2 Symmetry
The colour solid has a point of reflectional symmetry at (12 ,
1
2 · · · ). This is due to the
symmetry of the set of reflectances it projects from. We can see this by first noting that
the set of reflectance spectra R has the following property:9
∀s ∈ R∞ : 12 + s ∈ R ⇐⇒ 12 − s ∈ R (2.3.13)
i.e. if we conceptualise a hypercube representing R, it is centrally symmetric around
(12 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 · · · ).
The symmetry of the colour solid motivates a parametrisation of it in which the sym-
metry is easily represented.
2.3.3 Metamers Sets and Their Volumes
Because of the projective nature of colour spaces, it is possible for spectra to be different
and be projected onto the same point of a given colour solid. This phenomenon is called
metamerism and has been well studied (see e.g. Wyszecki and Stiles, 2000). Usually
the set of spectra under consideration are reflectance spectra and the colour space is the
colour solid. I wish now to briefly mention a few properties of the colour solid and its
corresponding metameric spectra. I shall consider the properties of [0, 1]n, which is equal
to R in the limit of n→∞.
I would like to introduce some notation. First of all I shall call the (not necessarily
infinite) space of spectra sampled at m points: R = [0, 1]m. The number of cone classes
possessed by an organism is denoted n. The set of all spectra which can produce a colour
q – i.e. the metamer set of R at q – is defined as:
M (w, q) = {s ∈ R : 〈s, w〉 = q} (2.3.14)
This can be related to an intuitive notion of an (m − n)-dimensional volume, V (M). I
take this volume to be given by the Lebesgue measure on Rm−n. Informally, if there are
more spectra in M1 than M2, then V (M1) > V (M2).
Let’s now concentrate on a line, γ, that passes through the centre of symmetry of the
colour solid in the direction of a unit vector v, parametrised by k:
γi(k) = kvi + 12 (2.3.15)
9For each wavelength, if the reflectance takes a value of x ∈ [0, 1] then there is another in R that for
that wavelength has the value 1− x. i.e. x ∈ [0, 1] =⇒ 1− x ∈ [0, 1]
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From the symmetry of the colour solid we have:
M (w, γ(k)) = {12 −m : m ∈M (w, γ(−k))} (2.3.16)
a corollary of which is
V (M (w, γ(k))) = V (M (w, γ(−k))) (2.3.17)
At the centre of symmetry the volume of the metamer set is nonzero:
V (M (w, γ(0))) > 0 (2.3.18)
and at some value of k we go beyond the boundary of the solid and M = ∅. This means
that the volume of metamer set is zero:
∃k : V (M (w, γ(k))) = 0 (2.3.19)
Now, considering three points along the line, where k is equal to −k1, k2 or k1. so that
−k1 ≤ k2 ≤ k1, we define the convex combination
N =
(k2 − k1)m0 + (k1 − k2)m22k1 : ∀m0 ∈M (w, γ(−k1))∀m2 ∈M (w, γ(k1))
 (2.3.20)
which is the same or greater in volume as the two sets it is derived from. We can see this
by considering only a single metamer from one of the sets, say m ∈M (w, γ(k1)), so:
N ′ =
{
(k2 − k1)m0 + (k1 − k2)m
2k1
: ∀m0 ∈M (w, γ(k1))
}
(2.3.21)
and V (N ′) = V (M) as this kind of linear combination of spectra cannot transform unique
spectra to identical ones. However, some convex combinations of spectra in M (w, γ(k1))
and M (w, γ(−k1)) may be the same, but there will always be at least the spectra in N ′.
N must be an improper subset of the ‘actual’ metamer set at k2:
N ⊆M (w, γ(k2)) (2.3.22)
and therefore:
V (N ) ≤ V (M (w, γ(k2)) (2.3.23)
We can restate this in words: given a point in the solid, there is a set N made constructed
from the metamer sets at opposite sides of the solid, which is definitely not bigger than
the metamer set at that point. The set is definitely not bigger than those it is constructed
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from either. The metamer volume is then bigger than that of N and thus bigger than the
two metamer sets from which N was constructed. So,
V (w, γ(k2)) ≥ V (w, γ(k1)) (2.3.24)
Remembering the symmetry of the colour solid around the centre, (12 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 . . .), we can
infer that the centre is the point where the volume is largest. This is true no matter what
the functions wi happen to be.
This result can be easily generalised to any linear projection of any set of points that
is closed under convexity, but I will not go down that route here.
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Figure 2.9: Monte-Carlo Sampling of R for a dichromat with A1 type pigments (Stavenga et al.,
1993) under spectrally uniform illumination. λmax values for SWS and LWS sensitive cones are
450nm and 580nm respectively.
2.3.4 The Interpretation of Metamer Set Volumes
Clearly, not every spectrum in [0, 1]∞, or indeed [0, 1]m, exists in the real world. This
would seem to be a problem for the application of the theory above. I will go into the
details of this in chapter 6. For now though, let us consider what it is that was shown
in the previous section. The proof works by taking a process - convex combination - and
showing how the geometric structure is induced by it. Although it is possible to think of
the spectra existing as actual spectra, a more useful conception is of them as possibilities.
Let me unpack this a little. If I am presented with a colour from the middle of the colour
solid, there are many possible ways of using the process of mixing (convex combination)
to achieve that colour. If I choose a colour exactly at the edge of the colour solid, then
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there is no way I can mix other colours to achieve it. In other words, I do not claim
that the volumes of metamer sets of [0, 1]m should be interpreted as statistical features of
natural scenes (though there is some correspondence which can be seen in Nascimento et al.
2002), but as a model that corresponds, at least qualitatively, to the number of physical
explanations for a given colour. As I have indicated, I will present a fuller argument in
chapter 6.
2.4 Comparative Colour Solids
Using the geometry of colour solids it is possible to analyse the relationship between the
perceptual spaces of different organisms. This allows us to come up with general rules
about comparative colour vision and motivates a class of coordinate systems that are
particularly relevant to such studies. With the argument here, for any point in the colour
solid of one organism we can find a convex volume in the other organisms colour solid that
must contain the colour of the underlying spectrum. The concepts I use here are formally
the same as those used in the study of metamerism. However, the study of metamerism
is usually concerned with the occurrence of spectra in nature that don’t produce the
same colours to humans under different illuminations (Alsam and Finlayson, 2007; Feng
and Foster, 2012; Finlayson and Morovic, 2004; Ohta and Wyszecki, 1975; Trussell, 1991),
whereas here I am concerned with the a priori relationship between observers with different
photoreceptor classes.
The question I ask here is “what does the colour for one organism tell me about the
colour for another”.
2.4.1 The Monochromatic Case
I will begin with the comparison of two monochromats. As we find with many multidi-
mensional problems it is easier to begin with the one dimensional case and work up. For
this problem, it is the only case that it is simple to visualise.
We begin by noting that for two monochromats we can construct a two dimensional
colour solid as if the observer’s individual photoreceptor types belonged to the same ob-
server. This is perfectly a valid thing to do as a colour solid is, essentially, a diagram that
shows where there is a spectrum that fulfils the constraints of yielding a given quantum
catch in each photoreceptor class. Similarly, we can ask if
Let us call the quantum catch for one observer a and the other b. Then for a colour a,
we can find an interval in [b1, b2] where there is spectrum that corresponds to both a and
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Figure 2.10: The ability to predict the colour for one (green) organism from that of another (red)
is related to the colourfulness and the similarity of the photoreceptor functions. Similarity between
photoreceptors (the inner product between the two would be a suitable measure for this) narrows
the colour solid, which is always broadest at 12 .
b ∈ [b1, b2], this is shown in in figure 2.10. The size of the interval is a measure of how well
we can predict b from a. As the colour solid is convex, with reflection symmetry about
the point (12 ,
1
2) and contains the points (0, 0) and (1, 1) we can show that it is broadest
at a = 12 . If, for the two dimensional solid we take a = f(b) to be the upper bounding
curve (where a ≥ b) then the width, w(a), of the interval [b1, b2] at a is given by:
b1 = f(a)
b2 = 1− f(1− a)
w(a) = b2 − b1 = f(a) + f(1− a)− 1 (2.4.1)
We can express the convexity of the solid as
kf(x) + (1− k)f(y) ≤ f(kx+ (1− k)y) (2.4.2)
Taking k = 12 we have
1
2(f(x) + f(y)) ≤ f
(
1
2(x+ y)
)
(2.4.3)
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and looking at the points where x = a and y = 1− a we get:
f(a) + f(1− a) ≤ 2f(12)
w(a) + 1 ≤ w(12)+ 1
w(a) ≤ w(12) (2.4.4)
demonstrating the interval is indeed widest at a = 12 .
More generally, we can take a new parametrisation where a = β + 12 for a ≥ 12 and
show that for ∆β ≥ 0 that:
w
(
1
2 + β + ∆β
) ≤ w(12 + β) (2.4.5)
Firstly we note that 12 +β and
1
2−β are convex combinations of 12 +β+∆β and 12−β−∆β.
So we can write:
1
2 − β = k1
(
1
2 + β + ∆β
)
+ (1− k1)
(
1
2 − β −∆β
)
k1 =
β + 12∆β
β + ∆β
(2.4.6)
1
2 + β = k2
(
1
2 + β + ∆β
)
+ (1− k2)
(
1
2 − β −∆β
)
k2 =
1
2∆β
β + ∆β
(2.4.7)
this relies on the positivity of ∆β. Then from equation 2.4.2 we can write:
w
(
1
2 + β
)
+ 1 = f
(
1
2 + β
)
+ f
(
1
2 − β
)
≥ k1f
(
1
2 + β + ∆β
)
+ (1− k1)f
(
1
2 − β −∆β
)
+ k2f
(
1
2 + β + ∆β
)
+ (1− k2)f
(
1
2 − β −∆β
)
(2.4.8)
It is easy to see that k1 + k2 = 1 so:
w
(
1
2 + β
)
+ 1 ≥ f(12 + β + ∆β)+ f(12 − β −∆β)
= w
(
1
2 + β + ∆β
)
+ 1 (2.4.9)
and
w
(
1
2 + β
) ≥ w(12 + β + ∆β) (2.4.10)
as required. So, for one monochromat, the ability to predict the colour for a different
monochromat increases with distance from 12 .
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2.4.2 Polychromatic Cases
We have a very similar situation for dichromats, trichromats and n-chromats in general.
We simply make a 2n-dimensional colour solid, and cut it with an n dimensional hyperplane
the corresponds to a fixed colour for one observer, leaving a n-volume in the solid of the
other. Indeed, there is no reason why we cannot use observers with different numbers of
photoreceptor classes.
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1
Figure 2.11: The relationship between the colour solids of two dichromats. The curves at the
top correspond to the response curve of each photoreceptor class, with the set of red curves cor-
responding to one organism and green to another. The colour solids at the bottom are coloured
correspondingly. We see that in this case each point in one space corresponds to an area in the
other. I have chosen to display three points, one which is almost black, one which is grey and one
which is very colourful. Like in figure 2.10, it is clear that the distance from the centre of a point
in one solid is an indication of the size of the area to which it corresponds in the other.
We can see in figure 2.11 that again, that colours lying in the centre of the colour solid
of one observer are the worst at predicting the colour for another.10 Generally, the further
10I do not provide a proof of this like in the monochromatic case, the proof should be basically the same
but more lengthy.
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one gets to the edge of the solid, the more sure we can be about the location of the colour
in another observers colour solid. If we had not demonstrated that the extreme colours,
X(n), did not necessarily lie on the surface of the colour solid, then one might be led to
believe that there was a bijective mapping from all the points on the surface of one colour
solid, to those on another. This is not true, the only determined mapping points that we
can be completely sure of without knowing the details of the photoreceptor responses are
those of black and white.
2.4.3 Summary of Comparing Colour Solids
Essentially, the size of the metamer set places a restriction on the predictive power from
one observer’s colour to another’s. When the metamer set is big, it is difficult to make
predictions, when it is small, it is easy. As there are ‘more’ metamers near the center of
the colour solid, the colours near the middle of the solid provide less predictive power.
As I have said before, there are no direct biological consequences of this. However, if
we view this in terms of the number of processes that can provide mixtures (instead of
spectra that can be combined) we do obtain something biologically relevant. Indeed, I
have phrased this section in terms of prediction in an idealised system, this only serves
to highlight the stucture of the solid and it’s relationship with convexity – namely, that
convex combinations provide a means to establish a natural notion of colourfulness, as a
distance from the centre of the colour solid.
2.5 Colourfulness
The discussion so far motivates a coordinate system for the object colour system. In the
human case it is equivalent to that of Logvinenko (2009), although his motivations are
very different.11
2.5.1 Definition
There are four quantification of colourfulness that I would like to define here. They are all
simple geometric distances, all of them very similar to each other. They differ in whether
they a distances measured from the centre of symmetry or from the line between the black
and white points, and, whether or not they are corrected so that they are unity at the
boundary of the colour solid.
11His aim was to use extreme spectra for a spectral description of colours, something which is impossible
in the general (i.e. not human) case, as I have discussed.
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They have the general form (I use bold type to denote vectors):
J(q)
def
=
‖ q− g(q) ‖
f(q)
(2.5.1)
where f and g are specific to the particular quantity (see table 2.1).
Colourfulness Symbol f(q) g(q)
Spherical JR 1
1
2
Cylindrical JC 1 1 〈1,q〉
Corrected Spherical J¯R h(q− 12 , 12) 12
Corrected Cylindrical J¯C h(1 〈1,q〉 − q, 1 〈1,q〉) 1 〈1,q〉
Table 2.1: The functions f and g for different quantifications of colourfulness. Here I assume that
the one vector is normalised, i.e. ‖ 1 ‖ = 1.
I define the function h so that for an n chromat:
h(a,b)
def
= sup
{
k : a +
k(b− a)
‖ b− a ‖ ∈ S(w)
}
(2.5.2)
In words, h(a, b) finds the distance to the furthest point on the colour solid in direction of
a from point b.
The two uncorrected quantities are simply the euclidean distance from the centre of
the colour solid, in the case of the spherical colourfulness JR, and the euclidean distance
in the null space of the one-vector in the case of cylindrical colourfulness JC .
Details of Figure 2.12
The colour solid is formed by the n− 1 dimensional surfaces (in 2D – curves) labelled Ψ
and Ω. It lies within the unit n-cube (a square) OSWL. O, the black point and origin,
lies at one tip of the solid and W , the white point, at the other. G, the grey point and
centre of symmetry lies half way between O and W and is the centre of the (n− 1)-sphere
(circle) circumscribing O, S, W , L and I. This sphere is the locus of all points with
spherical colourfulness equal to the maximum (whether physically achievable or not). An
(n−1), 1-cylinder (square) shown as wxyz inscribes the sphere (circle) so that the black
and white points are at the the centre of the capping (n − 2)-spheres (line segments wx
and yz). The sides of the cylinder lie on the locus of points with cylindrical colourfulness
equal to the maximum for any visual system. These sides (in 2D, line segments xy and
zw) are tangent to the sphere halfway between the cylinders caps (here, at L and S).
The spherical colourfulness of the point Q is given by the length of the line GQ – The
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Figure 2.12: Schematic of the calculation of various quanifications of colourfulness for a quantum
catch specified by Q for a dichromat (n = 2). See text body for details.
euclidean distance from the centre to Q. The corrected spherical colourfulness is calculated
by finding the intersection of the spherical ray that passes through Q (GI) with the colour
solids boundaries. In this case it is the intersection of GI with Ω at H. To correct the
colourfulness we simply divide by the length of GH to get J¯R =
∣∣GI∣∣/∣∣GH∣∣. Similarly, we
calculate the cylindrical colourfulness as the length of the line through Q, which also passes
through the line OW perpendicularly. This happens at A, so the spherical colourfulness is
given by the length of the line AH – the correction factor is 1/
∣∣AB∣∣. The function h(a, b)
in the text is defined to find points lying on the colour solid. In terms of this function we
calculate H as h(
−−→
GH,
−−→
OG) and B as h(
−−→
AH,
−→
OA). Note: High dimensional cylinders are
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classified by dimension of their capping spheres and the dimension of their sides, formally
the unit a,b-cylinder is given by the Cartesian product Sa × [0, 1]b – a is the number of
sphere like dimensions and b is the number of cube like dimensions.
2.5.2 Hue, Saturation and Lightness
Colourfulness (in both the cylindrical and spherical systems) can be naturally identified
with the more established notion of ‘saturation’. Saturation, when taken as a proxy for
colourfulness, has an interpretation in terms of the number of spectra12 that can produce
a colour, and for similar reasons, the ability to predict the location of colours for one
observer from another.
For value, we naturally have an axis lying between black and white, similar to the
‘lightness’ axis of RGB devices. Such an axis exists for all observers. The spectra given
by s(λ) = k, k ∈ [0, 1] always lie along this line. However, when we are talking about the
world an animal experiences, we would like to not have to refer to spectra at all. Probably
the best interpretation of this axis is as the convex combinations of black and white.
For human colour vision this just leaves the hue. The remaining dimensions of colour
solids have no easy generalisation. It seems it is just the remaining coordinate that ‘falls
out’ when we identify lightness and saturation. The properties I have discussed so far,
then, provide the basis for a naturalisation of the hue, saturation and value axes used in
many human colour systems (they are defined e.g. CIE, 1931, 1976), although, as I have
already indicated, this naturalisation is not complete until a behavioural role is explicated.
I will do this in later chapters.
2.6 Summary
The discussion in this chapter has been about the gross geometry of colour spaces –
which colours are next to others and which ones are not next others – which colours are
possible and which are not. We know for example, that black or white objects will fall
in exactly the same relation to other colours for all observers. We also know our ability
to perceive relationships between other colours as seen by other animals is dependant on
how colourful we perceive that colour to be. I am often asked about whether some bright
coloured biological signal can be seen by other animals - clearly the answer is almost
certainly yes. Nonetheless, it seems that people still consider it reasonable to think that
12or physical processes.
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we need strong evidence to assert that a signal is obvious to another animal (Penney et al.,
2012), but the chances are, if a signal is colourful to us it is colourful to the animal too.
Colour spaces display the relationship between different colours in geometric form and
it is always the relationship between colours we care about. But, in this chapter I have
not really discussed how we measure distances between colours. It is quite reasonable
to say that I have only discussed which colours are allowed to exist given physical and
physiological constraints. The involved subject of measuring distances between colours,
from it’s philosophical basis to application, will be covered in chapters 3, 4 and 5.
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Part II
Colour and Measurement
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Chapter 3
Measuring Living Things
“Man is the measure of all things”
Protagoras, 420 BC
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the philosophical grounding for the models
which I develop later in this thesis. The argument I present is founded on the idea that to
identify an organism to identify a agent - an subject that we consider justified in treating
as animate: one for which beliefs and desires lead to actions. I will go on from this
premise to discuss information theoretic measures in this context, with the ultimate goal
of elucidating the foundations upon which the application of information theory to colour
is, or at least should be, based.
The argument I am about to present is aimed at justifying the more formal theories
in later chapters. Without a grounding in a more general theory, the decisions made
in the derivation would be rather arbitrary. Importantly, the aim of this chapter is to
lay the foundation for the theory of risk, and emphasise the importance of using relative
measures (divergences) as opposed to ‘absolute’ measures such as entropy. This requires
us to discuss the meaning of these terms, and for that, we must first discuss measurement.
Measurement is dependant on the methodology of measurement, and the choice of
methodology is far from uniquely defined. Importantly, in probability theory, the set of
possibilities, the ontology or the support, is a limitation on our objectivity as it can only
be obtained by a judgement that can be at best held up to empirical observation, but
never truly specified.
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3.1 Perception, Behaviour and Purpose
Phrases like ‘perceptually uniform’ and ‘perceptual space’ are commonplace in psychophys-
ical discourse, and the idea that a colour space is a perceptual model (in the sense of
describing ‘internal’ appearance or psychological phenomena) is widespread. However, my
concern here is not with perception, but behaviour – or more precisely, perception only
to the extent that it is behaviourally observable within the constraints of a well defined
experiment.
Though there are common limits to behaviour and to perception, the two are not the
same. Perception contains objects and qualities which can never, in their totality, manifest
as quantifiable behaviour. My perception of some detail may never have behaviourally
observable consequences, at least not to the point of deduction, by another, of the entirety
of that perception. I might be placed in a situation where I have a choice of doing one thing
or another based on a judgement about something’s appearance, but given the datum of
my choice (or any data that one cares to measure), using it to reconstruct my perceptions
over the duration of my judgement would be impossible. Similarly, there can be behaviours
that are not fully part of perception. I may behave in some way that I am not aware of -
tapping a foot or stroking my beard: I might perceive a consequence of this or that action,
or deduce post hoc some aspect of it from my current perception, but this is not the same
as being directly aware of it. In any case, even were it necessary for my action to enter my
perception partially, it is certainly possible (if not necessary) for it not to in its totality.
This hints at how I wish to differentiate between perception and behaviour; the former
is a first-person view, the latter a third-person view. Theories of perception concern what
is immediately present to me or to others, but theories of behaviour are concerned with
how others appear to me or to others.
A behavioural theory relies on our ability to identify agents and their actions, it does
not tell us how to do so. Indeed, the field of ethology has proceeded without any great
need to define what an organism is (Queller and Strassmann, 2009, for a recent attempt)
– agents and their actions are apparent to us and it is from this ‘given’ that organisms
are identified and behavioural theory is formed. A behavioural theory relies on perception
and the ‘standing out’1 of organisms against the rest of the world. Whatever the criteria
or mechanism for this judgement is deemed to be, the meaning of doing so is clear: By
recognising something as an organism we are recognising that it acts with its own goals
1or ek-stace as used by Merleau-Ponty (1945, p100).
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and with its own understanding of the world.
It is action for a purpose, be it teleological or teleonomical2 in nature, that separates
organisms from non-organisms and behaving from mere happening. A behavioural model
then, treats organisms as agents with goals and beliefs, where actions are decided by the
expectations of costs or benefits as shaped by an understanding of how outcomes may be
achieved.
3.1.1 A Technical Note on Agency, Organisms and Genes
At this point I should clarify one aspect of my stance on the nature of the goals and beliefs
of the organisms. For the purposes here, beliefs and desires need not be considered as more
than things that we impose upon the world around us, be it voluntarily or otherwise.
However, I am not agnostic towards the general use of agency. Far from it. When faced
with even the simplest of cells, a physical-chemical approach becomes impossible as a
living cell, like the ship of Theseus, is in a constant state of flux. The cell is not defined
by atoms, or by chemical interactions, but by macroscopic properties; namely those that
correspond to our judgement of it as a freely acting entity. Indeed, this principle lies in
the origin of the word ‘organism’ itself: cognate with ‘organ’, it stems from the concept
of a (usually) physical entity that communicates on behalf of another physical or non-
physical entity (e.g. A pipe organ is the physical means by by which the non-physical
component of music is communicated). As such, an organism is the physical counterpart,
the “material structure”, of a biological agency (OED, 2012). It is also worth noting
that none of these words are cognate with ‘order’, despite the similarities of their modern
interpretation (ibid.).
It is all well and good to say that what I’m describing here is a concept of the organism
that follows the spirit of the original term, but this is no argument for its correctness. For
now, I will simply say that the description I have given is sufficient to define an organism
for the purposes of this thesis, and, that I will be happy to resign my argument when or
if someone provides me with a physical, mechanistic description of an organism.
Organisms as described here share some common ground with those of Dawkins (1976,
1982) in the sense that when we see an organism, we are seeing it as, or resulting from,
goal directed action. For Dawkins, the only viable goal is maximising inclusive fitness as
described by natural selection. I approach this more ecumenically, the goal may be what-
ever one chooses as long as it can be justified. A gene centred justification can be perfectly
2Teleology is purpose in reality, teleonomy is ‘as if’ for a purpose - see Bedau (1991); Weber and Varela
(2002) for a pro-teleological accounts, or Reese (1994) for the contrary
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fine, but so can those justifications that do not mention genes at all. Fundamentally, the
difference lies in an approach to science, a strict gene centred approach suggests that one
can and should eliminate this kind of judgement from scientific enquiry, where as I think
that such an endeavour is impossible.
3.2 Introducing the Formal Tools
Now I shall proceed by describing the formal tools that I am using, as well as providing
justification for using them. To mathematicians this may seem to be an overly verbose
description of a fairly simple formal theory that would be found in a sufficiently detailed
book on probability theory. For those more verbally inclined it may seem like long and
overly formal description of some common sense principles. However, seen as intended it
is a description of the correspondence between the mathematical formalisms of probability
theory and some very general concepts that underlie all of scientific investigation. This
understanding is necessary if we are to be clear about exactly what is measured and
predicted.
3.2.1 Identity and Equivalence
The notions of identity and equivalence a fundamental to probabilist and informational
measurements, as these will eventually become part of the theory, these foundational
notion requires some attention. The famous Gibbs paradox highlights how calculation
thermodynamic entropy is dependent on what we consider to be the same or different (in
thermodynamic terms, indistinguishable) a problem which is far more profound when the
idea of entropy is taken away from its original context. Furthermore, concepts pertaining
sameness and difference are fundamental to the concept of number (Husserl, 1891) and
thus, are present in the very tools foundation of measurement. The formal languages of
mathematics are abstractions from based upon these ideas (ibid.). I shall start with the
concept of identity - the idea that two things are exactly the same.
It is tempting to think that it is possible for two objects to be identical, at least in
theory, for it happens in mathematics all the time. For example, one might consider two
hypothetical apples, both internally identical so that for every molecule in one there is a
corresponding molecule in the other. The two are chemically identical; each constituent
molecule them standing in the same relation with every other constituent molecule. Thus,
one may wish claim that there is no difference between the two. Of course you would
be right if position and orientation in space were ignored. But being able to reference
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their spatial location relative to each other allows us to distinguish them, indeed, it does
distinguish them. If it was impossible to do even this, then one could not reasonably
claim that the apples were different things, nor could one claim that there were two of
them in the first place. This highlights the difference between equivalence and identity:
equivalence is the claim that there are two different things but we are unable to distinguish
them by some or other measurement, and identity is the claim that actually there is just
one thing. In the case of the two apples, they are equivalent if we ignore spatial difference
and are aware that we are ignoring it, they are equal if either they exist in the same
position space, or, if we ignore, consciously or otherwise, the possibility that they may
differ in their location.
Let us make this more concrete with an example from the history of science. Before
the 1820s, it was thought that all molecules could be completely described by the number
and type of atoms within them, chemical species were identical when they had the same
constitution as determined by quantitative techniques such as titration3 and gravimetry4.
In the 1820s a German chemist named Friedrich Wo¨hler synthesised a compound known
as silver cyanate, on analysis of this he discovered it had the same formula as another
molecule, silver fulminate, which had been synthesised by another German chemist, Jus-
tus Liebig. As the understanding at this time was that species with the same chemical
composition were equal, so, when it was observed that these two substances behaved dif-
ferently (unlike silver cyanate, silver fulminate explodes) there was confusion and hostility
between the two chemists (Esteban et al., 2008). The situation was resolved with Jo¨ns
Jacob Berzelius’ concept of isomers (literally same-parts-ers), in which he suggested that
the atoms could be joined up in different orders (ibid.). Through this development, what
was once an identity became an equivalence - conceptually, every molecular species differ-
entiated into the permutations of its atoms, the unity of the chemical composition became
manifold.
This happens again and again in science. With new measurements comes new differ-
ences, and it is not surprising that isomers were not the end of the story. Now, in the days
of structural biology, it is not even the order that the atoms within the molecule that are
of greatest concern, but their overall shape. But of course, this is just a newer way for
something to be different, an there are yet new ways of finding finer differences still.
All I wish you to take away from this is that equivalence is just an identity that has
been shown to be false, and that in all likelihood, equivalence is the fate of all equalities.
3Analysis of volumes and concentrations.
4Analysis of mass.
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Silver
Cyanate
Silver
Fulminate
Figure 3.1: No longer equal, but compositionally equivalent. Left: Silver fulminate (AgCNO).
Right: Silver cyanate (AgOCN). Red – oxygen, Blue – nitrogen, Grey – carbon, Silver – silver. The
molecular bond lengths and angles are calculated with a molecular dynamics energy minimisation
(universal force field) and may not completely correlate with those determined crystalographically
or using more detailed simulations
3.2.2 Pragmatism
But we cannot work in a world where everything is differentiated into an infinity of possi-
bilities, nor do we want to. Even knowing that a coiled spring can be described in terms
of subatomic particles doesn’t mean that this is the correct way of thinking about it. And
it’s certainly not the most practical mode of description: it wouldn’t help me design a
car’s suspension system! For this, its possible that Hooke’s law will suffice, failing that a
non-linear model, or continuum mechanics, etc. Practical application requires parsimony,
but moreover, it’s quite possible that parsimony is as good as it will ever get.
If we do not (or cannot) choose to describe the infinite variety of the world, at what
point should we draw the line with our finite one. Which formalism should we choose?
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Should it come from principles, or from intuition?
Indeed, what I am expressing is a central thesis in pragmatism, often stated as Peirce’s
Pragmatic Maxim (Peirce, 1878):
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of
our conception of the object.
Not only are we required to make assumptions about the latent composition of things
to make sense of our measurements (Lewis, 1952) but we should embrace, or at least be
conscious of, this need when approaching study of them.
Any quantitative theory has at its core a set of atomic components that are not identical
by definition. In the example above, before the theory of isomers chemists worked with a
set of components that could be enumerated as ratios of elements, each of these element
ratios were not only bound by equivalence but identity – at the time they were considered
to be all there was to know about the composition of a chemical species. Any chemical
species could be represented by a member of the set {XYaZb . . . ; a, b . . . ∈ Q0/+} where
each X,Y, Z . . . was some known or unknown element. At that time, if I synthesised some
chemical, it was assumed to be exactly one of these. This kind of set – a set that contains
all the different allowable possibilities for something to be – I shall call ‘the ontology’
for now. Later on I shall give it the more conventional name of ‘the support’.5 It is the
enumeration of the ways of being (Greek: ὄντος, ontos). In physics, in particular statistical
mechanics, a way something can be is called a ‘state’. Using my wording, in the example
above we would say: after discovering the possibility of isomers, a new ontology emerged
– one that accounted for the new observed differences.
5It seems that this term has some root in the philosophy of Leibniz, where the support is similar to the
Aristotelian concept of substance: something that exists and has properties (Broackes, 2006).
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Formalisation
The formalisation begins with a set of atomic possibilities X , the support, or
ontology. This set may be finite or infinitea. Each element of the set is mutually
exclusive, or, in other words, different and distinct.
We also require a way of addressing these possibilities. To do this, we introduce
coordinates and/or indexing. I will use xi to denote a continuous coordinate
belonging to a coordinate system X = (x1 . . . xn), so that each point in the
coordinate system corresponds to a different mutually exclusive possibility. If
there are discrete possibilities I will just use labels, although I will use indices
such as i, j or k when it is efficient to do so (such as describing a set of N discrete
possibilities by {xi | i ∈ {1 . . . N}}).
aBut it must be measurable – more on this later.
The Ontology and Measurement
The question arises of why we should need to decide on an ontology at all, especially given
the vanishing chance that it is absolutely correct.
In a sense we do not. We can always acknowledge the fact that our picture is incomplete
and doing so does not by necessity affect our understanding. However, it does affect one
thing that is of utmost importance to scientific understanding: quantification. I will
demonstrate this by comparing two chemical theories, one is very well established and
practical, the other is designed for this explanation and of little practical value beyond it.
Later, we will see this phenomenon is a stumbling block in the measurement of entropy.
The 19th century chemistry was a time before the widespread acceptance of the con-
cept of atomic mass. Often, all that was considered was the ratios of elements. For
example, ethene and cyclobutane have the same elemental ratio, two hydrogen atoms for
each carbon – written using the empirical formula CH2. These days, we would describe
these two chemicals with different molecular formulae, C2H4 and C4H8 respectively (or
even represent them schematically). We would know that in one gram of ethene there is
twice as many molecules than in one gram of cyclobutane. Once we establish a constant
(Avogadro’s constant, NA) and choose weights for each type of atom, we can put an actual
number on it6- there is approximately 2× 1022 molecules in a gram of ethene and 1× 1022
6The calculation is N = mNA
nHmH+nC+mC
, where N is the number of atoms in mass m, NA is a constant
equal to 6.022× 1023, nH and nC are respectively the number of hydrogen or carbon atoms in a molecule
64
in a gram of cyclobutane.
But let us imagine that we didn’t know how to do this and simply thought the empirical
formula was sufficient. This doesn’t prevent us from making some kind of molecular theory.
Let us do this now. Instead of molecules, lets say that a mass of chemical is composed of
something else: polecules. Each polecule has an integer numbers of each type of component
atom, but unlike molecules, polecules contain the only minimal number of atoms required
to achieve this, thus C2H4 and C4H8 refer to the same type of polecule: CH2. We can
say how many polecules are are in a given mass of a given chemical, just as we can
with molecules. There is some physical significance to polecules too, we could identify
individual polecules within a mass to the same extent that we can molecules. Ethene is
a pair of polecules and cyclobutane a quartet. The molecular and polecular descriptions
are both valid within certain constraints; in a world where only the relative proportion of
elements matters there is no difference between them at all. Outside of this domain of the
experimental techniques of pre-19th century chemists the two are of course very different7,
indeed, despite a physical correspondence, polecules have proven far less useful, far less
illuminating, providing far less resolution of the world the attempt to explain.
More formally, every molecular formula of the form XnYanZbn . . . (for integer n) is
mapped to an empirical (polecular) formula of the form XYaZb . . .. Effectively, we are
still measuring the same physical thing, only we are choosing to multiply the empirical
formula by n. The mapping from molecules to polecules is many-to-one, reflected in the
limited applicability of empirical formulae when compared to molecular formula. These
two measures of a pure substance are exactly the same except for a difference in the on-
tology, to find the number of molecules/polecules we perform exactly the same procedure.
Firstly we find relative mass corresponding to the formula, then we divide our mass by
this number and multiply it by Avogadro’s constant. There is no difference in how we
measure, nor in the physical substance that we are measuring, the only difference to be
found is in what we are measuring it in terms of.
In this case it is fairly obvious the polecules and molecules are different things, but as
we will see, such differences become obfuscated in the language of information theory. The
difference between molecules and polecules is easy to keep in mind – they have different
names – but in information theory, everything is measured in bits.8 The word bit hides a
and mH and mC the relative atomic masses of one of those atoms (a mass per NA atoms quantity).
7They may be different, but they can be related to each other: the number of polecules in a pure
substance is always a strictly positive integer multiple of the number of molecules.
8Bits, or multiples thereof: e.g. nats (or decibels Jaynes, 1994).
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gross difference between informational measures and provides a false sense of generality.
To observe consequences of our choice of ontology, we must show how it results in a
measurement that can correspond to some real world phenomenon. In the hypothetical
case I just described, the physical meaning of either molecules or polecules requires adding
a way of getting a measurement from the ontology – in this case in the form of amount
of molecules/polecules. We could then go on to test this against some other, physical,
measurement of the number of molecules/polecules, such as reactions that only proceed
on a single molecule. If we had an ontology that corresponded to the collection of points
found along the edge of a ruler we would need to define how to take one of those points
and turn it into a distance. Informally, a sensible way of doing so might be ‘counting’ how
many points there were between that one and which ever one we call zero.
So, not only do we need to state those things that we are considering, but also we need
to state how those things should determine or relate to the measured, observable world.
Before we define a way of measuring things our ontology is intangible – we merely have a
collection of things without meaning. The (abstract) measurement of the members of the
ontology enables (physical) measurement and defines the mode by which any ontology is
validated or invalidated.
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Formalisation
Sigma Algebras. Before talking about belief and knowledge, I will quickly ex-
plain the established underlying formalism. The use of σ-algebras allows us to
talk about events – not just the different elements of the ontology, but combina-
tions that might not be mutually exclusive.
Measure theory begins with the ontology (support) and on top of adds a list of
the combinations of those things about which a measurement can be made, the
measurement may be something tangible, like a volume, or something else, like a
probability. This is called the σ-algebra, Σ (see footnotea). We generally require
the sigma algebra to reflect valid statements in a reduced classical logic (again, see
footnote) – one where we do not have implication as such. Σ contains only subsets
of X , ∀E ∈ Σ : E ⊆ X . Then we define, when it is possible, a function µ that
assigns a positive real number: µ : Σ→ R0/+. This happens quite naturally (but
not uniquely) for the ruler example, in such a case, µ is known as the Lebesgue
measure, and corresponds to our usual notions of distance (as well as area and
volume in higher dimensions). This kind of formulation will be needed if we wish
to consider ontologies which are described using continuous variables.
In the next section I will describe how beliefs are usually formalized in this frame-
work.
aOften we can assume that the σ-algebra is the power set of X : Σ = 2X , but this is not
true by necessity. Allowable σ algebras are given by the axioms: (a) Non-emptiness: Σ 6= ∅,
(b) Closure under (countable) union: E1, E2...En ∈ Σ =⇒
(⋃i=n
i=1 Ei
)
∈ Σ (c) Closure under
complement: E ∈ Σ =⇒ (X \E) ∈ Σ. In probability theory, these correspond (approximately)
to: (a) A requirement for at least one possibility and it’s negation. (b) The necessary validity
of asking ‘p OR q’ for any valid p and q. (c) The necessary validity of ‘NOT p’ for any valid p
3.2.3 Belief and Knowledge
Knowledge endows its possessor with the ability to act with finesse. For this reason it is
a tangible subject of scientific enquiry. One would be hard pushed to say that given the
observation of someone riding a bike, that they do not know how to ride a bike. But,
we cannot talk about knowledge without talking about the related concept of belief and
drawing a distinction between the two.
One of the earliest distinctions was made by Plato (Jowett, 1871), often translated as
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“knowledge is true belief”.9 Explicating the general meaning of ‘true’ is far too difficult an
exercise for the purposes here, so I shall not use Plato’s statement “as is”. Nonetheless,
it’s a good starting point – knowledge is indeed a type of belief that can be shown to be
‘correct’ according some chosen criteria. I shall make no claims as to whether one should
consider this correctness as truth in any sense.
The concept of an agent provides us with a good platform for investigating this. If
we are consider something as an agent on the basis of rational action towards – or as if
towards10 – some goal, then we already have a good candidate for what could be taken to
be meant by truth in Plato’s canon. Knowledge can be measured by the ability to achieve
a goal, as long as that goal is desirable; On being given a desired goal we are able to judge
the efficacy of a belief to that end, and in doing so we are treating that belief as knowledge
about achieving it. Plato’s canon should perhaps be “knowledge is useful belief”.
Without the assumption of some goal, belief would be without behavioural consequence
and it would be impossible to quantify it. For example, one would not trust someone to be
honest if it was clear that they had either motivation not to be, or lacked such motivation
entirely. Effective communication of belief requires the person being informed of it to
recognise in the one informing them a motivation that would reveal their true belief. It is
probably worth noting that it is exceedingly rare for us to consider any organism as having
a complete lack of motivation towards some goal or other – such a lack is incongruous with
our intuitions about agency.
Given what I have said so far, we might consider modifying Plato’s cannon further to
refer to measurable belief.
This all presupposes that we may correctly judge what is and what is not a goal that
the organism desires, a difficulty that all such arguments come up against. This is well
known in biology as it proves to be a major difficulty when discussing adaption (Gould
and Lewontin, 1979) but it is a necessity that stems from our decision to consider agents
as the subject of enquiry (Weber and Varela, 2002). Some goals are more reasonable than
others, for example, staying alive11 is in most cases fairly easy to justify, but the further
away from fundamental needs one moves the more difficult such justification becomes. No
doubt this is reflected by the many varied schools of psychoanalysis. On the other hand,
if we choose to throw out the purposefulness of behaviour we should also throw out the
9Generally it is now stated as “knowledge is justified true belief”, this is completely consistent with
what I will say in the following pages as they describe a way in which a belief can be justified.
10If one chooses to acknowledge this distinction.
11Compare with ‘replicating’ (Dawkins, 1982).
68
concepts of agents and organisms and with them biology, social science, economics and
the entirety of the arts.
To develop our understanding of belief we must first consider the ontology about which
any belief is held. This is probably the most difficult part, as it is very easy to conflate an
agent’s ontology with our own. There are two ways in which one can make this mistake.
First, there is the obvious mistake of assuming that some object that we understand
to exist also exists for some other agent. For example, thinking that cups of coffee, as
such, exist in the world of an ant.
The second way is far more surreptitious and is only usually realised when we recognise
that we have ended up asserting that our knowledge of an organism is accessible to that
organism itself, or in the extreme, that it has direct access to its own physiological state
in its entirety. It is obvious that a person does not have a direct awareness of, or present
behavior that can illuminate, the entire state of neuronal potentials or concentrations
of neuromodulatory molecules, but avoiding such implications proves difficult if we are
going to talk about organisms both as agents and as physical entities, in part comprised
of neurons and neuromodulatory molecules. If we cannot say that an organism makes
decisions directly on the basis of its physiological state we must instead say how we can
use physiology to inform our understanding of goal directed action. If physiological and
behavioural descriptions are not automatically compatible, and we wish to integrate them,
we must say how we can make them compatible.
In the proceeding chapters I will discuss the limitations upon action as informed by
physiology. For example, it is very useful to consider the limitations of discrimination
caused by the indeterminacy of the state of photoreceptor cells (Buchsbaum and Goldstein,
1979a,b; Vorobyev and Osorio, 1998). As the state of a photoreceptor determines the
ability to perform particular tasks it is very tempting to say that an organism holds some
kind of belief about that state. There is a problem with this, but it is not that the
organism does not hold such beliefs! It may or may not. We cannot know beyond what
we choose to test. The problem is instead that, as third person observers of the organism,
the interrogation of these beliefs requires that we measure them against some goal. Unless
the goal the organism desires is to report the exact degree of photoreceptor excitation it
would be an error to take it to be the object of the organisms belief12.
12We should none the less remember that this does not directly exclude the possibility of beliefs being
held about it
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Ratifying Behaviour with Physiology
So how then do we ratify the behavioral with physiological? I shall approach this by
explaining how we do it in practice and argue why this approach is justified.
The first step (of three) is to only consider behaviours in such a way that allows
a comprehensive description: we select aspects of behaviour to be the only things that
matter for our purpose - choosing a collection of behaviours which are reasonably assumed
to be complete. An example of doing this is in two alternative forced choice paradigm
(2AFC), where the organism is only considered as doing one of two things. In this case, it
is not that the experimenter is unaware that the organism behaves with infinite subtlety,
but they are choosing to look at behaviour in a way so that every action of the organism
during a trial must belong to one of two classes.13
We can phrase this step in another way: As scientists we wish to treat the system
as causally determined, but for some reason we have chosen to study something that
we consider not to be – something with freedom to act on its own behalf – something
autonomous. To make this thing something that we can study scientifically we must rid
the thing of it’s autonomy.14 We do this in two ways as, firstly by putting it in a situation
where its actions are physically constrained, i.e. put it in a laboratory setting, secondly,
we course grain the behaviour; choosing to look at it as something with no other actions
than the ones we select. In effect we redefine the rat in a maze so that it is identical to a
‘left-right turning machine’ or a ‘getting-lost-not-getting-lost machine’.
Of course, as I have indicated before, the validity doing this rests on a judgement that
the constrained behaviour in the lab reflects the non-constrained behaviour in the world
at large.
The second step is to control the goals of the agent by either providing sufficient
motivation towards a goal we choose, or by identifying a goal that the organism already
has. I have already discussed the relationship between goals and beliefs above, but I should
once again say that we must make a judgement about whether we can rightly claim that
we know the goal of the organism. We must coerce it.
The third and last step is the one which has important consequences for information
13I should probably point out that when we generalise to situations outside of such paradigms, we are
making the assumption that the goals of the organism in the new situation are suitably aligned with the
goals of the organism in the experimental paradigm.
14Put like this it is hard to ignore the potential for ethical implications of performing even non-invasive
behavioural experiments.
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theoretic interpretations. This step is the constraint of the ontology. Concisely, we must
choose a collection of physiological properties that we take to detail every relevant physical
parameter. We can write this another way:
Assumption: our ontology is sufficient to resolve the beliefs of the organism to
the degree that is observable using our class of behaviours.
This can be seen as simply an application of the the pragmatic maxim.
Under this assumption there are two ways that the ontology of organisms belief may
differ from ours as observers that have no consequence: (a) The organism’s ontology may
be ‘coarser’ than ours; there is a many to one mapping from the states of affairs in our
ontology to that of the organism. In this case we would discover that there are aspects of
our ontology of no consequence for behaviour and we do not need to do anything, except
perhaps reduce our ontology for the sake of parsimony. (b) The subject may hold beliefs
about extraneous states of affairs; about things which we (the experimenters) neither
represent in our ontology nor play a role in determination of the experimental result. This
clearly does not matter.
The making of the above assumption is further justified as it leads to testable conse-
quences in the sense that it is possible to demonstrate that it was used incorrectly. We
can do this by simply extending our ontology and looking at whether it allows us to better
predict behaviour. In other words, we can consider more and more factors, and look in
more and more detail, until we have confidence that we have sufficiently resolved the states
of affairs that lead to a particular behaviour. The limit, where for a particular behaviour
we have assured or assumed that our ontology is sufficiently detailed so that our ability
to predict the behaviour bottoms out, is the psychophysical limit.
It is not just the ontology that we must be careful about projecting onto the organism,
but our beliefs too. In fact, taking a subjective view of probabilities as we must to discuss
beliefs, it is not obvious how we may talk about another agents beliefs at all. Indeed,
we cannot if we take “agents beliefs” in the sense of some objective fact that we are
determining. We must remember that the beliefs we consider the agent to have relate to
the goals and actions we consider it to have. To treat this correctly, we must take the
beliefs of the agent to be anything sufficient action towards the goals with the degree of
skill that we observe. We should then, of course, measure them in a way that corresponds
to this.
By definition, in specifying a non-deterministic relationship between a physical and
another (probably physiological) physical property we are saying that no-one who has
access to only one can have complete knowledge of the other without additional data
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about it. Thus, when we consider an organisms physiological state that is is specified in
this way we are saying that the organism cannot have complete knowledge of some physical
property. This means, that although we are not forbidden to make claims about what an
organism cannot know, they must be justified by a argument for why it is reasonable to
assume the organism cannot obtain data that allows it to know more.
A simple example of such a justification is this. I put a black ball and a white ball
into an opaque bag and shake it around. The colour of the next ball I pull out will be
underdetermined for me. It is then easy to justify that it should be underdetermined for
others too: unless they are in a position to see into the bag and judge which ball I will lay
my hand on first, or track where each ball lies within it, they have the same information
that I do about which ball I will draw. Their knowledge, as judged against their accuracy
of prediction, will be the same as mine.
The same applies to cases such as the modelling of photoreceptors, in this case a
justification can be made based on the greater investigatory power that scientific instru-
mentation provides us with.
To reiterate what I have said:
We know what the organism wants to do and we know what it has done, and, although
we don’t know all the details of the process by which it has chosen a given action we
know all the data that it could have used to make that decision.
Summary of this Section
What I have said so far has an interpretation that I have been avoiding up to now, but
one that is central to this thesis. The interpretation is information theoretic, and what I
have said above can be re-expressed as:
1. Make the organisms behaviour well defined so that it can be measured.
2. Make the physiological parameters well defined so that they can be measured.
3. Define a goal so that we have a clear understanding of what information is required
to achieve it i.e. the information required for particular beliefs to be rationally held.
4. Investigate the physiological limitations of achieving that goal i.e. the information
present to the organism from the physiology.
Expressed in this form, I hope that it is fairly clear. Once the formalisations are
complete I shall explain why this is relevent to information theory and perceptual theory
more generally.
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Formalisation
Belief can be adequately formalised by probability theory. Whilst there are other
formalisations (e.g. fuzzy logic as popularised by Zadeh, 1968), probability theory
has the benefit of fitting with classical conceptions of rational thought. I shall
not argue this here, as the argument has been made by many times before (Cox,
1946, 1961; Jaynes, 1994). Here I review the widely accepted formalisation of
Kolmogorov (1956), which differs to the foundations favoured by some subjective
probabilists, but it is still the most popular and fits with the rest of the formalism
here.
Probability is a particular kind of measure, so, we have already laid down much
of the groundwork. Indeed, we already have a space of things to be measured X
and a list of the combinations of which we can measure Σ. Probability is then
formalised by defining a function µ that takes some measurable combination
of things from Σ and assigns it a number in [0, 1]. So µ : Σ → [0, 1] with
the constraint that the probability of the system not being in any state is zero
µ(∅) = 0, the probability that it is in some state is one µ(X ) = 1 and that for
any disjoint subset of Σ: {Ei} that µ (
⋃
iEi) =
∑
i µ (Ei). This last requirement
is a refined version of requiring that the measure of a set from the σ-algebra, E, is
the sum of the measure of its elements, µ (E) =
∑
xi∈E µ({xi}). We are required
to use a more nuanced definition than this as it does not work when the measure
of the individual elements, µ({xi}), is vanishingly small (as it is when X is used
to represent a continuous variable).
If we assign logical statements to the elements of Σ then we can find correspond-
ing probability statements. For example the probability of A and B, Pr(a, b)
corresponds to µ(A ∩ B); not A, Pr(¬a), to µ(X \ A); A or B, Pr(a ∨ b) to
µ(A ∪B); etc.
Conditionals are slightly more difficult so I shall ignore some details here, specif-
ically the problems concerning conditioning on set x where µ(x) = 0 (see e.g.
Jaynes, 1994, chap 15.7). Essentially though, we simply define the probability of
A given B, Pr(a | b) by using the law of conditional probabilities (Pr(a | b) Pr(b) =
Pr(a, b)) leading to a correspondence of Pr(a | b) with µ(A∩B)/µ(B). Difficulties
associated with µ(B) being zero can be avoided by assuring that in such cases
we are explicitly take some well specified limit (ibid.).
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Now that we have a formalisation of belief. We only need to show the formalism of their
connection to behaviour. This is done using the apparatus of risk. To apply it, we take it
to be true that the organism has the knowledge of how to rationally act in a contingent
manner upon their beliefs about the world. The type of rationality to which I refer is
began with the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) but is now best identified
with the notion of generalised rational expectations. In this case, formally, the problem
becomes a general maximisation problem. We expect that an agent uses some kind of rule
to compare the relative benefits of the various contingent behaviours. This is known as a
decision procedure.
The formal decision procedure is the expression of a goal as an objective (target)
function conditioned on the belief of the agent. This is then maximised according to some
criteria (which can be also thought of as a part of the goal).
The assumption of a well defined goal is nescessary, and can been see as a problem for
this theory. I will discuss this more fully in the later chapters, but there is one sense that
a poorly defined goal can enter the formalism – by having a risk that depends on certainty.
This can be thought of a way of catching the problems associated with ill defined goals –
and as I will discuss in the next chapter, the seed of information theoretic measures.
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Formalisation
Risk: Most generally, we say that a behaviour b from a set of behaviours B = {bi}
is assigned a value the corresponds to how well a goal is achieved, vb. The
behaviour that is enacted is then the one which has the largest vb. There are many
ways of assigning it, generally, it will involve (a) an ontology enumerating the
contingent factors in making the decision X (and Σ) (b) a probability representing
a belief about which state of affairs is correct, µ(x), (c) a function that assigns
a the benefit to each one −Rb (x) (d) A function that dictates how these are
integrated to judge each behaviour f . So we have vb = f(X , µ,Rb). Often we
can can write this as
∫
X Sb(x)dµ(x) for some Sb. In the case of the Bayes risk
based decision S = R. In the case where the decision is based on minimising
the worst possible outcome (as measured by R, known as minimax) we have
vb = maxxRb (x), in which case we cannot write it in integral form. However
in this case we observe that if we assume for simplicity that R is positive then∫
X Ra (x)n−Rb (x)n dµ(x) diverges to positive infinity if the largest risk belongs
to behaviour a and negative infinity if it belongs to behaviour b, allowing us to
rank the behaviours in the same way as the non-integral form. Although, the
integral form is very general and many choices of f can be written as an integral
of some S so that they give the same ranking of behaviours, it is not completely
general.
3.3 Measures of Information
Now we are in a position to see how this relates to information theory. As the first part of
this, I would like to identify four different types of measurement involved in information
theory. It is good to make this explicit as it will allow me to both explain the motivation
behind the approach used in later chapters and how information theory fits with what I
have described so far. I will attempt to go through them in a natural way.
3.3.1 Geometric Measures
The class of measurements that I call geometric measurements are the kind of measurement
that we make with rules, scales and stopwatches. They are when we measure the distance
between two points in space or time, or the mass or volume of an object, or even the
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fractal dimension of a coastline (Mandelbrot, 1982). They concern the ‘world out there’
(the word geometry, after all, stems from the Greek meaning ‘measurement of the land’,
OED 2012).
Geometric measurements require method. For example, if I draw a number of different
right angled triangles on a page and measured them using a standard ruler, I would find
that the square of my measurements of the two shorter sides was equal to the square of
my measurement of the longest side. If instead, I use a slide rule to measure exactly the
same triangles, I will not observe the Pythagorean relationship between the squares of the
numbers I read off.15
Geometric measurement has a normative character, there is no reason to choose a linear
rule over the logarithmic slide rule other than convention and the ease of applying certain
laws. The apparent arbitrariness of geometric axioms concerned many great thinkers
of the 19th and 20th century, including von Helmholtz (1876) and the logician Alfred
Tarski (Tarski and Woodger, 1938, paper II)16. This is before we even consider field of
mathematics proper.
To make measurements of things in the world, we need a method - an agreed protocol
by which we measurements are taken - so that we know exactly what it is we are measuring
which rules apply to the measurements that we make. It is in such protocols, and their
interpretation, that we find the role of judgement calls.17
3.3.2 Entropic Measures
Entropy is the earliest information measure. It was originally developed as part of
Boltzmann-Gibbs statistical physics to describe thermodynamic entropy. It is usually
expressed, for discrete supports (ontologies) as:
H = −
∑
i
pi log pi (3.3.1)
15Say we have a right angled triangle with sides a, b and c, and we measure it with a normal ruler making
measurements, Ra, Rb and Rc then we would observe that R
2
a +R
2
b = R
2
c , however, if we used a slide rule,
getting measurements Sa, Sb and Sc, we would instead see the rule e
2Sa + e2Sb = e2Sc .
16Tarski was, like many logicians, about what was part of a particular formal system, and what we
impose upon it.
17In the case of the Pythagorean relation, I expect it is so ingrained most people would make the same
judgement about how to measure the lines to which it applies - but it is quite possible they might make
mistake of judging it to be applicable where it is not, on the surface of a sphere, for example.
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An Example of Bit Accounting
The appeal of the application of information theory comes from examples such as those
found in Jaynes (1994). In certain cases it is possible to use information measures to say
what number of statements about a state of affairs is enough to deduce exactly what is
going on. This relies on the entropy being zero in complete certainty and maximal in
complete ignorance.
Lets take the example of two people playing a very simple game with two different
fair coins - one £1 coin and one £2 coin. The first person (Alice) tosses both of them
keeping them hidden from the second person (Bob). We can measure what Bob knows
about these coins by the entropy - there are four possible states: (£1,£2) is one of
(H,H), (H,T ), (T,H) and (T, T ). The (maximum18) entropy, in bits, is then given by
assigning the probability of 14 to all states, so −
∑
p log2 p = −414 log2 14 = log2 4 = 2bits.
Doing this gives us an upper bound on the ignorance of Bob. Being able to do this is
essential.
Now, Bob is allowed to ask yes or no questions to Alice so as to determine the state of
the two coins. There are a large number of questions he could possibly ask her, some of
which are better than others. For example, he could ask “does the £1 coin show a head?”,
this would determine exactly the state of the £1 coin, meaning that the state of affairs,
(£1,£2), is given by (H,H) or (H,T ) if the answer is yes or (T,H) or (T, T ) if the answer
is no. This question reduces the number of possible states to two, the expected change in
entropy is the mean of −212 log2 12 = 1bit (answer is yes) and −12 log2 12 = 1bit (answer is
no), which, of course, is 1bit . Bob’s entropy with respect to the coins changes from 2bits
to 1bit . This binary question gives him 1bit of information.
If however the question was “does at least one coin show a head?” the possible states
that the coins could be in are: (H,H), (H,T ) and (T,H) if the answer is yes, or (T, T )
if the answer is no. The first outcome is expected to happen 34 of the time, the second
1
4 of the time. So the expected entropy of Bob’s knowledge after getting an answer to
this question is 34(−313 log2 13) + 14(− log2 1) = 34 log2 3 ≈ 1.189bits - asking this question
is suboptimal as it provides19 only 0.811bits of information about the state of the coins.
Three quarters of the time Bob potentially needs another two questions to know exactly
what the state of both coins are.
18We take the maximum entropy as the coins, and their tossing by Alice, are at least thought to be
unbiased by Bob
19I use ‘provides information’ in the sense that the ignorance of Bob as measured by the entropy of his
subjective probabilities is reduced.
77
The maximum information from a yes or no question is one bit - which happens when
the answer evenly partitions the number of states (assuming each one is equally likely).
The proof of this is not hard, but the result is intuitive enough for me to omit it. Of
course, there are other questions that could be asked which would be optimal, such as “do
both the coins show the same face?” Naturally, succeeding questions must chosen so as
to reflect the first question (and sometimes its answer). In the example here, we see that
Bob can gain complete knowledge about the state of the two coins by asking two of the
right binary questions.
Given the possible states a system (here, the faces shown by some coins) and the nature
of the questions (in the case above, yes or no questions), we can say how many questions
are needed to exactly determine the state of the system.
However, there is a difficulty here. We are required to state what exactly the beliefs
are about. This may be acceptable when an agreement between people can be made, but
it is not when we talk of animals, or people, whose ontology is unknown to us.
An Thought Experiment Demonstrating a Problem with of Entropy
It is very clear that entropy is problematic in the case of continuous distributions, which
may be easily demonstrated by a change of coordinates (see Shannon, 1948, Part IV). In
the discrete case it is often claimed that problems concerning the ontology (or measures
of it) have no bearing.
Carol, an excellent musician with perfect pitch, is the subject of an experiment about
the confidence in which she can identify certain pieces of music. Carol is not formally
trained and never concerns herself with classical music – indeed she could not name a
single composer. The experimenter, Dave, tells her that he is going to play short excerpts
from Johan Sebastian Bach’s Das wohltemperierte Klavier and that it contains a one piece
of music in each key. Dave plays a two second excerpt from one of Bach’s preludes and
fugues as establishes what probability Carol assigns to each20. He then calculates the
entropy of her knowledge:
HCarol = −
∑
k
pk log pk , k ∈ {Cmaj , C#maj . . . B[min, Bmin} (3.3.2)
Claire is just like Carol, in fact, she is a perfect copy of Carol up to the point where the
experiment begins. Dave repeats the experiment, only afterwards, he tells Claire that Das
wohltemperierte Klavier contains both preludes and fugues. Not knowing what a prelude
20Somehow. Methods exist for this, such as De Finetti’s game, though in this example I shall just assume
it is possible to do so whilst maintaining the procedure I describe.
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or fugue is, the probability that it is a prelude or a fugue is one half. The probabilities for
Claire are halved, but there are twice as many things to have the knowledge about. Dave
now assigns an entropy to Claire’s knowledge, as:
HClaire = −
∑
k
1
2pk log
1
2pk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Preludes
−
∑
k
1
2pk log
1
2pk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fugues
so that k ∈ {Cmaj , C#maj , Dmaj . . . B[min, Bmin}
= −
∑
k
pk log
1
2pk = log 2−
∑
k
pk log pk (3.3.3)
= HCarol + log 2 (3.3.4)
which is a difference of one bit of uncertainty (no knowledge about whether it is prelude
or fugue). An interpretation of this in the spirit of Jaynes (1994) would be that it is in
fact the entropy about Dave’s beliefs, based upon Dave’s ontology, when Dave does the
calculation and that Dave, who is clear about what the ontology is used in each case,
should understand the difference between the two. This is all well and good, but such an
interpretation does not tell us about Carol and Claire’s beliefs. Carol and Claire’s beliefs
are clearly the same in both cases, and really, we should expect to get an answer to that
effect. The entropy here is sensitive to the ontology, really, what we require is a measure
that is not sensitive in this way (measure invariant). No entropic measure that is of the
form:
H(f) = E [f(x)] =
∑
p(x)f(p(x)) (3.3.5)
avoids this.21 One way to avoid this problem is to make a measurement that uses our
understanding of the ontology to cancel out its effects, or, in a more Jaynesian spirit, get
Dave to report a quantity that takes this effect into account.
There are two ways to do this, using enumeratory measurements such as the channel
capacity, or diversional measurements, such as the KL-divergence (Kullback and Leibler,
1951). I cover these in the next two section.
21Consider the transformation so that the ontology changes scale uniformly so that its size changes
with n → m and the probabilities change under the maximum entropy rule such that pi → qi = nmpi.
Say that the entropy is changed as Hn → Hm, then for invariance we require Hn = Hm so we have∑
i pif(pi) =
m
n
∑
i qif(qi) =
m
n
∑
i
n
m
pif(
n
m
pi) =
∑
i pif(
n
m
pi) and therefore we need f(p) = f(kp).
The only solution to this is where f is a constant, meaning that the entropy it measures would also be
constant and therefore rather pointless. Indeed, we cannot reasonably call a number that does not vary
with anything a measurement.
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3.3.3 Enumeratory Measures
Enumeratory measurements are, roughly, those that count something. Trivial examples
may be counting the number of eggs in a basket, or the number of needles on a spruce
tree. But also, lengths, volumes and areas can be thought of in this sense too. In essence,
a given area can be thought of as being formed of multiple, infinitely small areas joined
together. Notions such as length or area can be thought of as counting something that is
infinite by giving each of those things an infinitesimal value.
Shannon’s channel capacity (Shannon, 1948) can be thought of as an enumeratory
measurement too. It, in a manner very much like counting the questions in the coin
example, counts a number of distinguishable states that a communications channel can
be in during a given time period. In this sense, it measures the number of elements an
ontology must have to completely describe an set of given things and is geared to the
in the case where there is noise that hinders doing so with the degree of accuracy of a
deterministic scenario.
Let’s say Carol was asked to communicate her best guess at the identity of the music
to Dave, to do so well, she would need to use a channel with at least the capacity of
CCarol = log2 24 = 4.58bits, whereas Claire, who is in addition required to specify whether
it is a prelude or a fugue, would require the ability to transmit at least CClaire = log2(24×
2) = 5.58bits.22 The channel capacity, like the entropy is dependant on the ontology, in
fact, it is not just dependant on it, it is what it measures. By talking about channel
capacity we are in effect postulating an object, the channel, the number of properties of
which are either known or unknown. By measuring a channel capacity in a system, we
are putting a lower bound on the number of properties this object has – the size of the
ontology. If for example, we say the channel capacity is 10bits we are in effect saying there
is 1024 different states in our ontology.
3.3.4 Diversional Measures
Diversional measurements, in a sense, are the opposite of Shannon’s channel capacity.
They do not seek to measure the part of the entropy which is dependant on the ontology,
but the part which isn’t. They are concerned with information in the truest sense - how
different are two beliefs. We can measure how much ‘information’ is required to change an
22The channel capacity can be written supp(x) MI(X,Y ) and in the case of a discrete noiseless channel
and a single message we can show that it is equal to logn where n is the number of different messages that
we may wish to send.
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agents belief from this to that, with minimal thought about how that belief is represented
to that agent.23 Formally, divergences compare two probability measures in a way that
does not depend on the ontology. Using one of the principles that state that complete
ignorance can be thought of as a probability distribution with equal probabilities24 (in
this case 124) we can write a measure of the magnitude of difference between Carol’s actual
belief and complete ignorance as:
dCarol = DCarol
( (
1
24 ,
1
24 . . .
1
24
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣ (pCmaj , pC#maj . . . pB[min , pBmin)) (3.3.6)
A special case of which would be where D refers to the KL-divergence25 I will define the
KL-divergence properly later, but for now, I will just write it’s value for the case above:
dCarol =
∑
k
pk log
(
1
24
)
pk
= log 24−
∑
k
pk log pk (3.3.7)
and for Clair we have
dClair = 2
∑
k
1
2pk log
(
1
48
)
1
2pk
= log 24−
∑
k
pk log pk (3.3.8)
so
dCarol = dClair (3.3.9)
which is what we would sensibly expect from an information measure. Divergences mea-
sure only the ‘knowledge part’ of entropy, whereas channel capacities only measure the
‘existence part’ of the entropy. This comes at the cost only being able to compare two
beliefs, where in entropy we have a way of describing a single belief. However, this is
not so strange. The absolute position of points in space are really points relative to an-
other point: the origin – there is no reason to expect it should be different in the case of
diversional measures.
I should probably point out, that one can obtain a similar invariance by subtracting
channel capacities from the entropies. In an informal sense, the entropies are measures
which combine channel capacities with divergences.
23Though we do require that there is sufficient capacity to do so. This idea is formalised by Fisher
Sufficiency.
24Such as the Principle of Maximum Entropy, or the Principle of Indifference etc.- they’re all the same
in practice.
25The KL-divergence has an interpretation in the spirit of Shannon, as how many bits of data would I
need to transmit to change the receivers belief from the distribution on the left (right) to the distribution on
the right (left) assuming I am using an encoding optimal for transmitting data according to the distribution
on the left (right). But I wish to avoid using such interpretations in general.
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3.4 The Logarithm in Information Theory
The logarithm is a reoccurring function in information theory, the examples above have
used nothing else. I would like to take some time describing where they occur, why they
occurred where they did and when and when not they are essential. It is good to make
this explicit as it will allow me to both explain the motivation behind the approach used
in later chapters and how information theory fits with what I have described so far.
Traditionally, logarithms occur throughout information theory, for example the Shan-
non entropy (Shannon, 1948) can be written as the expectation of the surprisal (− log p(x)):
H(X) = E [− log p(x)] (3.4.1)
The most widespread divergence, the KL-divergence (Kullback and Leibler, 1951) is also
the expectation of a logarithm (see appendices A.1 and A.3 or chapter 4 for an explication
of the notation):
D(KL) ( ξ || ρ ) = Eξ
[
log
p(x; ξ)
p(x; ρ)
]
(3.4.2)
The Fisher score and Fisher information are defined as :
Si =
∂
∂ξi
log p(x; ξ) (3.4.3)
and
gFisherij = Eξ
[
∂
∂ξi
log p(x; ξ)
∂
∂ξj
log p(x; ξ)
]
(3.4.4)
respectively, and the channel capacity also contains a logarithm (note the base):
C =
∫ ∞
0
log2
(
1 +
S(f)
N(f)
)
df (3.4.5)
In all these, the original motivation was because the quantities under consideration change
geometrically. In the case of the channel capacity, entropy and the KL-divergence, it is
because the number of different messages that one can represent with a sequence of symbols
increases geometrically with the sequences length (Shannon, 1948). In the case of Fisher,
it was motivated (at least in part) by the geometric increase in population sizes (Fisher,
1930).
Whilst the logarithm is traditional and has many nice properties, it is by no means
necessary. For example, there are a number of alternatives for the entropy, such as those
suggested by Re´nyi (1960) or Tsallis (2002). The class of divergences is also incredibly
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large (Amari and Nagaoka, 2000), after all, all we really need is a way of comparing
probability distributions with each other in a sensible way.
In contrast to the use of probability theory itself, where there is good reason to claim
a correspondence to rational beliefs, there is no requirement to use logarithms (with one
exception which I will discuss shortly). The bulk of chapter 4 explores other ways of
measuring probabilities in a way so that they justified in the terms of rational goal-oriented
behaviour.
In appendix C.1 we see that a logarithmic quantity arises naturally in the case of the
Fisher metric. In many ways it is quite a natural choice. Indeed, the Fisher metric is
the second derivative (curvature) of the Shannon entropy and the covariance matrix of
the Fisher score. In terms of the justifications here, not their original justifications, they
are natural because they ultimately come from local approximations of non-logarithmic
divergences. With the philosophical grounding I have provided here, it is only the Fisher
metric that has any real need for a logarithm.26
3.5 Summary: The Application of Information Measures
The focus of the first part has been on how we can justify using our own beliefs about the
states of physiological components of an organism to discuss the organisms beliefs. The
second part has been a review of various information theoretic measures. I will briefly
review what I have said in the first part and show how it relates to the second.
From an information theoretic point of view, the biggest problem is the ontology.
Firstly, our ontology should be sufficiently detailed to encapsulate the knowledge of the
organism. As we do not know what the knowledge of the organism is about, we must
make sure that our ontology contains the ability to represent all the situations which the
organism’s behaviour could be contingent on. This is the pragmatic maxim. A way of
determining the size of ontology we need might be to measure channel capacity between
some low level components. For example, if the channel capacity of the optic nerve is,
say, 1Gbit/s, then we know that we can represent the organism’s belief concerning a given
second of optical data with an ontology of any size greater than 21,000,000,000 states.
We must also choose information measures that are prejudiced by the ontology. This,
in addition to their natural occurrence in chapter 4, is where we find a need for divergences.
As the size of the organisms ontology is not determined, we must choose something that is
26...and even that is simply a consequence of choosing a geometry that is locally Euclidean! i.e. consid-
ering the covariance matrix of the fisher score, rather than some other statistic.
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not affected by it. This comes at the cost of only being able to compare different beliefs,
not giving them absolute numbers.
In addition, how we use our assessment of probabilities to describe the beliefs of other
organisms is also dangerous. We must be very careful to ensure we are justified in doing
so. We do this by arguing that our knowledge is equal to or greater than that of the
organism so that the organism cannot possibly know anything more than we are aware of.
3.5.1 The Model Used in the Following Chapters
I have summarised the approach I will use in chapter 4 in figure 3.2. This figure should
be approached cautiously as it is only a rough schematic, with labels chosen for brevity
rather than exactitude.
Max
imum Entropy
DecisionTheory
InformationGeometry
Geo
me
try
Method
Goals
Mental
World
Physical
World
Figure 3.2: An informal diagram representing psychophysical relationships and quantification.
The diagram shows physical measurements on the left in red. These are geometric
and measure the world as conceived of by modern physics. We use specific tools and
methodologies to define geometric relationships between its components. On the right in
green, we have beliefs (mental world), these can also be measured geometrically someone
with access to a goal of the organism by judgements of the consequences in achieving that
goal. We formalise these measurements using information geometry. The arrows between
red and green are a possible way, but not the only way, we can relate the two domains. The
labels used here are the formal tools that I will use frequently throughout the remaining
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chapters.
The symmetry of this diagram is important. It shows the reason why I have made this
case precisely. In physics we have method which allows us to understand exactly which
measures to be making, but in information theory, there is presently not explicit rationale
for choosing any one measure above another. I suggest, that it is the goals of the organism
that provide us with exactly that. It is interesting to note that it could be said that the
stance of some positivists is that the green side should just be a copy of the red side, and
also, that it could also be said that it the stance of constructivist epistemology is that the
red side should really just be another copy of the green side. In this sense, the diagram
shows my stance as ratifying the two to some extent.27
To my knowledge there are no treatments of perceptual metrics that use this as a
basis, though there is some similarity with signal detection theory. As we discover more
and more about information theory we understand our motivations better: in the next
chapter I will use the concepts above to explain the rationale behind colour metrics.
27Although, I would probably take the side of the constructivists if I had to make a stand.
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Chapter 4
Geometry from Information
“The perception of what a thing is and the perception of what it means are not
separate”
James J. Gibson, 1971
(Reed and Jones, Reasons for Realism)
This section outlines the origin of a Riemannian geometry as a description of colour.
The derivation uses recent advances in theoretical machine learning and the relationship
between information and geometry.
The derivation proceeds from a description of optimal classification - firstly providing
a metric (the variational distance) which corresponds directly to the correctness of a
classification. This distance measure is shown to correspond to a particular risk function -
the 0-1 risk. From here I use results from machine learning as described by Bartlett et al.
(2004); Nguyen et al. (2009) (and similar work in operations research by Jose et al. 2008)
to describe a set of risk functions whose optimisation yields the same classification, and
with them, the set of distance-like measures which correspond to their optimised value.
This set of distance like measures (f -divergences) can all be thought of as sensible ways
of judging long range colour differences. Indeed, it is by connecting the statistical theory
with risk that we have a description of action, and thus, perceptually relevant quantities
(O’Regan and Noe¨, 2001; Philipona and O’Regan, 2006; Rachlin, 1992).
From here, I use the information geometric techniques developed by Amari and Na-
gaoka (2000) and others to derive the appropriate Riemannian metric associated with
these distance measures. Then in the next chapter I will show how this is equivalent to
the spaces used in colour science.
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Sketch of the Derivation
As I have suggested above, the following is a synthesis of three quite developed notions,
behaviour, risk and information geometry. It is unlikely that the average reader will be
well versed in all of these, so I have attempted to avoid an account that requires a lot of
technical knowledge. For similar reasons, before I continue I will bullet point the derivation
for reference:
1. Establish a standard behavioural experiment (2AFC) and standard error probabili-
ties.
2. Show how this can be interpreted in terms of risk.
3. Show that a whole class of risk measurements give the same behaviour in the exper-
iment.
4. Find corresponding information measures (divergences) - noting that they are sym-
metric.
5. Find their associated geometric quantities, showing that symmetry is preserved.
6. Observe that divergences do not necessarily lead to a Riemannian geometry.
7. Show that a standard Riemannian geometry is none the less generated from the risk
based information measures as defined above (from symmetry).
The rest of the chapter will focus on the formal relationships to the general principles
used in standard colour theory and extensions to more complex cases involving asymmetric
risks and unequal prior probabilities.
Notation and Technicalities
Because this chapter is effectively the integration of two existing theories, there are two
sets of notation which we will need to keep track of. The general set up of the probability
distributions in the chapter is represented graphically in figure 4.1.
Throughout, I will use x ∈ X to describe some observed variable. I will take it that
the distribution of the random variate X, on X , is the marginal distribution of paired
variables from another distribution on X × Y where Y = {−1, 1}.
I take these distributions to be parametrisable with parameters belonging to Ξ. I
will then associate the point in parameter space (ξ1, . . . , ξi) with the class where y = 1
87
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
x
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 D
en
si
ty
ξ1
ξ2
ρ1
ρ2
p(x|y=1)
p(x|y=−1)
p(x)
Figure 4.1: The structure of the probability spaces used in this chapter. The joint probability
density p(x, y) is composed of two densities, one for each y ∈ {−1, 1}. These are the two curves
shown here. These two densities are parametrised by two variables [ξ] and [ρ], these are considered
do define points within a statistical manifold.
and (ρ1, . . . , ρi) with y = −1. I denote the probability densities of the parametrised
distributions by p(x; ξ) and p(x; ρ). This means that the following holds:
Pr(x ∈ E | y = 1) =
∫
E
p(x; ξ)dµ(x)
Pr(x ∈ E | y = −1) =
∫
E
p(x; ρ)dµ(x)
Pr(y = 1) = τξ
Pr(y = −1) = τρ
Pr(x ∈ E, y = 1) = τξ
∫
E
p(x; ξ)dµ(x)
Pr(x ∈ E, y = −1) = τρ
∫
E
p(x; ρ)dµ(x) (4.0.1)
where µ is a measure continuous with the probability measure induced on X by condition-
ing the joint probability on X × Y upon members of Y.1
1As long as we are careful with sets of measure zero this is perfectly fine. See Kullback and Leibler
(1951) for more details.
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There is also the matter of risk functions. In the case of loss and risk functions more
generality can be achieved by extending their domain to the extended real line (R∪{∞}).
I will not need to invoke this myself at any point, but it is co-domain used in work on
which I expand (specifically Nguyen et al., 2009).
4.1 2AFC and the Variational Distance
Before introducing the information geometric method upon which this chapter is based, I
will first introduce the standard signal detection framework in a manner which is consistent
with the rest of this chapter.
Consider a subject of an experiment who is forced to make a choice between two
alternatives (a and b). The two alternatives have properties (x|a and x|b, the physiological
state given an alternative) which are drawn from two distributions (p(x|a) and p(x|b)).
Let’s assume that the subject’s motivation and ability to correctly assign x to either a or
b is ample. Then the subjects best strategy in terms of minimising the probability of error
is to assign a whenever the inequality p(x, a) > p(x, b) holds. Here we take the maximum
entropy distribution for the prior distribution of alternatives a and b (Jaynes, 1994):
p(a) = arg max
p
{p log p+ (1− p) log(1− p)} (4.1.1)
= 12 = 1− p(a) = p(b) (4.1.2)
so
p(x, a) = 12p(x|a) and p(x, b) = 12p(x|b) (4.1.3)
Given this, we can then write an equation for the expected error:
 =
∫
X
f(x)dµ(x) (4.1.4)
where
f(x) =
 p(x, b), p(x, a) > p(x, b)p(x, a), otherwise (4.1.5)
which can also be written:
f(x) = 12 (p(x, a) + p(x, b)− |p(x, a)− p(x, b)|) (4.1.6)
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and thus
 = 12
∫
X
p(x, a) + p(x, b)dµ(x)− 12
∫
X
|p(x, a)− p(x, b)| dµ(x)
= 12 − 12
∫
X
|p(x, a)− p(x, b)| dµ(x)
= 12 − 14
∫
X
|p(x|a)− p(x|b)|dµ(x)
= 12 − 14V (p(x|a), p(x|b)) (4.1.7)
and the probability of success, s, is simply equal to:
s = 1−  = 12 + 14V (p(x|a), p(x|b)) (4.1.8)
V (·, ·) is known as the (total) variational distance. It should be noted that the quantity:∫
X
|p(x, a)− p(x, b)| dµ(x) (4.1.9)
is also known by this name, being more general in the sense that it accounts for any prior
probabilities p(a) and p(b). A generalisation for asymmetric error weightings as well as
prior probabilities is given in appendix B, this generalisation is of some relevance to the
extension in section 4.7.1.
The variational distance plays an important role in information theory and its relation-
ship with informational quantities such as the Kullback-Leibler Divergences are numerous
(e.g. Lin, 1991; Topsœ, 2000). The variational distance takes a value in [0, 2] and is a
metric on the space of probability distributions. It is immediately obvious from this that
the success takes a value in [12 , 1] as one would hope.
This distance corresponds very well to the standard psychometric curve, for good
reason - the standard psychometric curve can be thought of as the variational distance
(or an approximation to it) under particular assumptions. The sigmoid shape is a general
feature of signal detection problems.
Expression in Terms of Bayes Risk
The formulation above can be thought of in terms of the binary case of Bayes risk. Bayes
risk is related to the variational distance - it is almost the same. However, how one arrives
at the Bayes risk is slightly different. Importantly, the usual set up for Bayes risk includes
a functions known as the discriminant function, γ, and the loss function φ. The derivation,
in the spirit of (Nguyen et al., 2009) is as follows:
Similar to above, we begin with a distribution (X ,Y) of observed properties X and
corresponding classes Y, one can think the pair (x, y) ∈ (X ,Y) as a pair of observed values
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Figure 4.2: The “success” for Gaussian variables as used in ROC analysis, compared to a psycho-
metric curve (1/(1 + exp(−x))) which would be obtained using logistic regression.
(x) with the correct class to assign it (y). To make things easier, we assume that the labels
of y ∈ Y are either −1 and 1 (instead of a and b above). Next, we define a discriminant
function γ which assigns a real number to each possible x ∈ X . The sign of this function
is used to predict the correct value of y from x, so that we have an estimation of y, called
yˆ:
yˆ(x) = sgn γ(x) (4.1.10)
so that yˆ almost surely2 belongs to {−1, 1}. As both y and yˆ(x) take values of either -1
or 1 it is obvious that:
yyˆ(x) =
 1, y = yˆ(x)−1, otherwise (4.1.11)
and that (almost surely):
y = yˆ(x) =⇒ yγ(x) > 0 (4.1.12)
y 6= yˆ(x) =⇒ yγ(x) < 0 (4.1.13)
2The difficulty of sgn 0 = 0 is often remedied by letting sgn 0 = 1 or sgn 0 = −1. However, this problem
can usually be ignored.
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From, here it is easy to write a function that gives us the probability of an error, which I
shall call the Bayes risk.3 Letting I (ϕ) be the indicator function for a proposition ϕ:
I (ϕ) =
 1, ϕ is true0, otherwise (4.1.14)
This is used to define the quantity known as 0-1 loss (φ0-1). It’s expectation is the Bayes
risk.
φ0-1(β) = I (β < 0) (4.1.15)
then we have:
RBayes (γ) = E [φ0-1(yγ(x))] (4.1.16)
= E [I (yγ(x) < 0)] (4.1.17)
=
∫
(X ,Y)
I (yγ(x) < 0) p(x, y)dµ(x, y) (4.1.18)
in words, this is the probability of making a mistake - the chance that γ has the wrong
sign.
We are now positioned to relate the Bayes risk to the variational distance. It should be
clear that with the probabilities of y values being equal, we get the following relationship
with the variational distance:
inf
γ
RBayes (γ) =  = 12 − 14V (p(x|a), p(x|b)) (4.1.19)
This relationship will be generalised in the next section to eventually yield information
geometric quantities.
4.2 Bayes Consistent Risk Functions
In the expression of risk I have discussed, there is the scope to describe the risk associated
with uncertainty. The value in reducing uncertainty is the major determinent of the results
here. This is known in economics as uncertainty aversion. Standard information theoretic
quantities can be thought of as describing uncertainty aversion where the risk is linear
with message length or some similar quantity.
Since we are only concerned with the sign of γ there is an uncountable infinity of
definitions of γ(x) which yield the same classification yˆ(x), i.e. the mapping γ → sgn γ is
many to one.
3Though often Bayes risk is considered to be the general formulation of risk involving the expectation
of a loss function.
92
−2.0 −1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
yγ(x)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
I(
y
γ
(x
)
<
0)
Cost per datum under Bayes risk
Figure 4.3: Plot of the 0-1 loss (φ0-1) with respect to the output of the discriminant function.
There are two things to note: Firstly, the magnitude of the discriminant function does not influence
the result, only it’s sign. Secondly, the function is not convex.
This section focuses on risk other than the Bayes risk, with the ultimate aim of de-
scribing risk measures which yield the same yˆ. In other words, what other ways are there
defining risk which yield the same classification as the Bayes risk. This question has been
answered by Bartlett et al. (2004) in the general case and by Lugosi and Vayatis (2004)
for the specific case of boosting.
The Bayes risk used the function I (α < 0) (where α = γ(x)) to map the discriminant
function to a contribution to risk, but there are numerous (infinite) ways of doing so,
represented in general by φ. I shall focus on a collection of functions often called surrogate
loss functions, so named because they are used in machine learning as tractable surrogates
for the 0-1 loss of the Bayes risk. These are not the complete repertoire of possible loss
functions, but they constitute a large class of well behaved functions that is sufficient to
demonstrate the the major points of this section. Surrogate loss functions are convex
upper bounds on the 0-1 loss - they, by definition, must be convex4 and satisfy φ(w) > 1
when w ≤ 0 and φ(w) ≥ 0 when w > 0. Whilst any loss function that satisfies this could
4Allowing us to use convex analysis. This is what makes them tractable surrogates!
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rightly be called a surrogate loss function, one would be missing a trick not replacing the
two inequalities with the requirement that φ(0) = 1 (and φ(x) ≥ 0). This assures that
φ bounds φ0-1 as tightly as possible. First of all, these functions are functions only of
yγ(x), a class of functions referred to as marginal loss functions (yγ(x) is known as the
margin). The φ-risk is then defined as:
Rφ (γ) = E [φ(yγ(x))] (4.2.1)
Also, we define the optimal φ-risk. This is the minimal risk that can be obtained given
free choice of the discriminant γ.
R∗φ = infγ Rφ (γ) (4.2.2)
A theorem of (Nguyen et al., 2009) is that, with some conditions on the nature of φ:
Rφ (γ)→ R∗φ =⇒ RBayes (γ)→ R∗Bayes (4.2.3)
As the φ-risk associated with a discriminant tends to its minimum value, so does its Bayes
risk. Or, more to the point, a φ-optimal discriminant function is Bayes optimal. The
conditions alluded to above are simple for the convex φ losses, and can be summarised as:
φ′(0) < 0 (4.2.4)
which has the simple interpretation when taken along with the convexity: any possible
error is always punished more than any correct choice.
4.2.1 Risk and Distance
Now that we know that the optimal φ-risk corresponds to a γ that is Bayes optimal we
can move on to asking how this relates to what might be considered a colour-distance.
The following is a summary of the results of Nguyen et al. (2009) in the slightly
narrower context of equal prior class probabilities, i.e. p(y = −1) = p(y = 1) = 12 .
This makes it easy to speak of conditional probabilities. Relaxation of this constraint is
straight forwards once we have established the information geometric formulation and will
be described in section 4.7.2. For now, I shall proceed with the maximum entropy prior.
Here I will make use of the following notation, this is to aid the transition to the
descriptions used in information geometry. Letting y1 and y2 represent the cases where
y = −1 and y = 1 respectively:
p(x, y1) = p(y1)p(x|y1) = 12p(x; ξ) (4.2.5)
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p(x, y2) = p(y2)p(x|y2) = 12p(x; ρ) (4.2.6)
This change of notation corresponds to adopting a new way of looking at the probabilities.
Conceptually, we consider the probabilities p(x; ξ) to belong to a statistical manifold.
A statistical manifold is a space of probability distributions, parametrised by some set
of parameters (coordinates) (ξ1 . . . ξN ) ∈ Ξ. Each point on the manifold, p(x; ξ), is a
distribution with support χ = {x} which is parametrised by ξ. Example in footnote5.
The equation for φ-risk can be written in terms of this new notation.
Rφ (γ) = E [φ (yγ(x))] (4.2.7)
= 12
∫
χ
(φ (γ(x)) p(x; ξ) + φ (γ(x)) p(x; ρ)) dµ(x) (4.2.8)
Letting us minimise in terms of γ(x). To do this we must note that minimising each of
the individual elements of the integral minimises the integral itself. Letting γ(x) = β for
clarity:
R∗φ = 12
∫
χ
inf
β
[φ(β)p(x; ξ) + φ(−β)p(x; ρ)] dµ(x) (4.2.9)
= 12
∫
χ
p(x; ξ) inf
β
[
φ(β) + φ(−β)p(x; ρ)
p(x; ξ)
]
dµ(x) (4.2.10)
Letting u = p(x;ρ)p(x;ξ) and:
f(u) = − inf
β
[φ(β) + φ(−β)u] (4.2.11)
the optimal risk can be written as:
R∗φ = 12
∫
χ
p(x; ξ)f
(
p(x; ρ)
p(x; ξ)
)
dµ(x) (4.2.12)
The class of quantities described by this equation are known as f divergences.6 The class
of f -divergences contains all quantities that corresponds to:∫
χ
p(x; ξ)f
(
p(x; ρ)
p(x; ξ)
)
dµ(x) (4.2.13)
These are often written as D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) (Amari and Nagaoka, 2000), in this notation we
have:
R∗φ = −12D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) (4.2.14)
5For example, if we have a one dimensional manifold of Poisson distributions parametrised by their
rate, then we have a manifold (Ξ, χ, P ) such that P = p(x; ξ) = ξ
xe−ξ
x!
, Ξ = R+,χ = N
6There is usually a convexity requirement, but I will get to this later.
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Figure 4.4: Example of the relationship between the φ loss and the convex function f of f -
divergences. In this case I show the relationship in the case of the exponential loss: φ(β) = e−β .
Beginning on the top left - the functions uφ(−β) for various u, the value of u in this case is found
where β = 0. On the bottom left - the three functions φ(β), φ(−β) and φ(β)+uφ(−β) for u = 1 (i.e.
φ(β)+φ(−β)). The centre panel shows φ(β)+uφ(−β) for evenly spaced u (u = {0.2, 0.6, 1, 1.2...}).
Here I mark the minima (given by inf {φ(β) + uφ(−β)}), the height of the minimum is the value
of the divergence of a given u. The grey lines at each minimum continue on into the right panel,
where the function f(u) relates u to those heights. In this case f(u) = 2
√
u.
4.3 f-Divergences and h-Divergences
In the f -divergences, we have a broad class of functions that could be sensibly thought of
as general measures of difference. All of these correspond to how well two stimuli can be
distinguished. There are of course other functions, but the fact that there is more than
one is of great significance. All of them correspond to making the same classification, so
from the point of view of making the best possible choice they are the same. No one of
them, when considering the classification to which it corresponds, is better than any other.
All of them measure difference is a sensible way - how well can the best classifier do, given
some way of quantifying of how well it is doing.
I should be noted that the general class of f -divergences is actually broader than those
that correspond to a φ-risk as defined above. The f -divergences corresponding to a φ-risk
are symmetric (Bartlett et al., 2004):
D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) = D(f) ( ρ || ξ ) (4.3.1)
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which does not hold for f -divergences in general. This will not be a problem as much
of what follows will apply in general to any f -divergence, symmetric or not (I will be
explicit when symmetry is used). However, I will impose a different constraint to these
divergences. Namely, that the divergences considered will be zero for two points that are
the same. Often this does not hold for divergences derived from φ-risks, but can simply
be corrected by the addition of a quantity. This is in a sense a geometrising transform: it
changes an f -divergence that does not obey certain axioms of metrics to one that does.
Doing this makes it easier to apply the formalisms of Amari and Nagaoka (2000). Letting
h correspond to the convex function defining the corrected divergence, we have:
h(u) = f(u) + (1− u)f ′(1)− f(1) (4.3.2)
in which h can easily be shown to be a convex function. The reason for the constant term is
twofold: From the psychometric perspective, choosing a measurement where the “distance”
between a point and itself is zero corresponds to our intuitive notion of distance. If we were
to compare distances, asking is one bigger than another a additive constant would have
little impact. Adding a constant does not affect the fact that larger f -divergences mean
a better classification, moreover, it grounds them by stating that the difference between
stimuli indistinguishable to a sufficiently able experimenter will always measure as zero.
The other reason - from a mathematical perspective - is that not having zero distance
from a point to itself does not produce anything that resembles what one would like to
call a geometry. The term first order in u assures that the divergence is always positive.
Importantly, this operation preserves the symmetry of the divergence - this is demon-
strated in the general case in appendix C.2. Another important property of this is that it
does not affect the connection coefficient corresponding to the geodesics that connect two
points (which I shall discuss soon). The geometrising transform adds a constant that is
dependant on f and the prior probability of the two classes at each point, most generally
we can write:
D(h) ( ξ || ρ ) = D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) + (piξ − piρ)f ′(1)− piξf(1) (4.3.3)
where piξ = p(y1) and piρ = p(y2).
In the current case with equal prior probabilities (and where divergences are in a sense
doubled) the geometrising transform is simply:
D(h) ( ξ || ρ ) = D(f) ( ξ || ρ )− f(1) (4.3.4)
More formally, the correction above assures the following axioms of metrics: the iden-
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tity of indiscernibles
D(h) ( p || p ) = 0↔ h(1) = 0 (4.3.5)
and non-negativity
D(h) ( p || q ) ≥ 0↔ h′(1) = 0 (4.3.6)
the exact form of this term can be derived from Taylor’s expansion of the divergence (see
appendix C.1). Symmetry of the divergence can also be written as a property of the
divergence defining function, h:
D(h) ( p || q ) = D(h) ( q || p )↔ h(u) = uh( 1u) (4.3.7)
Specific Cases
The variational distance is itself an h-divergence with f(u) = |1− u|. However, impor-
tantly, it is not differentiable at u = 1. It is not differentiable exactly where we will need it
to be when we want to differential geometry. Table 4.1 shows some common f -divergences,
their common names and common corresponding φ-risks.
Divergence Class f(u) Loss Name φ(α)
Variational Distance |1− u| 0-1 Loss I (α < 0)
Hinge Loss max{0, 1− α}
Hellinger Distance (1−√u)2 Exponential Loss e−α
Fisher-Rao Distance
Triangular Distance −4uu+1 Least Squares Loss (1− α)2
Table 4.1: Some definitions of common f -divergences with some common φ-risks
4.4 Differential Manifolds
This chapter requires a basic understanding of differential geometry. The geometry used
here is not the standard Riemannian (or pseudo-Riemannian) geometry that will be fa-
miliar to physicists, but a minor generalisation of it.
The most important object in differential geometry is the manifold. A manifold, M ,
is a continuum of points, here they are determined by some coordinates ξ = (ξ1 . . . ξN ).7
7Not that any coordinate system is required at all.
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The power of differential geometry lies in the fact that the manifold M is assumed to
be the same no matter what coordinates are used, say ρ = (ρ1 . . . ρN ) - it is coordinate
invariant.
But what do I mean by “the same”. The thing that needs to be the same is a particular
notion of distance between points, not one as measured by some difference in coordinates,
as this will change if we choose different coordinates, but by some other measure of dis-
tance, defined in addition to the coordinates - distances intrinsic to the manifold. This
function (F ) is a function of two points, but importantly only those pairs of points that
are “next to” each other on the manifold. Making some assumptions about the continuity
of the coordinates and the manifold, we can say that a point at ξ is “next to” a point at
ξ + dξ, where dξ is some infinitesimally small displacement in the coordinates. This is
true for any coordinate system.
Then at each point on the manifold we define a the infinitesimal distance between
neighbouring points, ds, to be given by:
ds = F
(
ξ1, . . . , ξN ,dξ1, . . . ,dξN
)
(4.4.1)
Is is this distance, ds, which is the intrinsic property that is kept the same. There are
numerous sensible ways of defining F . Generally, as long as F (ξ, kdξ) = kF (ξ,dξ) one gets
something sensible. There is, however, a particular case which is widely used - popularised
by Bernhard Riemann:
ds = F (ξ,dξ) =
√∑
i
∑
j
gij(ξ)dξidξj =
√
gij(ξ)dξidξj (4.4.2)
The last equality uses notation that will be used throughout: when there are quantities
with upper and lower indices next to each other summation is assumed (see appendix A.3
for a summary of the notation used throughout). The quantity gij(ξ), usually just written
gij is a function of the coordinate ξ. Objects like g defined over coordinates are known as
tensor fields or just tensors8. In the case of g - which basically defines ds - it is known as
the metric tensor.
4.4.1 Transformation of Coordinates
To maintain the same geometry in coordinates ξ and coordinates ρ is the same as requiring
ds to be the same in both coordinates. This means that the metric tensor has a different
8usually, objects are only called tensors if they behave in a particular way under change of coordinates,
see equations 4.4.3 and 4.4.4
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representation in the two coordinate systems. The transformation between ξ and ρ should
obey:
gij(ξ)dξ
idξj = ds2 = gab(ρ)dρ
adρb (4.4.3)
and noting that dξi = ∂ξ
i
∂ρadρ
a then
gij(ξ)
∂ξi
∂ρa
∂ξj
∂ρb
= gab(ρ) (4.4.4)
4.4.2 Geodesics and Long Distances
The distance between points, which do not neighbour each other requires integrating along
a curve. A curve between points a and b has coordinates γ(t) = (γ1(t)...γN (t)) and it is
usually parametrised by a variable t such that γ(0) = a and γ(1) = b. The length of the
curve is then:
s(γ) =
∫ b
a
ds =
∫ t=1
t=0
√
gij(γ(t))
(
∂
∂t
γi(t)
)(
∂
∂t
γj(t)
)
dt (4.4.5)
Of course there is more than one curve between two points. Often we want the shortest
curve, which is uniquely defined in Riemannian geometry as well as the extension here
- we want to calculate infγ s(γ) for all gammas with γ(0) = a, γ(1) = b. These shortest
curves are geodesics and are usually given by9(Postnikov, 1998):
d2
dt2
ξi(t) + Γijk(ξ(t))
dξj(t)
dt
dξk(t)
dt
= 0 (4.4.6)
where Γijk are the (affine) connection coefficients.
Up to this point the geometry outlined is bog-standard. But with the geodesic equation
we come across the assumption which will be relaxed. The most intuitive way of looking
at how the geometry used here is to look at how we arrive at the geodesics. Usually, the
calculation of the geodesics uses an energy functional of the form:
E(γ) = 12
∫ t=1
t=0
gij(γ(t))
∂γi(t)
∂t
∂γj(t)
∂t
dt (4.4.7)
whose minimisation ensures minimisation of s as
s(γ)2 ≤ 2E(γ) (4.4.8)
which is obtained quite directly from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality.
Now, when E is some other quantity, like one of the many derived from risk functions,
these rules change – the arc-length may no longer minimise E. Yet, as we will see, the
local geometry remains the same.
9This only applies locally. It is the shortest in the sense that there no shorter curves formed by changing
it slightly. There may shorter curves if a big change to the curve is made.
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4.4.3 Other Measures of Distance
In this chapter we are interested in other distance like measures than s. For the case of E
and s there is a particular choice of Γkij for which equation 4.4.6 yields the correct curve.
The values of Γkij are known as the Levi-Civita, or Riemannian, connection coefficients
and are given by:
Γij,k = glkΓ
l
ij =
1
2
(
∂
∂ξi
gkj +
∂
∂ξj
gik − ∂
∂ξk
gij
)
(4.4.9)
When not using E or s the connection coefficients Γkij are not necessarily these - indeed,
there is a different connection for every real number (denoted α). I will explain what they
are in the following sections.
Some of these choices yield f -divergences exactly, such as α = ±1, (Amari and Na-
gaoka, 2000) in this case it is the Kullback leibler divergence for which we can roughly
consider the risk to be linear with a reaction time (this follows from arguments similar to
Shannon, 1948).
4.5 h-divergence to Fisher Information
With a class of distance measures defined, we can now look at the differential geometry that
corresponds to them. To do this, we begin with the Taylor’s expansion of h-divergences
to the third order (this of course assumes the appropriate differentiability at u = 1):
D(h) ( ξ || ξ + ∆ξ ) = D(h) ( ξ || ρ )
∣∣∣
ρ=ξ
+
∂
∂ρi
D(h) ( ξ || ρ )
∣∣∣
ρ=ξ
∆ξi +
1
2
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρj
D(h) ( ξ || ρ )
∣∣∣
ρ=ξ
∆ξi∆ξj +
1
6
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρj
∂
∂ρk
D(h) ( ξ || ρ )
∣∣∣
ρ=ξ
∆ξi∆ξj∆ξk +
o(∆ξ4) (4.5.1)
The expansion is worked through in appendix C.1. Firstly, we consider the expansion
up to and including ∆ξ2. This is simply:
D(h) ( ξ || ξ + ∆ξ ) = f ′′(1)
∫
χ
1
pξ
∂
∂ξi
pξ
∂
∂ξi
pξdµ(x)∆ξ
i∆ξj + o(∆ξ3) (4.5.2)
where pξ = p(x; ξ). The integral in this can be written as:∫
χ
(
∂
∂ξi
`ξ
)(
∂
∂ξj
`ξ
)
pξdµ(x) (4.5.3)
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which is usually written as an expectation10. Here ∂i =
∂
∂ξi
and `ξ = log p(x; ξ) - a notation
which will be used throughout this chapter:
gij = Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ] (4.5.4)
This is known as the Fisher metric, or, Fisher information. At small enough ∆ξ we see
that any divergence is proportional to the Fisher metric based arc-length squared.
4.5.1 The Fisher Metric
The Fisher metric (or information) is symbolised as gFisherij - or when its identity is appar-
ent from the context gij - is a central quantity as it provides a link between information
theory and geometry. The fisher metric is defined on a statistical manifold of parametrised
probability distributions p(x; ξ). It usually written in one of two standard forms (Amari
and Nagaoka, 2000):
gFisherij = Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ] = −Eξ [∂i∂j`ξ] (4.5.5)
where ∂i =
∂
∂ξi
and `ξ = log p(x; ξ). The second form is only correct when the pξ is
normalised11.
The Fisher metric is a Riemannian metric tensor. It is the general form metric that I
will use in later sections to derive specific colour spaces.
Importantly, it was shown by Chenstov (1982) that the Fisher metric is the unique
Riemannian metric that is invariant under (Fisher) sufficient statistics (see footnote12).
Therefore the Fisher information is special: it is neither dependant on the specific coor-
dinates used to parametrise it (it’s Riemannian), nor is it dependant on any particular
representation of probabilities (it’s Fisher sufficient).
Every (smooth) h-divergence has, as it’s second order term, some multiple of the Fisher
information. So no matter what h-divergence one chooses, it is determined by the Fisher
information at small distances. We have a quantity that is common to all risk based
measures of colour difference.
10when one does not have a normalised probability distribution, one must multiply this by τ =∫
χ
pξdµ(x).
11For the same reasons as the other form requires multiplication by τ .
12A sufficient statistic has a rather technical definition which can be easily found in a good statistics
book. It is hard to describe in words without making the rather tautological claim that it is an information
preserving transformation of a probability distribution. An important example, however, would be a
deterministic transformation. A sufficient statistic is any transformation of a probability distribution that
does not, in effect, add noise.
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The Fisher Metric and the Variational Distance
The variational distance is not smooth at u = 1: we cannot derive the Fisher information
by using a Taylor expansion. This problem can be overlooked by noting that all of the
Bayes consistent loss functions (as discussed in section 4.2) that yield smooth h-divergences
do lead to a multiple of the Fisher information. The Fisher information is common to
all smooth h-divergences that are equivalent to the variational distance - this is in the
sense that they lead to the same optimal classification. Put another way, where a metric
tensor can be defined by an h-divergence, it is proportional to the Fisher information.
All optimal, Bayes consistent classifications correspond to the Fisher metric, or leave a
metric undefined. Or, in other words, where a metric is defined at all the Fisher metric is
common to the entire class decision rules that optimally reduce the error probability.
4.5.2 Connection Coefficients
As well as demonstrating the uniqueness of the Fisher metric, Chenstov (1982) shows that
invariance to sufficient statistics also lead to a definition of the connection coefficients.
The connection he describes is known as the α-connection and has coefficients defined by:
Γ
(α)
ij,k = Eξ
[(
∂i∂j`ξ +
1− α
2
∂i`ξ∂j`ξ
)
(∂k`ξ)
]
(4.5.6)
The α here is the parameter the defines a particular geodesic (as in 4.4.2). Each set of
connection coefficients, of which there is one set for each α, describes a different way of
drawing the optimal line between two points. To calculate them we take the observation
of Amari and Nagaoka (2000) that the coefficients can be identified in the third order
expansion of the divergence (see Appendix C.1) where we see that as a consequence
−α = 3 + 2f
′′′(1)
f ′′(1)
(4.5.7)
This does not mean, however, that integrating along such a curve yields the h-divergence.
Indeed, it only leads to it approximately (fourth order in ∆ξ).
4.5.3 Riemannian Connections
As the h-divergences are symmetric, they behave in a nicer way than f -divergences in
general. Their symmetry can be expressed as:
D(h) ( ξ || ρ ) = D(h) ( ρ || ξ ) (4.5.8)
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meaning that we can write (remembering u =
pρ
pξ
):
∀pξ, pρ :
∫
χ
pξf(u)dµ(x) =
∫
χ
pξuf
(
1
u
)
dµ(x)
f(u) = uf
(
1
u
)
(4.5.9)
Taking the third order derivative we can see that α = 0:
f ′′′(u) = −3f
′′ ( 1
u
)
u4
− f
′′′ ( 1
u
)
u5
2f ′′′(1) = −3f ′′(1)
α = −3− 2f
′′′(1)
f ′′(1)
= 0 (4.5.10)
This means that the affine connection coefficients associated with h-divergences are the
Riemannian connection coefficients, α-geodesics with α = 0:
Γ
(0)
ij,k = Eξ
[(
∂i∂j`ξ +
1
2∂i`ξ∂j`ξ
)
(∂k`ξ)
]
(4.5.11)
which can be seen to be the Riemannian connection by taking equation 4.4.9 and letting
gij = Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ] (this is a standard result, see Amari and Nagaoka, 2000, p33). Firstly:
∂kEξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ] = Eξ [∂i∂k`ξ∂j`ξ] + Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j∂k`ξ] + Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ∂k`ξ]
the last term of which is due to the expectation being taken over a distribution parametrised
by ξ. We now have:
Γ
(Levi-Citiva)
ij,k =
1
2 (∂iEξ [∂k`ξ∂j`ξ] + ∂jEξ [∂i`ξ∂k`ξ]− ∂kEξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ])
= Eξ [∂i∂j`ξ∂k`ξ] +
1
2Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ∂k`ξ]
= Γ
(0)
ij,k (4.5.12)
This symmetry leads to a zero third order term in the expansion of the divergence
in terms of ∆ξ, meaning that the euclidian distance approximates h-divergences an oder
better than non-symmetric divergences.
4.5.4 Variational Distance and Other Divergences
As I mentioned above, the variational distance, which directly yields the probability of
classification error, cannot be directly related to the Riemannian arc-length by geometric
considerations due to the non-differentiability of f(u) = |1−u| at u = 1. And, to do so in
any other way requires knowing more than the value of the divergence.
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Although there is not (necessarily13) a bijective relationship between the variational
and smooth h-divergences, there are a number inequalities that relate the two (Kullback,
1966; Topsœ, 2000).
The most well known inequality is Pinsker’s14 inequality, refined by Fedotov et al.
(2003) which relates variational distance V and the Kullback-Leibler divergence DKL
15
(an f , but not h, -divergence).
DKL(P ||Q) ≥ 12V (P,Q)2 (4.5.13)
In many applications assumptions can be made that allow one to uniquely define a
one-to-one relationship between the variational distance. For example, there is a sizable
section of Wyszecki and Stiles (2000, p682) devoted to, in effect, making such a calculation
assuming Gaussian variables (though this is never made explicit).
4.6 Proof of Concept
Before looking at how this theory can be put in a general setting, it is good to see an
example that shows that it works. Here, I take a basis for a colour space as described
in Vorobyev and Osorio (1998) as a starting point. The space is based upon Poisson
statistics, so the example here uses Poisson distributions and their statistics also. This
example also demonstrates a potentially useful trick. We need not calculate a metric
directly, we can instead use small differences in parameters as measured by a divergence
as an approximation to the metric.
Here I have formulated a model of spectral sensitivity (more specifically a ∆λ curve)
using the KL-Divergence as a divergence that approximates the metric. This curve rep-
resents the ability for an observer to discriminate two monochromatic lights, with wave-
lengths λ and λ + ∆λ: the value of ∆λ being that required for a particular adeptness in
discrimination (in this case set to c). The definition of the quantities here follows exactly
the same method as I will outline in part 5.4, except the calculation of KL-Divergence is
used instead of the Fisher metric.
13It is clear that when two divergences share a geodesics that one will be representable as a function of
the other, as they are both functions of the arc-length. When the geodesics are undefined, as in the case
of the variational distance, it is difficult to formally make such comparisons. There is still a gap in the
information theory literature with regard to this problem.
14Originally reported in Russian: M. S. Pinsker, Information and Information Stability of Random
Variables and Processes. Moscow, U.S.S.R.: Izv. Akad. Nauk, 1960.
15The KL-divergence is defined by f(u) = − log(u) or f(u) = u log(u). In the original paper by Kullback
and Leibler it is defined as (1− u) log u which is an h-divergence (Kullback and Leibler, 1951)
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Figure 4.5: An example of the relationship between the Kullback-Leibler Divergence and the
Variational Distance: The red area is forbidden for any distribution by Pinskers inequality. Pinskers
inequality can be refined making the red area larger. For many model families, such as the one
here: p(x; ξ) = e−(x−ξ)
2/2/
√
2pi, the relationship between DKL and V is bijective. Note: the green
line is the same for both DKL(P ||Q) and DKL(Q||P ).
The approximation can be expressed as:
D(KL) (λ || λ+ ∆λ ) ≈ gij(ξ) ∂ξ
∂λ
∂ξ
∂λ
(∆λ)2 = g(λ)(∆λ)2 (4.6.1)
and setting this to a constant discriminability (c) we have:
D(KL) (λ || λ+ ∆λ ) = c (4.6.2)
which is then solved numerically for small, constant c to produce the ∆λ curves.
A comparison is shown in figure 4.6. The two curves differ very slightly in their loci
in quantum-catch space, in Vorobyev and Osorio (1998) the spectral locus is taken with
equal spectral power, then the luminance contribution is discarded, in the calculation I
present here, the quantum catches of the monochromatic stimuli are forced to be within
the same isoluminant plane by adjusting their power. Even given this difference, it is
easy to see that approximations using divergences do agree well with a standard model in
animal colour vision.
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of the Vorobyev-OsorioVorobyev and Osorio (1998) model with the equiv-
alent model based on the KL-divergence (a non approximate form of 5.4). The graphs show pre-
dicted wavelength discrimination (∆λ), assumed to be inversely proportional to the measure of
discriminability between two neighbouring monochromatic spectra (delta functions centred at λ).
The values of k(i) in the KL-divergence model are 0 for photic and 1000 for scoptic vision. The
two models agree very well, considering the differences outlined in the body text - the difference
between the extremities of the graphs is because of the difference in normalisation described. The
grey lines describe the spectral dependence of each of the photoreceptor classes.
4.7 Extensions
I will now consider a number of extensions to the framework presented so far.
4.7.1 Asymmetric Loss and Non-Riemannian Geodesics
The theory presented so far is explicitly related to symmetric loss functions, as such losses
are need for Bayes consistency. The measure of loss from erring with y = 1 has been the
same as where y = −1. Indeed, this is why it was possible to write these losses as φ(yγ(x)).
However, in many settings, we may be interested in losses that are not symmetric. To
use a well known example from colour theory: the loss associated with a train driver
misidentifying a red light as green is much greater than the loss associated with mistaking
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a green light for a red one.
Relaxing the symmetry condition requires us to write the risk function as a combination
of two functions φ+ and φ− which have the same constraints as the symmetric φ-losses
(convexity etc.):
φ(γ(x), y) =
 φ+(β), y = 1φ−(−β), y = −1 (4.7.1)
This risk, like before, is given by - letting pi(x) = p(x, y = 1) and ψ(x) = p(x, y = −1):
Rφ (γ) = E [φ(γ(x), y)]
=
∫
χ
{
φ+(γ(x))pi(x) + φ−(−γ(x))ψ(x)} dµ(x)
=
∫
χ
pi(x)
{
φ+(γ(x)) + φ−(−γ(x))ψ(x)
pi(x)
}
dµ(x) (4.7.2)
and the optimisation with respect to γ yields an f -divergence:
R∗φ = inf
β
∫
χ
pi(x)
{
φ+(β) + φ−(−β)ψ(x)
pi(x)
}
dµ(x)
=
∫
χ
pi(x) inf
β
{
φ+(β) + φ−(−β)ψ(x)
pi(x)
}
dµ(x)
= −
∫
χ
pi(x)f(u)dµ(x) (4.7.3)
so
f(u) = − inf
β
{
φ+(β) + uφ−(−β)} (4.7.4)
No longer does f(u) = uf(1/u) and this means that the relationships that ensured the
Riemannian connection no longer holds: α = 0 is not by necessity true. Asymmetric losses
imply asymmetric divergences and non-Riemannian connection coefficients.
Example of Asymmetric Divergence from Asymmetric Loss
If we take the exponential loss functions φ(β) = e−β as a starting point, using it to define
an asymmetric loss so that:
φ+(β) = φ(β) (4.7.5)(
φ−(β)
)k
= φ(β) (4.7.6)
k (which is ≥ 0) can be thought of as putting complete emphasis on φ+ when it tends to
zero and complete emphasis on φ− as it tends to infinity; at 1 it is symmetric and Bayes
consistent. This defines a divergence such that:
f(u) = (ku)
1
k+1 + u(ku)
−k
k+1 (4.7.7)
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which is geometrised so that:
h(u) =
1
k
(
(1 + k)(ku)
1
1+k − k 11+k (k + u)
)
gij =
k
1
k+1
k + 1
gFisherij
α =
k − 1
k + 1
(4.7.8)
When k = 1 this is the Hellinger distance. The geodesics that are defined by this divergence
with other values of k range between α = ±1 in the limits of k → ∞ and k → 0. At
these limits, the geodesics are the same as those given by the Kullback-Leibler divergence
(though such limits are behaviourally irrelevant, as it corresponds to infinite risk for one
alternative).
A Testable Hypothesis
The difference in geodesics has testable outcomes. Take the following generalisation ex-
periment; As conditioning, we use two colours for which rewards are given upon being
selected - this is used to train the subject so that they develop a preference for these
two colours.16 Unconditioned stimuli of different colours lying on a line half way between
the two conditioning stimuli as measured by the various α-geodesic distances are then
presented and the preference for each recorded.
The theory presented here would suggest that in the case of equal rewards the preferred
colour would, approximately, lie on the geodesic for which α = 0, whereas, in the case
of unequal rewards (or punishments) a different geodesic would be expected. Let us now
look in more detail at a simple experimental paradigm that has the potential to illuminate
this phenomenon.
The first step is to select a diamond in colour space, ABCD, so that each vertex corre-
sponds to a colour that will be used in the experiment. The lengths of the edges are chosen
so that some information measure with α = 0 is equal for all edges - this corresponds to a
euclidean diamond in a ‘perceptually uniform’ space. Furthermore, we also require that un-
der other divergences, where α 6= 0, that D(f) (B || A ) = D(f) (B || C ), D(f) (A || B ) =
D(f) (C || B ), D(f) (D || A ) = D(f) (D || C ) and D(f) (A || D ) = D(f) (C || D ). In
other words, A and C should be both the same distance from B and both the same
distance from D. This need not be exact, but the closer we get to this, the better the
result.
16Though we could do the reverse and choose colours that are preferred.
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The variation in risk must in some sense relate to the uncertainty. A simple way of
doing this, would to be to put different limits to the response time for different stimuli.
Even if there are prior (i.e. non-equal) risks associated with each stimulus, we can account
for their contribution by exaggerating the difference.
As an example, I have chosen a simple space which is determined by Poisson statistics
(and uniform prior probabilities) so that the metric determining statistics are given by
Poisson distributions with a rate parameters given by the quantum catch (see section 5.4).
To do this I take a standard euclidean square in the coordinate system with coordinates
ξi =
√
qi, where qi is the quantum catch. I choose a square such that
∑
i ξ
i = 1, so as to
mimic chromaticity space. This example uses trichromatic colour space.
Point ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 q1 q2 q3
A 0.663953 0.663953 0.404145 0.440833 0.440833 0.163333
B 0.727350 0.427350 0.577350 0.529038 0.182628 0.333333
C 0.490748 0.490748 0.750555 0.240833 0.240833 0.563333
D 0.427350 0.727350 0.577350 0.182628 0.529038 0.333333
Table 4.2: Coordinates for colours in this example experimental setup.
Figure 4.7: Diagram of the choice of points in section 4.7.1, representing to those in table 4.2.
The triangle represents a chromaticity type space in ξ.
For the experiment, using an unbiased or unbiased set of rewards we train the subject
to colours specified by B and D, then as a test we look at the preference for the colours A
or C. When the rewards are equal we should expect no preference for either A or C, when
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they differ, we should expect a bias. We can see this in table 4.3. The exact quantification
of the distances is impossible as we do not know exactly which risk function is appropriate,
but we can look at the qualitative change. We can think of the different f -divergences as all
being monotonic functions of some natural α-geodesic distance (such as the α-divergences
of Amari and Nagaoka (2000)), thus, if for some divergence with a given α, one distance
is greater than another, this will also be the case for any other divergence with the same
α. The changing of α in this experiment, is in effect moving the two training points closer
or further away from one of the two test points (and a such requires a corresponding
asymmetry to exist in the relationship between the squares coordinates and geometric
structure of the statistical manifold). This is represented diagrammatically in figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: The ‘apparent’ geometry of the stimuli for different α (and thus, relative rewards in
the training scenario). The divergences are measured either rightwards (
−−→
AD,
−−→
BA,
−−→
BC and
−−→
CD)
or leftwards (
−−→
AB,
−−→
CB,
−−→
DA and
−−→
DC), or equivalently in one direction with ±α (see Amari and
Nagaoka, 2000, 3.1 - The Duality of Connections). Assuming that we are measuring divergences
in a chosen direction, as we change |α|, B and D move closer to either A or C, measuring in the
other direction, the converse happens.
4.7.2 Different Prior Probabilities
I shall end the substantive part of this section by showing how the theory presented above
can be extended to non-normalised probabilities. Up to now I have mostly considered mea-
surements on conditional probabilities by assuming a maximum entropy prior distribution
over the actual class Y. The theory can be easily extended to prior class distributions
that are not maximum entropy; it has been left to the end as it makes no difference
to the previous arguments except for making formulae much harder to read. This is an
application of the quite general procedure of denormalisation as outlined by Amari and
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Choice α = −1 α = 0 α = 1
A 0.47498 0.50000 0.52495
C 0.52495 0.50000 0.47498
Table 4.3: Relative distances of A and C from B and D. The values in the table are given by
D(f)(B || X )
D(f)(B || X )+D(f)(X || D ) , where X is either A or C. I have used the canonical divergences of Amari
and Nagaoka (2000) as D(f) ( · || · ), these are the two Kullback-Leibler divergences for α = ±1,
and the Hellinger distance for α = 0. Different choices would give different values but the trend
would remain; the fraction either increasing or decreasing with α (depending on the choice of A or
C) and with it staying constant at 0.5 for all α = 0.
Nagaoka (2000). Denormalisation allows us to not only consider a manifold of probability
distributions such that∫
X
p(x)dµ(x) = 1 (4.7.9)
but any value τ > 0:∫
X
p(x)dµ(x) = τ (4.7.10)
Using the same definition as equation 4.3.3, one can write a general f -divergence as:
D(f) ( y1 || y2 ) =
∫
X
p(x, y1)f
(
p(x, y2)
p(x, y1)
)
dµ(x) (4.7.11)
=
∫
X
p(x|y1)p(y1)f
(
p(x|y2)p(y2)
p(x|y1)p(y1)
)
dµ(x) (4.7.12)
From here, we make the identifications:
p(x|y1) = p(x; ξ1) (4.7.13)
p(x|y2) = p(x; ξ2) (4.7.14)
p(y1) = τ (4.7.15)
p(y2) = 1− τ (4.7.16)
but consider the more general case of divergences between (ξ1, τ1) and (ξ2, τ2) with the
above special case being where τ1 = τ and τ2 = 1 − τ . This means that we have, letting
ρi = (ξi, τi):
p(x, y1) = τ1p(x; ξ1) = p(x; ρ1) (4.7.17)
p(x, y2) = (1− τ1)p(x; ξ2) = p(x; ρ2) (4.7.18)
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so that in general we have f -divergences of the form:
D(f) ( ρ1 || ρ2 ) =
∫
X
p(x; ρ1)f
(
p(x; ρ2)
p(x; ρ1)
)
(4.7.19)
Defining the a new index τ which corresponds to partial derivatives as:
∂τ =
∂
∂τ
(4.7.20)
The Fisher metric is extended to g˜ by:
g˜ij = τgij , g˜iτ = 0, g˜ττ =
1
τ
(4.7.21)
or more graphically, for a parameter vector (ξ1 · · · ξN , τ):
g˜ =

...
...
. . . τgij . . . 0
N
...
...
. . . 0N . . . τ
−1
 (4.7.22)
Often we are concerned with a space with fixed prior probabilities - the sub-manifold with
τ = q(ξ). i.e. where q(ξ) is the prior probability at any ξ. This corresponds to cases where
q(ξ) is determined natural scene statistics or, if one wishes, other more contextualised
distributions. It is fairly straight forward to calculate the metric on this sub-manifold, it
is simply the value of g¯ which yields a solution to:
g¯ijdξ
idξj =
(
τgij +
1
τ
(∂iτ)(∂jτ)
)
dξidξj (4.7.23)
g¯ij = τ (gij + (∂i log τ)(∂j log τ)) (4.7.24)
I shall not go into any more details here, except to show that not using prior probabilities
(instead, just normalised and parametrised distributions) is equivalent to the uniform
(maximum entropy) prior over all ξ. If we want a prior distribution that yields the same
geometry as the conditional geometry (up to a multiplicative constant: kg¯ = g for some
k > 0), then we have the requirement:
kgij = τ (gij + (∂i log τ)(∂j log τ)) (4.7.25)
The easiest way of solving this is realising the second part of the sum must be zero:
∂i log τ = 0 (4.7.26)
τ = constant (4.7.27)
which is clearly a solution to the equation in general and corresponds to a uniform prior.
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4.8 Summary of Framework
The theoretical framework presented above shows how colour spaces can be generated
from the starting point of risk as found in machine learning literature. It will be seen in
the next chapter that this theory leads to familiar colour spaces.
I have shown how a requirement for Bayes consistency of the binary classifier responsi-
ble for discriminating colours yields a whole class of distance measures - the h-divergences.
These are symmetric. When it is possible to define a Riemannian metric from them, it is a
multiple of the Fisher metric. All of them yield the same geometry. Whilst it is true that
divergences in general do not give Riemannian geodesics, the class of h-divergences does.
The curves along which h-divergences are minimised are all Riemannian geodesics. If we
relax the constraint of symmetric loss functions the geodesics are potentially different.
Non-Riemannian α-geodesics correspond to non-Bayes-consistent binary classifiers and we
see that the weighting of the classifier towards a particular choice changes the geodesic
and that the effect of this can potentially be observed experimentally.
For all risks I have mentioned there is a corresponding divergence, and as demonstrated
in appendix C.1 and by the theorem of Chenstov (1982) this means that the Fisher metric
is the only Riemannian metric to use for colour theory (and perceptual theory in general!)
if one requires consistency with this model of risk. Such measures constitute a large class
of global metrics that can all be justified as measures of long range colour difference - this
reflects the difficulties that exist in deriving such quantities, in fact, to my knowledge no
other theoretically justified derivations of such measures exist.
With the addition of the α-connection to the geometry of colour we also have a gener-
alised notion of perceptual uniformity, with a different type of uniformity for each value
of |α|. The transformation of coordinates so that divergences become straight (euclidean)
lines is not uniquely defined, but connected to the value of α. Making a space perceptually
uniform in this sense applies to non-infinitesimal distances must therefore take this into
account (using α-affinity, see Amari and Nagaoka, 2000). In biological systems the risks
and rewards involved with making a decision are rarely symmetric. The results here are
of great importance in such cases. However, in the contrived situation of an experiment
where there is no bias in the risks or rewards involved, we can expect α to be zero and
the transformation to perceptual uniformity to be the one that makes the Fisher metric
proportional to the identity matrix.
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Chapter 5
Local Models of Colour Vision
“In nature we never see anything isolated, but everything in connection with
something else which is before it, beside it, under it and over it.”
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 1749-1832
In this section I will review some existing models of colour that use differential geo-
metric methods, formulating them in the framework of the previous section so that I may
highlight some of the theoretical assumptions that they suggest.
Although under certain regimes photoreceptor responses are linear (de Ruyter van
Steveninick and Laughlin, 1996), this is not always the case (Alleysson and He´rault, 1997;
French et al., 1993). A commonly cited example of photoreceptor non-linearity is the
Bezold-Bru¨cke effect, where lights that are bright relative to the state of adaptation de-
saturate (Backhaus, 1992). There is a less obvious, but ubiquitous source of non-linearity:
where there is non-Gaussian noise. This is so because in general we can find a non-linear
transformation of the support such that the noise becomes Gaussian. Similarly, we can do
the inverse; turn Gaussian noise on a non-linear coordinate1 into non-Gaussian noise on a
linear coordinate. This is where the coordinate invariant information geometric measures
find their true place.
Here I investigate non-linearities arising from various non-Gaussian noise regimes and
the connection between various existing colour spaces from the perspective of the frame-
work I developed. I will provide the Fisher metric and (where possible) a transformation
of the quantum catch coordinates that makes the space ‘perceptually uniform’.2
Perceptually uniform in this case does not describe the experience of the subject, but
simply to the affine nature of the geometry. Such correspondance could only be achieved
1By this I mean a coordinate non-linearly related to the transmitted signal - such as in Shannon (1948).
2The transformation ρ(ξ) makes the space perceptually uniform if gij(ρ) = kδij .
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if the model were perfect and the risk was entirely captured by the Euclidean distance.
Perceptual uniformity in this case is simply a short hand to describe a cannonical form of a
coordinate system which if derived from a good model would have rotationally symmetric
and equal sized ellipsoids describing the ability to descriminate.
Notation
For this section I will adopt the convention that the coordinates ξ ∈ Ξ refer to those of
the quantum catch space - previously written q in 1.3.1. I use ρ ∈ R to represent other
coordinates systems. The support coordinates x ∈ X , as before, parametrise the space
whose elements are used to produce a classification.
5.1 Gaussian Noise
The most immediately apparent application of information theoretic approaches is the
case where Gaussian noise is ‘added to a signal’, much like the cases used by (Shannon,
1948) to derive information measures based on signal to noise ratios. This simple model
is the point of departure for the rest of the chapter, in which the models will become
increasing detailed. However, it can be shown that this situation is broadly applicable and
that a similar result holds for all members of the exponential family whose parametrisation
define only the mean and leave all other moments constant3. Although this model is rather
simplistic, it is important as the Gaussian distribution plays a central role in information
theory and the metric space it induces is affine. From now on I will make use of some the
notational devices in appendices A.3.1, A.3.2 and A.3.3.
The model of the colour system of an n-chromat is simply taken to be the statistical
manifold described by the probability density functions representing independent Gaussian
noise around a mean value of ξ:
p(x; ξ) =
n∏
k=1
1
σk
√
2pi
exp
(
−(ξk − xk)2/2(σk)2
)
(5.1.1)
Each variate in X is independent so we can immediately see that gij(ξ) = 0 when i 6= j.
For the same reason it is possible to treat each case where i = j separately - letting us
3See Amari and Nagaoka (2000)
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drop the indices for now. I will use ∂ to denote ∂∂ξ .
`(x; ξ) = −(ξ − x)
2
2σ2
+ constant
∂`(x; ξ) = −(ξ − x)
σ2
E [∂`(x; ξ)∂`(x; ξ)] =
∫ ∞
−∞
(ξ − x)2
σ4
1
σ
√
2pi
e
−(ξ−x)2
2σ2 dx (5.1.2)
which can be evaluated (using parts) to:
E [∂`(x; ξ)∂`(x; ξ)] =
1
σ2
=⇒ gii = 1
σ2(i)
(5.1.3)
so
gij =
δkij
(σk)
2 (5.1.4)
The metric in this case is equal to the inverse of the covariance matrix of that would
describe the multivariate Gaussian in equation 5.1.1 - as the coordinates of X are inde-
pendent such a covariance matrix would be diagonal. It is not particularly hard to derive
the case where Gaussian noise is correlated between the photoreceptors, in which case,
the metric is given by the inverse of a non-diagonal covariance matrix. This justifies the
commonly used covariance matrix derivation (Vorobyev and Osorio, 1998; Wyszecki and
Stiles, 2000), but also shows that it can only be taken to be realistic when the assumption
of independent additive Gaussian (up to change in measure) noise is applicable.
5.2 Weber’s Law: Helmholtz’s and Stiles’ Spaces
The colour model of von Helmholtz (1896)4 represents the earliest non-trivial colour space
model. This space has many justifications, I wish to use it here as a means of idealising two
extremes of explanation - one where the metric arises deterministically, the other where it
arises statistically. The examination of this space provides an entry point to a discussion
about the correct derivation of colour space metrics.
The Helmholtz space has the metric:
gij =
δklij
(τ lξk)
2 (5.2.1)
which is often justified as the application of Weber’s law to each photoreceptor channel.
This can be seen by choosing a straight line γ(t):
γ(t) = tzi + ci (5.2.2)
4See also Wyszecki and Stiles (2000, p658)
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for zi ∈ R+ with the constraint that z is a unit vector (zizi = 1). Then:
ds2 = gij
∂γi(t)
∂t
∂γj(t)
∂t
dt2
= δkij
zizj(
τ(k)ξk
)2 dt2 (5.2.3)
so that when a line which only changes in one photoreceptor coordinate, m, i.e. zi = zm =
1 for some i = m then:
ds =
dt
τ(m)ξm
(5.2.4)
To get Weber’s law, we consider a linear approximation:
∆s = δijm
∆t
τ iξj
(5.2.5)
If we identify ∆t∆s the apparent change with respect to the actual change - i.e. a small
change in the coordinates: ∆ξ we get, after dropping the indices:
∆ξ
ξ
= τ (= ω) (5.2.6)
where ω is known as the Weber fraction. We say ‘the discriminability is proportional to
the intensity’. We should note that this doesn’t apply to changes in any directions other
than along the coordinate axes i.e. z = (1, 0, 0, ...), (0, 1, 0, ...) etc. Weber’s law cannot be
taken to apply both at the photoreceptor level and in the colour space at large.
But how is this justified mechanistically? Is it justified at all? There have been many
attempts to justify Weber’s law mechanistically (Cope, 1976; Deco and Rolls, 2006; Masin
et al., 2009; Shen and Jung, 2006), the problem it seems, is not that it’s hard to derive,
but the complete opposite - it is too easy - there are so many different ways that it can
arise that it is impossible to say that it is any particular one without further argument.
I will now provide two interpretations of this metric, one statistical, the other deter-
ministic.
5.2.1 Derivation as a Statistical Phenomenon
The firing of sensory neurons can often be described as a Poisson processes, neurons that
can be described like this are known as Poisson neurons. One could consider a population
of N Poisson neurons whose mean inter-spike interval5 is proportional to signal intensity
as defined by the quantum catch ξ (spike time encoding, see e.g. Sanderson et al., 1973).
5The inter-spike interval is the time between action potentials. The distribution is typical of sensory
neurons.
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This situation implies that each of the population’s inter-spike intervals, xi, are distributed
according to a gamma distribution.
Pr(xi = xiα) =
(xiα)
N+1e−xiα/τξi
Γ(N)(τξi)N
(5.2.7)
With some work it is possible to derive equation 5.2.1 as the Fisher metric for this distri-
bution (see Appendix D.2). It results in an equation of the form:
gij =
Nδkij
(τξk)2
(5.2.8)
which is the Helmholtz metric.
5.2.2 Interpretation as a Deterministic Phenomenon
It is possible to assume that photoreceptors respond logarithmically to the amount of
light incident upon them (see e.g. Koshitaka et al., 2008). Using this we can calculate the
transformation from the quantum catch type space (parametrised by ξ) to a photoreceptor
type space (parametrised by ρ = [ρa]). As the channels are independent we can do the
calculations without indices, as in the first section:
ρ = log ξ so
∂ξ
∂ρ
= ξ (5.2.9)
We now get the metric in this coordinate system that corresponds to the Helmholtz metric
in the quantum catch coordinates (this is to show that when we use this parametrisation
the metric is affine).
gab(ρ) = gij (ξ)
∂ξi
∂ρa
∂ξj
∂ρb
=
δkij
τ2(k)(ξ
k)2
(δiaξ
i)(δjbξ
j) =
δkab
τ2(k)
(5.2.10)
We see that when parametrised by the logarithm of the quantum catch the Helmholtz
space is affine. The affine (Gaussian based) metric on logarithmic quantum catch space is
the same as the Helmholtz metric on (linear) quantum catch space.6
5.2.3 Two Explanations, One Result
It seems that without any extra argument neither of these is justified more than the other.
Indeed, attempting to reverse engineer a single result to find a complex mechanism is not
very sensible in the first place. However, there may be additional reasons to accept or
reject a given way of arriving at a particular result when many alternatives exist. The
6The original coordinate system in which Helmholtz defined the metric was this (linear in quantum
catch).
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following section argues that when addressing psychophysical metrics we should reject a
deterministic model in favour of a statistical model. More precisely, I argue that deter-
ministic models such as the one above are actually statistical models in disguise.
5.3 The Fallacy of Metrics Based on Noiseless Physiological
Transformations
I have described two potential explanations for the Helmholtz metric that seem to be at
odds with each other. One is based on a physiologically motivated, deterministic trans-
formation, the other on the addition of physiologically motivated, non-Gaussian noise. I
would like to briefly discuss how deterministic transformations should be applied and how
noise based spaces are related. I will then argue that in actuality a physiological space is
a noise based space with tacit assumptions about the nature of the noise. To illustrate
this I will begin by beating on a straw man - the claim that “you can have a colour metric
without noise”.
Consider a one dimensional system completely without noise. The value of a signal s
is transformed by a one-to-one function f into a probability distribution p on support X
with elements x and parametrised by s. This is completely general, it captures all possible
(continuous) deterministic relationships between the ‘input’ s and the ‘output’ x:
p(x; s) = δ(x− f(s)) (5.3.1)
where δ, unlike elsewhere in this document, is the Dirac delta7. As the Dirac delta is
discontinuous, let us instead consider the distribution:
p¯(x; s) =
exp
(
− (x−f(s))2
2k2
)
k
√
2pi
(5.3.2)
which converges to the distribution in equation 5.3.1 in the limit k → 0:
lim
k→0
p¯(x; s) = p(x; s) (5.3.3)
To calculate the Fisher metric we need to assume that it can take values in the extended
real numbers R¯ with their usual algebraic definitions8. The Fisher metric for the p¯ system
7This is defined so that δ(x) = 0 if x 6= 0 and ∫X δ(x) = 1.
8The extend reals (R¯) are the real numbers with the addition of points at ±∞ so that R¯ = R∪{−∞,+∞}
In this case these additional numbers obey, for all x ∈ R¯, y ∈ R: −(+∞) = −∞; +∞ > −∞; +∞ > y;
−∞ < y; x + (+∞) = +∞, for x 6= −∞; x − (+∞) = −∞ for x 6= +∞; x × (±∞) = ±∞ for x > 0;
x× (±∞) = ∓∞ for x < 0; y/±∞ = 0; ±∞/y = ±∞ for y > 0 and ±∞/y = ∓∞ for y < 0.
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is:
gij =
δij
k2
(5.3.4)
so that in the limit where p¯→ p we have:
lim
k→0
gij = lim
k→0
δij
1
k2
=
 +∞, i = j0, otherwise (5.3.5)
and similarly for the linearised distance between two points arc-length ∆s we have:
∆s2 = gij∆ξ
i∆ξj =
|∆ξ|2
k2
so ∆s =
|∆ξ|
k
(5.3.6)
then
lim
k→0
∆s =
 limk→0
|∆ξ|
k , |∆ξ| > 0
0, |∆ξ| = 0
=
 +∞, |∆ξ| > 00, |∆ξ| = 0 (5.3.7)
Here, every signal is perfectly discriminable from every other. By it, everything is either
exactly the same or completely different. There is in fact a metric which has this property,
it is called the discrete metric (Sutherland, 1975) and the distance between two stimuli x
and y is given by:
d(x, y) =
 0, x = yk, otherwise where k is a strictly positive constant (5.3.8)
This metric could be described as categorical. Each point is a unique in every possible
way. There are no degrees of sameness, just ‘identical’ and ‘different’. In fact, the topology
it induces is completely different from the other metrics I have considered (Sutherland,
1975) - it is so perverse that the (topological) dimension of the colour space is no longer
the number of photoreceptor classes, but is instead 0. The space is a sea of isolated points;
there is no concept of a point being ‘near’ another; there is no geometry at all!.
While we have got a metric from this transformation, it is not Riemannian, nor does
it even correspond to a more general differential manifold.9 On this basis we can quickly
see that it does not correspond to any known colour model. Nor does it correspond to our
sensibilities about biological systems. A sensory system with perfect fidelity is unheard of.
9Such as those described by multidimensional scaling. This technique is widely applied, in domains
including colour (Backhaus et al., 1984), sound (Ame´zquita et al., 2011) and electrosensation (Von der
Emde and Ronacher, 1994).
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Nor does there exist an organism capable of a myriad of contingent actions. This would
require an oracle of a scale that only exists in works of fiction (Borges, 1941).
A noiseless system is both unintuitive and leads to unrealistic metrics. Conversely,
as the discrete metric of equation 5.3.8 is a consequence of all deterministic mappings10,
when there is geometry other than the discrete one we must infer there is indeterminacy
underlying it.
A physiological result that suggests an input is deterministically transformed
in some way tells us absolutely nothing about perceptual metrics without the
addition of further assumptions!
Later in this chapter I will give an example of a case where this was not recognised
and then go on to derive a similar result in the correct way. But for now I will continue
my review of established colour metrics as they lead to this space incrementally.
5.4 Schro¨dinger’s, and Vos and Walveren’s Spaces
Spaces such as that of Schro¨dinger (1920) and Vos and Walraven (1972a,b), as well as
that of Vorobyev and Osorio (1998) can be thought of as being based on Poisson statistics
and in their simplest form upon the Poisson distribution parametrised by a linear function
of the quantum catch. This has so far been calculated by substituting the variance of a
Poisson distribution into the euclidean metric equivalent to the inverse covariance matrix.
In this case this method does not yield a different result from the Fisher metric (though
this does not hold more generally). To derive these three Poisson based spaces we calculate
a metric based on two Poisson processes:
1. Photon noise: the number of photoisomerisation events happens at rate ξ.
2. Dark noise: the photopigment molecules spontaneously isomerise at rate k. This is
a constant parameter for these models.
In the case of (Schro¨dinger, 1920), k is set to zero. Explicitly, in the space of Vorobyev
and Osorio (1998), and implicitly in the Stiles space, photoreceptor density is taken into
account: the incident light is summed over a given area of the retina and is thus dependent
on the photoreceptor density d. For a particular area, A we have11:
X ∼ Poisson (dA(ξ + k)) (5.4.1)
10The methodology here only applies to continuous mappings, but a derivation for discontinuous f should
be possible using the foundation provided by Lebanon (2005).
11We can consider multiple photoreceptors by the rate additivity of the Poisson distribution.
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so that, more generally in the case of multiple receptor types the Fisher metric is given
by (see Appendix D.1):
gij =
δlij
Ad(l)(ξl + k(l))
(5.4.2)
In the case of scotopic (night-time) vision, k(l)  ξl and:
gij ≈
δlij
Ad(l)k(l)
(5.4.3)
which defines a euclidean space: The metric has constant diagonal elements, much as in
the Gaussian case presented earlier.
In photopic (day-time) conditions k(l)  ξl:
gij ≈
δlij
Ad(l)ξl
(5.4.4)
which, unlike the scotopic space is not affine in the quantum catch coordinates - it is not
automatically perceptually uniform. When this is taken as an equality is equivalent to the
space of Schro¨dinger (1920) at fixed luminance. It is also interesting to note that if ∆s2 is
taken to be an apparent distance, then this space obeys Fechner’s law in a non-coordinate
determinant manner (unlike the Helmholtz space). As I described in chapter 4, divergences
can be thought of as squared arc-lengths as D(f) ( ξ || ξ + ∆ξ ) ≈ ∆ξi∆ξi = ∆s2 and are
the best candidates for long range perceptual measures.
In the space of Vorobyev and Osorio (1998) the photopic and scotopic cases are treated
individually and not shown as a continuum of k/ξ between 1 and 0 - unlike here. Further-
more, in their model the space I have so far described is further elaborated upon. This is
the subject of the following section. Before doing this, I will specify the transformation of
the quantum catch space to the perceptually uniform space. This is simply a solution to:
gij (ξ)dξ
idξj =
δlijdξ
idξj
Ad(l)(ξl + k(l))
= δabdρ
adρb (5.4.5)
noting that the metric has no cross terms we have for each coordinate:
dρ2 =
dξ2
Ad(ξ + k)
so
∂ρ
∂ξ
=
1√
Ad(ξ + k)
and (after reintroducing the indices)
ρi =
∫
dξi√
Ad(ξi + k)
=
√
4
(
ξi + k(i)
)
Ad(i)
(5.4.6)
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5.5 Projective Models of Colour Vision
The class of projective colour spaces are used to model chromatic-opponent processes -
processes where comparisons are made between the excitations of photoreceptors. These,
in their most na¨ıve (and common) form are produced by a linear projection of coordinates
into a space orthogonal to a ‘luminance vector’. This vector is often assumed to be the
‘one vector’ (1), i.e. the vector whose components in the quantum catch space are all
equal to 1. This is fairly trivial in affine spaces, but when the projection is made from
a coordinate system where the metric depends on the coordinates, extra considerations
must be made.
In an affine space, it suffices to simply consider the null space12 of the luminance vector.
Here, the null space is identical no matter what value the luminance takes. However, as
we will see when the metric changes as we move in direction of the luminance vector we
have to use a more specific projection, such as the one used by Maxwell (1860), see figures
1.6 and 1.7.
5.5.1 Chromatic Opponency
The most straight forward way of modelling chromatic opponency is by simply considering
the vectors spanning the null space of the luminance vector. We simply say that:
ρi = Sijξ
j (5.5.1)
where [Sij ] is a matrix that spans the null space of the achromatic vector. For example, in
human colour vision, it is usually a red-green and a yellow-blue opponency channel, so if:
[ξi] =

Red
Green
Blue
 =

R
G
B
 (5.5.2)
then we have
[Sij ] =
 1 −1 0
1
2
1
2 −1
 (5.5.3)
meaning that the opponent mechanisms can be expressed in their usual form (Wyszecki
and Stiles, 2000) of:
ρ1 = R−G and ρ2 = 12(R+G)−B (5.5.4)
12Let A be the m-by-n matrix formed by the n-vectors, {v1 · · ·vm} = V , then the null space of V (and
also of A) is the set of all n-vectors {x} which are solutions to Ax = 0
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The general linear transformation of coordinates in equation 5.5.1 could equally be written
:
∂ρi
∂ξj
= Sij (5.5.5)
There are many possible values for [Sij ], each one corresponding to a particular set of
linear chromatic opponency mechanisms. Here, I consider these mechanisms in general.
Applying [Sij ] gives a new metric tensor g¯:
g¯ab(ρ) = gij (ξ)
∂ρi
∂ξa
∂ρj
∂ξb
= gijS
i
aS
j
b (5.5.6)
to get the form used by Vorobyev and Osorio, g¯ is expressed as a function of the original
coordinates ξ as opposed to the chromaticity coordinates ρ. This has the advantage of the
resulting expression being insensitive to the particular choice of [Sij ] (but not the choice
of achromatic vector).
5.5.2 Vorobyev-Osorio Model
Now we are in a position to write an expression for the Vorobyev-Osorio space. It is simply
the application of the projection above to the general Poisson space:
gij(ξ) =
δlabS
a
i S
b
j
Ad(l)(ξl + k(l))
(5.5.7)
This works very well in practice, and is theoretically sound when ξi  k(i) and we can
approximate it as affine. However, there is a minor problem in photopic vision. The
problem occurs when looking at geodesics, and thus long range colour difference measures.
We know that by definition of [Sji ] as the null space of an achromatic vector [a
i], that:
Sji a
i = 0 (5.5.8)
This means that the geodesic distance d between pairs of points that differ only in the
achromatic direction in colour space should always be the same. In other words, there
is no cost (in terms of distance between points) for moving either of them in a direction
parallel to the achromatic axis. More formally for a metric d, points p and q and scalar
constants k and k′:
d(p, q) = d(p+ ka, q) = d(p, q + ka) = d(p+ ka, q + ka) (5.5.9)
We know that as we move a point away from the origin in the achromatic direction we
necessarily increase all of ξi and therefore decrease gij . Restricting the measurement of
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distances to within the space perpendicular to a we see that for any  > 0 that we can
find a value of k such that:
d(p+ ka, q + ka) <  (5.5.10)
as the metric g becomes arbitrarily small as we increase k. Thus, as the geodesic is the
minimum possible distance under certain constraints, and those constraints do not exclude
the method of choosing a path that goes in the direction of achromatic vector to a point
arbitrarily far away in terms of coordinates (yet adding no distance), through the null
space (adding an arbitrarily small distance) and back in the opposite direction to the
achromatic vector to the second point (again adding no distance), then, for any  > 0 we
have:
d(p, q) <  (5.5.11)
In other words, the geodesic distance between any two points is arbitrary small. In practice
this problem is avoided by restricting the choice of colours to an isoluminant plane13,
removing the possibility of points which differ only in the achromatic direction. The model,
as it stands, is nonetheless problematic for the methods used in the previous chapter - it
is unsuitable for the consideration of long range colour distances.
5.5.3 Honeybee Hexagon Space
We now come to the Honeybee Hexagon space of Chittka (1992): the space I discussed
in section 5.3. I must emphasise that Chittka is not the only person to use this kind
of methodology, I use his space here firstly because it is a colour space14 and secondly
because he made his assumptions very explicit.
The Honeybee Hexagon Space defines a perceptually uniform coordinate system for
the honeybee. The space uses the physiological transform of Backhaus (1992), mapping
the quantum catch space to the unit cube (honeybees are trichromats):
ρi =
(
ξi
k(i) + ξi
)d
(5.5.12)
where d is taken to be 1. It is then assumed, as in Vorobyev and Osorio (1998) to create
a uniform space so that the colour distance ∆s is given in a projected space by:
∆s2 = δijS
i
aS
j
b∆ρ
a∆ρb (5.5.13)
13An isoluminant plane is defined with respect to a particular achromatic vector a (usually taken to be
1). It is the locus of quantum catches such that 〈a, ξ〉 = a · ξ = constant .
14The misconception that it is how a signal that gets transformed, not how a signal and noise gets
transformed, is very common in neuroscience.
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where [Sia] spans the null space of 1. This projects the unit cube into the eponymous
hexagon.
To get the associated metric we first find the the Jacobian of the coordinate transform:
∂ρa
∂ξi
=
δami
(k(m) + ξm)2
(5.5.14)
meaning that the metric in quantum catch space is simply:
gij (ξ) = δαβS
α
a S
β
b
∂ρa
∂ξi
∂ρb
∂ξj
=
Sai S
b
jδ
l
ab
(k(l) + ξl)4
(5.5.15)
Whilst it differs from the Osorio-Vorobyev model by some constants and a power, the
two are pretty similar. Both of them have a projective part and a part of with the form
1/(Aξ+B)C . This is a feature common to all the spaces in this chapter (with the exception
of the one to follow, which differs very slightly). This is an important informational feature
which I will return to.
However, as I have stated before, we cannot base a colour metric on physiology alone,
there must have been some assumptions made. Post hoc we can see that this corresponds
to Gaussian noise with unit variance centred around the ρ coordinate (up to invariances
of the Fisher metric). But, the space was not based on such a theoretical construct, it was
simply an application of the transform of Backhaus (1992) with an empirical justification.
However, we can arrive at a very similar result on a (comparatively) rigorous basis.
The next section describes how we can get a space that describes photoreceptors that
saturate in accordance with the phenomenology of the Bezold-Bru¨ker effect through purely
statistical considerations. I will show that the coordinate transform that such an exercise
yields is similar, but not equivalent to that used in the Honeybee Hexagon space. The
noise based model I will describe is the most detailed in this chapter, so in a sense the
following work justifies the less rigorously grounded animal colour space of Chittka (1992)
using the principles of more theoretically justified animal colour space of Vorobyev and
Osorio (1998).
5.6 A Statistical Saturating Photoreceptor Model
Using the framework I have described it is possible to generate colour space metrics for
a saturating photoreceptor from first principles. The space developed by Vos and Wal-
raven (1972a,b) is similar in being based on Poisson processes and exhibiting saturation,
it is based on fairly arbitrary assumptions (leading to their exact words being quoted in
Wyszecki and Stiles, 2000, p676.). The following is a simplified model of the phototrans-
duction processes in a photoreceptor cell. The simplest model is that described in section
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5.4, where the metric is simply determined by shot noise from photons. For a single pho-
toreceptor this yields15 gij = g =
1
ξ+k where ξ is the quantum catch and k is dark noise
arising from spontaneous isomerisations of photopigment molecules.
It is well known that G-protein signalling is a fundamental part of the signal trans-
duction pathway. I will proceed from the general form of signal transduction as described
by Hao et al. (2007) (but see also Bao et al., 2010; Heitzler et al., 2009; Linderman, 2009,
for a comparison of approaches). The models used by Hao et al. (2007) to model yeast
osmosensation have a common structure - each amplification stage can be written as an
equilibrium catalysed by the catalytic product of the previous step.
∅ −→ A C↓−−⇀↽− B −→ ∅ (5.6.1)
Which is a general adapting molecular sensor. The equilibrium between A and B is
catalysed by C. Adaptation is achieved by the constant creation of A and the concentration
proportionate flow of B out of the system. For the purposes of the model, here I will
assume there is just a single stage, or that the first stage dominates the statistics of the
later stages. Explicitly labelling the rates we have:
∅ kcreation−−−−−→ A kforwards−−−−−⇀↽ −
kreverse
B
kdecay−−−−→ ∅ (5.6.2)
Before continuing I will make a further approximation - that the system is adapted. This
can be either expressed as the constraint that16 kcreation = kdecay[B] where the number
of molecules in the system is constant up to Poisson noise or that kcreation, [B]kdecay 
kreverse[B], kforwards[A] and the number of molecules is exactly constant. Both of these
assumptions allow us to isolate the catalysed equilibrium, so that we can write it as:
A
kb−⇀↽−
kr
B (5.6.3)
The two approximations imply that we should treat the relationship between kr, kb and
kcreation, kdecay, kreverse, kforwards differently. In the first, kb should depend on kreverse and
kforwards, in the second it shouldn’t. Also, in the first approximation we know the expected
number of A and B molecules is constant, in the second, we know the exact number is
constant. I will take the latter approximation as the basis for this model, noting that we
may make it more like the first by including the creation and decay rates in the parameters
which I will call λ and µ.
With this in place, this model becomes a type of queueing problem, the statistics of
which were developed by Agner Krarup Erlang (a gentle but thorough introduction can
15We can drop the indices now we are only talking about one photoreceptor class
16I use square brackets to mean ‘concentration of’
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be found here: Iverson, 2010). We can arrive at a probability distribution for the number
of isomerised photopigment molecules in the membrane by considering a process where
photopigments molecules are photoisomerised according to a Poisson process with rate λ
per active molecule and then recycled with at rate of µ = 1/τ where τ is the half-life of
the photoisomerised molecule. This assumes the recovery to exponentially distributed, as
would be expected from reaction kinetics which are first order in bleached pigment. We
begin with a state diagram that looks like figure 5.1.
0
nλ
μ
1
(n-1)λ
2μ
(n-k+1)λ
kμ
k
(n-k)λ
(k+1)μ
k+1
(n-k-1)λ
(k+2)μ
2λ
(N-1)μ
n-1
λ
nμ
n. . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 5.1: State diagram of the number of active photopigment molecules in a photoreceptor
membrane.
In this diagram we have states corresponding to each of the possible numbers of active
molecules in the membrane - i.e. states numbered as k from 0 to n, where n is the
maximum number of isomerised molecules. The number of molecules transitions from a
state k to a state k + 1 proportionally to n − k - the number of active molecules. This
is also proportional to the rate of photons hitting the cell: λ. So in total we have a rate
of transition for k to k + 1 of λ(n − k). Similarly, we have a recovery process with rate
proportional to the number of inactive (bleached) molecules.
From this state diagram we find the probabilities of each state as found in statistical
equilibrium. We do this by solving equations for zero net flux between the states, for
example, for the state k = 0 we have the equation (where pk is the probability of finding
state k):
µp1 − nλp0 = 0 (5.6.4)
and for k = 1:
2µp2 + nλp0 − (n− 1)λp1 − µp1 = 0 (5.6.5)
similarly for all other pk. We also wish to assure that the probabilities add to one, so:∑
k
pk = 1 (5.6.6)
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It is fairly straight-forwards to verify that this system of equations is satisfied by:
pk =
n
k
 λkµn−k
(λ+ µ)n
(5.6.7)
where
n
k
 is the standard representation of the binomial coefficient. This implies that
k is distributed binomially such that:
k ∼ Binomial
(
n,
λ
λ+ µ
)
(5.6.8)
The Fisher metric for this is derived for a general binomial distribution in appendix section
D.3. It is given in terms of the coordinate p as:
g(p) =
n
p(1− p) (5.6.9)
so
g(λ) =
(
∂p
∂λ
)2
g(p) =
(
∂p
∂λ
)2
n
(λ+ µ)2
λµ
=
nµ
λ(λ+ µ)2
(5.6.10)
Now we are in a position to introduce more reasonable physical parameters, first we
can let µ = 1/τ as above, and second we can express λ as the sum of photo-induced
isomerisations, ξ, and spontaneous isomerisations ζ, i.e. λ = ξ + ζ. So that the metric is
now17:
g(ξ) = g(λ− ζ) = nτ
(ξ + ζ)(1 + τ(ξ + ζ))
(5.6.11)
and letting E = τ(ξ + ζ) we have
g(E) =
(
∂ξ
∂E
)2
g(ξ) =
(
1
τ
)2 nτ2
E(1 + E)2
=
n
E(1 + E)2
(5.6.12)
In telecommunications theory quantities such as E - a product of a “use rate” and a
“recovery rate” is known as the offered traffic - it describes the demand that is put upon
a system. In the case of telecommunications this is the rate that calls are made multiplied
by how long they last, similarly, here it is how many isomerisations multiplied by how long
it takes them to recover. E is a dimensionless characterisation of the system measured in
Erlangs. It is necessarily positive. A graph of the sensitivity in this coordinate system can
be seen in figure 5.2.
This model shows that there is an optimal region for the rate of photopigment re-
placement for any given isomerisation rate. This is given by τζ = 1 (see figures 5.3 and
5.4).
130
10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101 102 103
Offered Traffic: E
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
102
Se
ns
iti
vi
ty
: √
g/
n
Figure 5.2: The photoreceptor sensitivity with respect to the offered traffic E. In this coordinate
system, the sensitivity decreases with increased traffic.
We can go on from here to find the transformation to an affine coordinate system with
coordinate ρ. We wish for a metric g(ρ) so that g(ρ) = 1:
1 = g(ρ) =
(
∂E
∂ρ
)2
g(E) (5.6.13)
so
∂ρ
∂E
=
√
g(E) =
√
n
(1 + E)
√
E
(5.6.14)
and:
ρ =
√
n
∫
dE
(1 + E)
√
E
(5.6.15)
solving the integral by letting y =
√
E so that dE = 2
√
Edy:
1
2
∫
dE
(1 + E)
√
E
=
∫
dy
1 + E
=
∫
dy
1 + y2
(5.6.16)
= arctan y = arctan
√
E (5.6.17)
17Here I use the fact that the metric is unchanged on addition of a constant to a coordinate variable: If
y = x+ c for some constant c then ∂x
∂y
= 1 and thus as g(x) =
(
∂y
∂x
)2
g(y) then g(y) = g(x+ c)
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Figure 5.3: Graph of the sensitivity of the saturating photoreceptor model in coordinates nor-
malised by the rate of spontaneous isomerisation. The redness of the lines increases with 1/τ : the
rate of photopigment recovery. We see at rates faster than where τ = 1 (see figure 5.4) there is a
trade off between sensitivity at low photon counts and high photon counts.
So we have an affine coordinate system in ρ as expressed by:
ρ = 2
√
n arctan
√
E (5.6.18)
or in terms of the physiological parameters:
ρ = 2
√
n arctan
√
τ(ξ + ζ) (5.6.19)
This principled transformation is qualitatively similar to that given by Chittka (1992), but
it is not equivalent. It should be expected to behave the same at high luminance values,
but in addition it is a noise based metric - grounded in basic physiology.
5.7 General Properties and Classification of Colour Spaces
I will end this chapter with a categorisation of colour spaces by two properties. First
by how they behave at high luminosities and second where the point of minimal Fisher
132
Rel. Photon rate: log(ξ/ζ)
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
Rel. Recovery H
alflife: log(τζ)4 3 2
1 0 1
2 3 4
Se
ns
iti
vi
ty
: √
g/
n
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Figure 5.4: Graph of the sensitivity of the saturating photoreceptor model in coordinates nor-
malised by the rate of spontaneous isomerisation. We see there is an optimally sensitive recovery
rate where τ = 1/ξ - i.e. the rate constant of recovery of photopigment is equal to the rate constant
for it being destroyed by spontaneous isomerisation. This can be seen in rod and cone photorecep-
tor cells where the rod cells, with their low spontaneous isomerisation rates, recover from bleaching
slowly in comparison with the more noisy cone cells.
information is within any given cross section of the achievable quantum catches.
5.7.1 Saturating or Non-Saturating
It is possible to obtain a very general criterion for whether a colour space describes satu-
rating neurons. Obviously, any colour space that claims to be truly realistic should fulfil
these criteria or else imply that our visual pathways have infinite capacity for information
transmission.
We can arrive at a fairly natural definition of saturation by considering the mapping
of quantum catch coordinates ξi to a perceptually uniform coordinate ρi. When the
intensity of the incident light increases we should expect the information about the light
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to decrease due to physiological limitations. The Bezold-Bru¨cker effect implies that the
ability to distinguish colour should decrease.
At first it may seem that all we should require is that limξ→∞ ∂ρ∂ξ = 0, but this is
insufficient. Here is why: consider a dichromat with quantum catch coordinates ξ =
(ξ1, ξ2), choosing two colours α and β we have ξα = (ξ
1
α, ξ
2
α) and ξβ = (ξ
1
β, ξ
2
β). Increasing
the intensity of the incident light by a factor of k yields the coordinates (kξ1α, kξ
2
α) and
(kξ1β, kξ
2
β) (preserving the ratio of the quantum catches). Now, the euclidean distance
between α and β is
k
√
(ξ1α − ξ2α)2 + (ξ1β − ξ2β)2 (5.7.1)
so we see that the distance between points in the euclidean metric is multiplicatively
increased with intensity. Thus, if we require the distance between these points to tend to
zero, not only must the metric decrease with intensity, it must decrease faster than log k
increases, as I will show now.18
As we know that gij(ρ) = δij for a perceptually uniform space, we have:
gij(ξ)dξ
idξj = gab(ρ)dρ
adρb = δabdρ
adρb (5.7.2)
so that for a diagonal metric
ρa =
∫ ξa
0
√
gii(ξ)dξ
i +A(a) (5.7.3)
for constants A.19 The criterion for saturation is then:
∀ρa : lim
ξa→∞
ρa(ξ)→ B(a) (5.7.4)
for a different set of constants B.20 In words, as we increase the brightness towards
infinity, the point in a perceptually uniform colour space to which it corresponds should
stop moving. We can write this another way using big-O notation21:
∀ρa : O (ρa(ξ))  O(1) (5.7.5)
18Exactly the same argument holds for infinitesimal colour distances (which is in a sense more appro-
priate).
19I have not used the integration constant explicitly until now as it has been of little consequence.
20This definition is different to that where we require limξ→∞ ∂ρ∂ξ = 0 as we cannot assume that the
operation limξ→∞ ∂∂ξ is the same as
∂
∂ξ
limξ→∞. This should be fairly clear as a limit for ξ is never a
function of ξ.
21In big-O notation O(f(x)) = O(g(x)) ⇐⇒ limx→∞ f(x)g(x) 6= ±∞ and limx→∞ g(x)f(x) 6= ±∞. The
relationship signifying symbol ‘’ is ‘≤’ for big-O and should be read as “is lower than or equal to” where
O(x) is read “the order of x”.
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Now, let us take a rather general form for the metric that will cover all those discussed
above and more besides. Let [gij(ξ)] be a diagonal matrix of rational functions ri of ξ
i so
that gii(ξ) = ri(ξ
i) > 0. A rational function is a quotient formed of two polynomial
functions. Here, let us let P (ξ) be an order n polynomial and Q(ξ) be an order m
polynomial. If the rational function r(ξ) is the ratio P (ξ)Q(ξ) , then the order of r is n −m.
This lets us consider each dimension independently, so that we can drop the indices and
write equation 5.7.2 as:
P (ξ)
Q(ξ)
dξ2 = dρ2 (5.7.6)
so that the coordinate ρ can be written as:
ρ =
∫ ξ
0
√
P (ξ)
Q(ξ)
dξ +A (5.7.7)
Now, it is known that such rational functions are real analytic. It is also true that
√
x is
real analytic when x ≥ 0. Thus, the composition
√
P (ξ)
Q(ξ) is also a real analytic function.
If a function f(x) is real analytic, it can be represented as a convergent Taylor series and
we can consider its integral to be that of a polynomial. It is then safe to say that if:
lim
x→∞
f(x)
xD
6= 0,±∞ (5.7.8)
then it is implied that
lim
x→∞
∫ x
0 f(y)dy
I(x,D)
6= 0,±∞ (5.7.9)
where
I(x,D) =
 xD+1, D 6= −1log x, otherwise (5.7.10)
As the order of
√
P (ξ)
Q(ξ) is
n−m
2 then from equation 5.7.8 we have:
lim
ξ→∞
√
g(ξ)
ξ
n−m
2
= C (5.7.11)
For C > 0 (as g is positive) and C 6=∞ (from 5.7.8). This then implies that from equation
5.7.9
lim
ξ→∞
∫ ξ
0
√
g(ξ′)dξ′
I
(
ξ, n−m+22
) = lim
ξ→∞
ρ
I
(
ξ, n−m+22
) = C (5.7.12)
and thus
O(ρ(ξ)) = O
(
I
(
ξ,
n−m+ 2
2
))
(5.7.13)
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This means that the requirement of equation 5.7.4 can be written for a single ρ as:
O
(
I
(
ξ,
n−m+ 2
2
))
 O(1) = O (ξ0) ≺ O(log ξ)
n−m+ 2
2
< 0
m− n > 2 (5.7.14)
and when all ρas are considered, the assigning of indices to n and m allows equation 5.7.4
to be written in full as either:
∀ρa : ma − na > 2 or min
a
{ma − na} > 2 (5.7.15)
I shall apply this to the spaces discussed so far once I have discussed another property.
Then, with that property defined in addition to the one above, I will summarise all22 the
colour spaces I have discussed in this chapter as well as a number of others that I have
not yet mentioned.
5.7.2 Relative Information at the Achromatic Point
Now I shall consider a slightly less general class of colour spaces to which most the spaces
I have described belong. It is possible to perform the same calculation for the ones that
do not fit into this class, but I shall not do so here as this case is sufficiently general for
our purposes. Throughout this section I will reintroduce explicit summation in place of
the implicit summation of Einstein notation.
This class of models has metrics given by:
gij =
 Bi
(
ξi +Ai
)µ
, i = j
0, otherwise
(5.7.16)
where {Ai}, {Bi} and µ are parameters. The parameter µ can be identified with n −m
in the previous section.
Here I consider is the infinitesimal volume of Fisher information at points in the colour
space. This volume is related to, but not equivalent to, the entropy. It is given at a point
ξ by
dV (ξ) =
√
det [gij (ξ)]dξ = v(ξ)dξ (5.7.17)
Where dξ is the volume element at point ξ.23 Using this we can find the points of maximum
and minimum information. The volume factor v(ξ) for this class of models is simple to
22though I will ignore projections
23The volume element is the outer product of the infinitesimals, i.e. dξ = dξ1 ∧ dξ2 ∧ ... ∧ dξN .
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calculate as the determinant of a diagonal matrix is the product of its diagonal components:
v(ξ) =
∏
k
Bk
(
ξk +Ak
)µ
2
(5.7.18)
Let us now find the stationary points of the Fisher information volume when constrained
to an isoluminant plane. This gives us a way of looking at how information varies with
respect to colourfulness and also has the side effect of making the result applicable to the
two projective projective models previously mentioned. In this case we take the luminance
(achromatic) vector to be the [ak], yielding a constraint of the form:∑
k
akξk = b (5.7.19)
and which yields the system of Lagrange multipliers
L (ξ, λ) = v(ξ) + λΛ(ξ) (5.7.20)
Λ(ξ) = b−
∑
k
akξk (5.7.21)
the stationary points are then given by the constraint (∂L∂λ = Λ(ξ) = 0) and by:
∂iL =
µ
2(ξi +Ai)
∏
k
Bk
(
ξk −Ak
)µ
2 − λai = 0 (5.7.22)
so
µ
2λ
∏
k
Bk
(
ξk +Ak
)µ
2
= ai(ξi +Ai) (5.7.23)
As the left hand side is the same for every i, though still not a constant. It is possible to
simply replace the whole left hand side with another variable, t:
t = ai(ξi +Ai) (5.7.24)
which can be written as a vector equation defining a line:
ξ = Xt+ Y (5.7.25)
with X =
[
1/ai
]
and Y =
[−Ai]. Notice that this line - upon which the stationary points
lie - only coincides with the luminance vector it is equal to the vector of ones, 1 (and
Ai are negligibly small). The one vector therefore has a special place in colour theory:
Projections based upon the one vector are justified in the sense that the achromatic point
corresponds to an information extremum in (hyper)planes spanning the one vectors null
space. The previous equation gives:
ξi =
t
ai
−Ai (5.7.26)
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combining it with the constraint in equation 5.7.19:
b =
∑
i
(
t− aiAi) so t = b+∑i aiAi
dim ξ
(5.7.27)
where dim ξ is the dimensionality of the parameter space (we are modelling a dim ξ-
chromat). This gives the coordinates for the stationary points as:
ξi =
b+
∑
i a
iAi
ai dim ξ
−Ai (5.7.28)
Let us now look more closely at the stationary point. To determine its nature we calculate
the Hessian matrix [∂i∂jL ]. Remembering that ∂iv(ξ) =
µ
2(ξi+Ai)
v(ξ), component wise we
have:
∂i∂jL = ∂j
(
µ
2(ξi +Ai)
v(ξ)
)
− ∂jλai
=
(
∂j
µ
2(ξi +Ai)
)
v(ξ) +
µ
2(ξi +Ai)
∂jv(ξ)
=
(
−µ
2
δij
(ξj +Aj)(ξi +Ai)
)
v(ξ) +
µ
2(ξi +Ai)
µ
2(ξj +Aj)
v(ξ)
=
1
4
µ(µ− 2δij)
(ξi +Ai)(ξj +Aj)
v(ξ) (5.7.29)
Reintroducing t for simplicity and evaluating ∂i∂jL at the stationary point we have:
∂i∂jL =
1
4
µ(µ− 2δij)
(t/ai)(t/aj)
∏
k
Bk
(
t
ak
)µ
2
= Caiajµ(µ− 2δij)
∏
k
(Dk)
µ
2 (5.7.30)
where C and {Di} are positive constants. We can then write:
∂i∂jL = a
iajµ(µ− 2δij)f(µ) (5.7.31)
Here f(µ) > 0 which means we can ignore it for the purposes of calculating the nature of
the stationary point, only looking at the matrix:
M = [aiajµ(µ− 2δij)] (5.7.32)
Also, we only need consider the curvature of the Lagrangian in directions other than the
chromatic vector. Projecting this into the null space of the vector (a1, a2...a3) (spanned
by T ) we have:
Q = T TMT
= [−2µ(1 + δij)aiaj ]i,j=1...N−1 (5.7.33)
with the indices covering one less dimension. We can now indirectly look at the eigenvalues.
We can show that this fulfils Sylvester’s criterion for positive (negative) definiteness, and
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therefore all of the eigenvalues are positive (negative). The determinant of the upper
m-by-m square matrices is given by:
det [−Qij ]i,j=1...m = (m− 1)2m−2µm
k=m∏
k=1
(ak)2 (5.7.34)
Which is always positive when µ > 0, so Q is negative definite in this case, conversely, as
changing the sign of µ changes the sign of Q, when µ < 0 the matrix is positive definite.
For simplicity, consider the case when µ < 0 (knowing that the opposite will apply for
µ > 0). Negative µ means that the Lagrangian curvature matrix is positive definite in
directions within the particular isoluminant plane we are considering. This means that we
have a minimum in terms of the infinitesimal volume of Fisher information. This volume
is similar to a negative entropy, so minimising it is reducing the information content
at that point. The stationary point that is found here is, in a certain sense, the least
informative point. Empirically, the necessity for µ to be less than zero can be thought of
in terms of terms of discrimination, the sign of µ must be negative if it is to make the
correct predictions about spectral sensitivity curves – peaks would become troughs and
vice versa.
5.7.3 Comparison of Colour Spaces
We now have two qualities that we can use to classify colour space: Whether the achro-
matic point is an information minimum or an information maximum, and whether they
exhibit a Bezold-Bru¨ker type saturation phenomenon. Both of these can be considered
on a single axis, µ = n − m. As the model used to investigate information minima is
not as general as the one used in the investigation of saturation, to find the position of
information minima we must perform some extra calculations for some spaces that do
not correspond to the general model. Table 5.1 is a summary of the two global proper-
ties. Curvature corresponds to whether the space has a minimum or maximum near the
achromatic point - positive when there is a minimum, negative when there is a maximum.
Saturating refers to the exhibition of the Bezold-Bru¨ker effect.
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Space µ Curvature Saturating
Gaussian Noise Based 0 None No
Vorobyev and Osorio (1998) (Scotopic)
CIE (1931) - XYZ
CIE (1976) - L∗u∗v∗
Schro¨dinger (1920) 1 Positive No
Vorobyev and Osorio (1998) (Photopic)
Stiles (Wyszecki and Stiles, 2000) 2 Positive No
CIE (1976) - L∗u∗v∗ - Y coordinate
Space described in section 5.6 3 Positive Yes
Chittka (1992) 4 Positive Yes
Chittka (1992) (d 6= 1)
Vos and Walraven (1972a,b)
Table 5.1: This table summarises the colour spaces discussed in this chapter. All spaces have
either have even information content across the quantum catch coordinates (µ=0) or there is
an information minimum at the achromatic point (positive signed embedding curvature in the
isoluminant plane). Only a few of the spaces here exhibit saturating effect (µ > 2). For the CIE
(1976) entries, the value of µ was assessed by using the order of the coordinate axis in the volume
element, it differs between the Y and X,Z coordinates. CIE (1976) is given a value of 0 by equation
5.7.15 but if we consider only the Y value (related to both the green channel and luminance), we
have a value of 2.
When considered in quantum catch coordinates all the spaces I have discussed are
either flat (Gaussian, Scotopic Vorobyev and Osorio, 1998 and CIE, 1976), or have an
information minimum at (or around) the achromatic point. This would seem to be a
universal property.
Only a few spaces exhibit a saturating effect (Chittka, 1992; Vos and Walraven, 1972a,b,
and mine). These spaces, where µ > 2, are the only ones that would be expected to behave
correctly at high luminance values.
5.8 Summary
Using the Fisher metric yields many of the well known colour spaces as specific examples.
This correspondence confirms the correctness of its use. During this identification between
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the theory of the previous chapter and established colour theory, I have made a number
of points that I will reiterate now.
The identification of the metric of colour spaces with the Fisher metric is consonant
with the conceptualisation of colour difference as a statistical phenomenon. Indeed, I have
shown that when we treat colour as a deterministic phenomenon we obtain a result that
neither corresponds to our intuition or to empirical evidence. I have highlighted a case
where this has been ignored.
Photoreceptors saturate. A proper model of colour spaces should have perceptually
uniform coordinates that tend towards a finite value with respect to the quantum catch
coordinates. I have described a model based upon the statistics of molecular interactions
which exhibits this behaviour.
All colour spaces have an information minimum in quantum catch coordinates, this
is at, or near to, the achromatic point (as I have defined it). It may even be a natural
definition of it!
In addition to these points, I would like to add another. When studying animal colour
vision to find uniform colour coordinates we should apply the function:
ρ(ξ) = k1 arctan
√
k2(ξ + k3) (5.8.1)
to find perceptually uniform spaces for animals. Here k1 is the fraction of photoreceptors of
a particular type and the constants k2 and k3 are physiologically determinable parameters
(see above). The number of constants can be reduced by using appropriate approximations,
such as k3 = 0 in photic conditions. This would result in space that is is based on solid
principles like (Vorobyev and Osorio, 1998) but nonetheless qualitatively similar to that
of Chittka (1992). This model is fairly minimal and thus easily applied to all animals.
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Part III
Colour in Nature
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Chapter 6
The Colourfulness of Signals in
Animal Communication
“ ‘Must a name mean something?’ Alice asked doubtfully.
‘Of course it must,’ Humpty Dumpty said with a short laugh: ‘my name means the
shape I am – and a good handsome shape it is, too. With a name like yours, you
might be any shape, almost.’ ”
Lewis Carroll
Through the Looking Glass, 1871
In The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex Darwin talks of organisms
being selected for according to judgements of beauty (Darwin, 1871) – an idea which
fitted well with his more general investigation into the similarities between man and other
animals.
Whilst the notion of æsthetic preference and use of the word ‘beauty’ in discussions of
animal behaviour are now uncommon (excepting Burley and Symanski, 1998; Welsh, 2004),
the current study of sexual selection still investigates the same phenomena that concerned
Darwin.1 In modern evolutionary theory Darwin’s ‘beauty’ has become a broad collection
of differentiated theoretical constructs (see Endler and Basolo, 1998, for a comprehensive
list). But within this pool of theories, the Darwinian principle of female preference for
‘attractive’ males is still considered to be of wide importance - even if its exact role and
meaning is frequently disputed (see e.g. Faivre et al., 2003; Hamilton and Zuk, 1982; Pape
1The decline of the word beauty in evolutionary theory most likely stems from neglect of sexual selection
arising from the arguments of Wallace (Gayon, 2010) followed by the positivist attitude taken when it was
revisited by Fisher (1930).
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et al., 1996; Roughgarden et al., 2006; Takahashi et al., 2008; Zahavi et al., 1999, for a
broad range of opinions).
Investigating sexual selection as communication necessarily involves the integrated
study of psychology, genetics and ecology. Since the emergence of psychology as a science,
the consideration of sensory systems has been the most immediately fruitful means of
relating the physical domain to the psychological (see e.g. Masin et al., 2009). This too is
seen in the investigation of female mate choice and a number of sense-based explanations
of evolutionary scenarios have arisen. These include: exploitation of specific or general
sensations, such as the use of forced perspective to increase apparent size in bowerbirds
(e.g. Endler et al., 2010; Madden, 2003; Schaefer and Ruxton, 2009); exploitation of pre-
existing biases, such as signalling using a colour which is innately preferred (e.g. Bravery
and Goldizen, 2007; Endler and Day, 2006; Uy, 2004); and the need to form distinct
‘channels’ of communication in complex sensory environments, such as the differentiation
of calls found in Dendrobate frogs (Ame´zquita et al., 2011; Ryan, 1990).2
6.1 Beauty and Judgement
The rejection of the term ‘beauty’ in the sexual selection literature might at first seem to
be because beauty relies on a subject for which a thing is to be beautiful. We can dismiss
this explanation pretty quickly, as biology (especially natural history) takes things that
should rightly be called subjects as its foundation.
The real difficulty that the notion of beauty has faced, is not the need for a subject, but
the need to choose a particular æsthetic theory in which one can judge the æsthetic value
of an object to another organism. It seems then, that it is not because anyone thinks that
the idea of a subject is silly,3 but because of the difficulties that we encounter when we ask
“What exactly do you mean, Darwin, when you say ‘beauty’?” After all, science does not
proceed by engaging in philosophy; in its struggle for definitive explanations it replaces
difficult concepts such as beauty with more concrete objects of enquiry. Beauty therefore,
I hope, has not been thrown away, but has fallen down the cracks between mechanistic
explanations.
2The formation of preferences for and signals within distinct parts of signal space was preempted in
sensory ecology and neuroethology with the concept of Matched Filtering (Franz and Krapp, 2000; Wehner,
1987, 1989) and has been somewhat formalised as a semantic theory by Donaldson-Matasci et al. (2007)
(Donaldson-Matasci, 2008, also)).
3Although I’m sure some do!
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6.1.1 In the Eye of All Beholders
A quality of æsthetic judgements is their normativity. That is, when we find something in
good taste we are tacitly or otherwise expecting that others will too (“a claim to validity
for all men”, Kant 1790, p51). For example, if I tell you that a particular brand of
Camembert is the best, I am doing so to help you choose a cheese that is to your liking
also. I expect us to share a similar appreciation for cheese. This means that the idea of
animals making an æsthetic judgement faces a challenge: that of anthropic bias. Who are
we to say what an animal finds beautiful? It seems that talking about a sense of beauty
in animals is either very close to, or is, committing the pathetic fallacy.4
The Descent of Man does not exist in fear of anthropic bias - it is about demonstrating
that man and animals are not so different after all. Indeed, it would not be unfair to say
that its business is to claim that certain human norms extend into the animal kingdom.
More specifically, when it comes to æsthetic judgements, there are many cases where it is
made clear that Darwin uses beauty to mean a judgement that can be shared by both man
and animal; for example, he speaks of the good taste of female birds, whom he considers
to be more adept in this regard than some humans (Darwin, 1871, p64). I take the stance
that Darwin was right in his observations, but I take it upon myself here to give reasons
why he should be.
Most generally: if we have an evolutionary advantage in finding pleasure in something
in the natural world, why shouldn’t the members of species. After all, their lineage has
faced the same struggle to exist, they have sensory organs not unlike our own, and they
act in the same world that we do. They have the same imperative to learn5 and they too
live in a world too complex to be understood in all its detail. By virtue of just being alive
we all must share certain norms.
But the question that we really want an answer for is this: Why would nature conspire
to produce something that I find appealing?
This is exactly the right question to ask. If we avoid asking it we risk finding ourselves
asking why a general principle should apply to everything except ourselves. Norms held
by all living things should be held by us, and vice versa, we should entertain the possibility
that our norms are held by animals, especially when it seems that they act upon them.
This said, the answer to this question has implications beyond that of understanding
4Also known as the anthropomorphic, or sentimental fallacy.
5Our sense of pleasure and ability to learn are tightly linked. As evidenced at the behavioural level
by classical conditioning experiments and at the neural level by studies, in particular, of dopamine neuro-
modulation (Arias-Carrio´n et al., 2010; Bressan and Crippa, 2005).
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of æsthetic values. The identification and justification of psychological principles that
transcends the boundaries between species is of value no matter what label is put on it.
6.2 Signals
The reason that I have taken some time to discuss æsthetic judgement is because there
is a step in the discussion of biological signals that relies upon it. When we consider a
peacock’s train as a signal and claim that its length or the number of eyespots6 has some
kind of significance as a signal we are appealing to the normativity of judgement – we
are saying that length or spottiness is something about which peacocks make judgements,
and further, that their valuation7 is in line with our own. We take it as a given that
our perception of the world resembles a peahen’s in some way; that, for example, their
view of the world is not some jumbled up, kaleidoscopic funhouse inhabited by gnomes.
One might call it parsimony.8 But here I discuss it in terms of the normativity of our
judgements. When it comes to discussing signals we need to describe things in a way
which seems reasonable to us as well as having validity for organism we are describing.
6.2.1 The Handicap Principle
The catch-all justification in biology is adaptation and the Handicap Principle of Zahavi
et al. (1999) uses it as is. Briefly, it states that sexual signals honestly advertise their
bearers fitness by requiring them to pay a cost to produce a signal.
Using this explanation, the peahen has a very direct evolutionary reason to make a
particular evaluation - we do not need to know the mechanism by which it does so - only
that those peahens whose judgement is calibrated in a direction consonant with natural
selection have, in general, a greater progeny. The handicap principle then, like all adaptive
explanations, is a direct appeal to natural selection as a norm setter to which living things
may benefit from being aligned to. Those who know the ins and outs of natural selection
can make a similar judgement; not in the capacity of a peahen, but in the capacity of a
biologist who understands what is deemed good and what is deemed bad by nature. One
might say that the handicap principle relies on an acquired taste.
But when we first identified the peacock’s train as a potential signal we did not use
the handicap principle. The handicap principle is effectively agnostic to the mechanism
6A ‘substantive æsthetic judgement’.
7I mean this in the sense of degree, not meaning.
8Parsimony is, in fact, completely wrong, as it is a principle that applies to situations which presuppose
particular norms.
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of the peahen’s judgement and we clearly do not share the need to pick a good peacock
to mate with. We cannot use it to explain why the train should be something we pick
out as a signal in the first place. The best that we can hope to achieve is saying that
it is either a massive energetic cost because of its encumbrance, or that it is obvious
to predators (invoking normativity with them!) thus costly and an honest signal of the
peacock’s fitness. The latter isn’t good enough. This said, judgement that the peacock’s
tail is conspicuous is clearly very reasonable, but why is it reasonable?
6.2.2 Conspicuousness
In many cases it is possible to rank the appearance of organisms from cryptic (camouflaged)
to conspicuous (the opposite). Usually this scale is taken to be based upon the ability for
a member of some relevant species to be aware of the existence the organism in question
(Bradbury and Vehrencamp, 1998). But, we can get a little further towards a satisfactory
explanation by considering the ecological psychology of Gibson (1986). To Gibson, objects
of perception are defined by their affordance - a jug isn’t a jug because of its specific
geometry, but because it affords us the ability to store and pour liquids.
Using this idea we can rephrase the distinction between the cryptic and the conspicuous
as a distinction between things that apparently have low affordance and those whose
affordance is greater. Judgements of the degree of ‘objectness’ of something is the same as
a judgement about value of a thing in terms of what it can afford, this idea is very similar
to conspicuousness.
We are now led to the newly phrased question: “On what basis do we (living things)
make judgements of the degree of affordance, and what is it that validates them?”
Like the rest of this thesis, I shall concentrate on the specific case of colour.
6.3 The Purpose of Colour
The distinction between grey and colourful is very intuitive to us, as are the associations
we make with it. Grey means uninteresting, colourful means interesting. We all knew
what it meant when John Major’s puppet in Spitting Image was painted grey, and we
naturally expect the festival of Holi to be a lot of fun. For us, this normative judgement
is so primal that most of the time we can survive without ever needing to question it.
Indeed, it is only when we begin to use it as a judgement that may be shared with other
organisms are we forced to enquire into its basis.
Anything that needs to act in a complex world needs to judge what things are important
147
and what things are not and the thing to note about colour is that when something is
colourful (in the sense of JR in chapter 2) then there is an associated predictive power.
This section attempts to justify this claim.
6.3.1 Colourfulness and Sensory Fidelity
At the sensory level colourfulness tells us two things. I have outlined these in chapter 2.
Firstly, it tells us, to some extent, how well we can judge the spectrum that produced
a given colour. If something is a very strong red, there are relatively few spectra that
correspond to it. Secondly, but for similar reasons, it tells roughly how well we can
know how it is seen by other observers. Thus colourfulness helps us predict whether
other observers will make a similar judgement about a given colour. It is a measure of
informativeness, and it is normative to some degree.
What is it that it informs us about? This is the subject of this section, although I
have hinted at it in the sections above. So that you may have some idea of where I am
going with the proceeding argument, I will simply say: “colourfulness doesn’t happen by
accident”.9
Adaptedness
I begin this section with an assertion: If a colour is to be strong there needs to be a force
or pressure towards making it so. This pressure can have varying degrees of directness.10
The green of a leaf relates directly to its function as an organ which harnesses the
energy of photons. The spectrum of chlorophyll is matched to the light which it uses.
This is probably as direct an adaptive significance as there is. Nonetheless, there are
other cases where physiological role and colour are connected, for example the very direct
significance that colour has with respect to the photoprotective role played by melanins
(e.g. Kaidbey et al., 1975) and the fluorescent pigments found in coral reefs (Salih et al.,
1997, 2000). With less direct significance, there is the colour of various oxygen carriers.
The intense colour of blood derives from the sheer mass of oxygen carrier, whose hue is
necessitated by the metal complexes that make oxygen binding possible.11 On the other
end of the scale, there is the colouration of tree bark, which seems to have very little direct
9Or, at least, it is very unlikely to.
10I think I should make it clear at this point that I am not only talking here about the colour of things
being an adaptation in itself, but also as the indirect result of some other adaptation.
11It seems that the use of metal ions is a universal solution, whether it is haemoglobin, haemocyanin (Hal-
liburton, 1885) or otherwise (Basolo et al., 1975), (with the notable exception of synthetic perflurocarbons
Castro and Briceno, 2010).
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adaptive significance. With even less significance we have the colour of sedimentary rocks.
Then with no relation to biological processes whatsoever we have the colours of igneous
rocks, the sky, the moon, and so on. I have deliberately excluded colouration which can
be considered as a signal or as camouflage from these examples.
It is in fact rather rare for an organism’s colour to not be associated with any adap-
tation whatsoever. As a corollary: we tend to explain colour in one of three ways, either
something is colourful and we see it as a signal or as the indirect result of some extraneous
function, or it is not colourful and we see it as camouflage. After all, there are costs and
benefits to having any given appearance and every configuration of an organism can be
ascribed some utility (Gould and Lewontin, 1979).
At this point we have the beginning of a theory that can explain why it is the strongly
coloured animals that are the ones that are signalling. In the examples I have given
(barring, possibly, the sky), strong colours are formed when the bearer has some kind of
evolutionary function, the stronger the colour the more singular the function. Things that
are strongly coloured are because they are affording something.
As it stands the evidence I have presented so far constitutes a fairly weak argument,
luckily we can shore it up a little. In colour there are a number of physical constraints
that affect our ability to make judgements about what something affords.
Judging what something affords in many ways is the same as judging what something
is. We could, if we wanted, use probability theory to make estimates of the affordance of
something, just like we could make estimates about any other property. Affordances are,
in any case, the properties that define the objects of our perception.
Physical Mixing
When a colour can be a mixture of two colours it is less colourful than the two original
colours (see chapter 1) and we can be less certain about what it is too; is it a mixture
of these two colours or those two? Should it be thought of as a mixture or as a singular
colour in itself?
There are many sources of (convex) mixing of colours and it is often used by animals.
A remarkable example is the tiger beetle Cicindela repanda (Seago et al., 2009) which
appears to be a grey that matches the rocks where it lives, but when its skin is viewed
with a microscope, we see that the grey is formed by an array of structurally coloured
dots, it is an additive mixture. In this case, the grey colour is actually a mixture of other
colours. This case of mixing is only one of many (Seago et al., 2009; Welch and Vigneron,
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2007, see e.g.). When we mix colours in this way, we expect less colourfulness, to have
a strong colour nature must avoid having to mix - in a metaphorical sense, it must go
against entropy.
In a similar way to the spatial mixing I have described, a mixture of pigments is
generally less colourful. This is known by anyone who has tried to mix paints in an
attempt to recover a colour of the original quality. This is exactly the motivation behind
the colour system of Alberti mentioned in chapter 1. When biochemical networks do not
work to the singular goal of a particular pigment based colour, we should expect less
colourfulness.
In appendix E I present a simulation in which in one instance spectra are, in effect,
free to mix randomly without any selective pressure. Unsurprisingly, in this simulation
neutral drift works towards the species being less colourful.12
Back to the case of the tiger beetle. The predator looking at a grey patch of rock does
not know if a tiger beetle is there, the converse would not be true were the tiger beetle,
for example, bright magenta. The magenta beetle provides certainty. Of course, were it
living on magenta rocks, this would not be true. But there is very little physical force or
evolutionary pressure in the direction of magenta rocks.
Mixing by Poor Resolution
The geometry of the colour solid described in chapter 1 is a result of poor spectral reso-
lution. When the set of photoreceptors is insufficient to resolve necessary spectral details
we see different colours projected onto the same part of the colour space. Whilst it seems
that this does not happen very often there is another case related to the additive mixing
above - that of poor spatial resolution. Simply put, when the eye is incapable of spatially
(or temporally) resolving two colours, they are seen as a single colour which is closer to
grey by virtue of being an additive mixture. This is why when discussing metamerism in
1 I was careful not to imply that the presence of convex mixtures was about the spectra
of objects. Here, we see that the significance comes from the relative probability that
some patch of colour is formed from two other distinct colours, this was partly covered
in the previous subsection. This is a very general reason why we should find grey things
uninteresting. We just cannot resolve their identity. It is often quite remarkable just how
much grey there is in the world, histograms of natural images often have far more grey
than one would expect, the explanation must be that it is ignored by us before it can even
12This appendix also shows how colourfulness can be occur as a result of needing to be generally different
in a world with many organisms that are without selective pressure upon their colour.
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enter our awareness.
Given what I have said, it easy to see why contrast is useful if one wants to be recog-
nised. The higher the contrast with the background, the lesser the greying effect caused
by poor spatial resolution and the more one establishes ones existence as something with
unique affordance. For grey organisms, by not having a given affordance with any signifi-
cant probability, the grey organism asserts that it may as well not exist.
6.3.2 Neutrality
The semiotician and critic Roland Barthes was concerned with exactly the same principle
as me, but from a different angle. He took the distinction between colourfulness and
greyness as a given that we can all understand so that he could then use it at a metaphor
in a number of social commentaries. He was fascinated by the idea of the neutral – a
stance that does not take sides. Neutrality, which he associates with a lack of colour,13
is for him about the lack of signification (Krauss, 2005). Here, I take an interest in the
difference between the grey and the colourful for the same reasons.
And now, I am going to give you the official name of the spilled color, a name printed
on the small bottle (as on the others vermilion, turquoise, etc.): it was the color called
Neutral [...] Well, I was both punished and disappointed: punished because Neutral
spatters and stains (its a type of dull gray-black); disappointed because Neutral is a
color like the others, and for sale: [...] the unclassifiable is classified [...]
Roland Barthes: The Neutral
See: Krauss (2005)
This should clarify my intentions in this chapter, as well as pinpointing a problem that
discussions of colourfulness must face. If lack of colourfulness is to be taken as a lack of
signification, then we run into difficulties when, upon recognising this, lack of signification
becomes a signified at a meta level. We see this phenomenon in discussing camouflage.
Things that are not colourful are cryptic in two senses, first, in the passive sense that
their roˆle is unclear, and second, when crypsis is taken as an adaptation it takes an active
sense: being cryptic now signifies an ‘unwillingness’ to disclose one’s roˆle. Or, taking the
Gibsonian perspective where signified affordances are the object - at the first level the
cryptic organism does not exist, and at another level it exists as something that makes a
claim not to.
13It is unfair to say that he associated it with ‘grey’, which is in fact a colour.
151
6.3.3 Summary
As a rough summary of this section, on one level we can say that colourfulness signifies a
singular affordance, and greyness none in particular, but at a meta level, where existence
is asserted, colourfulness is an honest claim to existence and greyness, on the other had, is
a dishonest claim to non-existence (by having any given affordance with low probability).
6.4 Some Relevant Cases
There are a number of cases where the theory I have discussed is relevant to discussions
within the field of animal colour vision. Here I present two that I feel, in particular, give
weight to my stance.
6.4.1 The Colour Vision of Bees
It has been observed that the colour of space honey bees, who are trichromats whose
photopigments lie in the UV, Blue and Green regions of the electromagnetic spectrum, is
arranged so that the green leaves falls in the same area as grey objects (Chittka, 1992).
This is not to say that it is impossible for bees to distinguish green and grey objects, it has
been shown that they can (Vorobyev et al., 1999). It is simply that, where green leaves
lie on the edge of our colour space, they lie in the centre of the space of bees.
Using the preceding theory it is possible to speculate about why this should be so.
If, as I have argued, the uncolourful centre of colour spaces signifies something of little
affordance, then it seems right to suggest that there is an evolutionary advantage in putting
the colour of leaves into this area, along with everything else which has lesser value to the
bee. By making green similar to grey, the bee is free to spend its time investigating more
important things like flowers and other bees.
6.4.2 Bowerbirds
Bowerbirds like many corvids display remarkable cognitive abilities, particularly so when
it comes to constructing the elaborate structures by which they are named. The male
bowerbird produces his bower14 as part of a mating ritual in which the female enters the
bower from one end to see the male displaying at the other. The display takes place atop
a collection of stones (or other items) which the male has chosen to enhance his display
(Bravery and Goldizen, 2007; Endler et al., 2010; McManus and Weatherby, 1997).
14A tunnel made of grass and twigs.
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Endler and Day (2006) have performed an experiment testing the colour preference that
male bowerbirds have towards the stones they use for constructing their bowers. Whilst
they display some preference for greens, the background colour of their environment, their
greater preference was towards grey.
The explanation for this, in the terms I have been using, is that they are making a
judgement about the stones which deems them to have no clear affordance. They deem the
stones they choose uninteresting, be it consciously or otherwise. For the male, who is far
from grey, putting themselves in front of such a background is a way of making the females
more aware of them. It is well known that such contrast effects are used by bowerbirds
in the other modalities, as exemplified by their use of forced perspective (Endler et al.,
2010). This is in contrast to other, more well known species of bowerbird, that collect
colourful coloured objects, but do not stand over them.
6.5 Conclusion
Colourfulness is a pre-existing preference, and it is sensory exploitation. It both relates
directly to the limitations that the sensory system places upon judgements of affordance
as well as taking advantage of the very same faculties that are needed to perform any task
in a complex world.
The primary role of the colourfulness of a signal is not to carry any specific meaning,
but to assert the bearer’s existence as something that should not be overlooked. It is not
a standing out from the background by contrasting with it, but a standing out by a claim
to being the bearer of utility. Conspicuousness may well be a very good word for this, but
I feel it must come with a warning. If taken in the sense I have just described, we may
find it very difficult to say what it is in terms of physical properties.
Going back to the idea of normativity. Like the members of any other species we share
a need to comprehend the world around us. But our worlds are complex and so few things
in them are relevant to us. We have the need to make a judgement about how useful some
object is, and we need to do so before we really understand what that thing is. We, and
our animal kin alike, must be careful to spend time with only those things that afford us
the most. We share this norm.
We also share physiology, in particular we (usually) have eyes. Though there are many
designs of eye, all of them are constrained to but a few types of photopigment. We share
uncertainty about the meaning of things that are grey, in part because of this common
physiology. But also because grey is a colour favoured by processes without a direction -
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by “entropic forces”.
So we should expect other organisms to prefer strong colours and we should expect
man to find them worthy of comment for precisely the same reason: colourfulness signifies
a singular purpose.
So perhaps animals can rightly be said to have a sense of beauty, or at least of taste.
Not in the sense of high-minded appreciation for classical music or portraits by old masters,
but in the sense that we all share a basic need to give similar values to the world around
us. Maybe Darwin’s use of the word beauty is more exacting than it may seem at first
glance.
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Chapter 7
Structural Colours in Batesian
Mimicry
“We live in a rainbow of chaos.”
Paul Ce´zanne
Up to now this thesis has been mostly concerned with brightness and saturation. There
is however, a common natural scenario where colour changes with a physical parameter
in a way that is better approximated by a hue-like dimension in colour space, rather than
brightness or saturation. This is structural colouration.
Structural colouration describes the phenomenon whereby the physical structure of a
surface at the microscopic level causes colour through wave interference. There are a large
number of specific physical mechanisms, which I will briefly review later. For now though,
to get a feel of how it is different from pigments and their properties, consider how the
hue of a rainbow changes with the angle relative to the anti-solar point - the hue changes
dramatically but the brightness and saturation remain approximately the same. This kind
of feature, a change only in hue, makes structural colour noteworthy.
The calculation of structural colours at the physical level is computationally expen-
sive and repeating these computations across ranges of different parameters is impossible
in reality. I tackle the complexity of this problem by making a number of simplifying
assumptions to produce a model that retains certain important qualitative properties of
colour forming structures. I then use this model to investigate what happens in a well
known evolutionary scenario - Batesian mimicry. This scenario involves the formation
of strong warning colours (aposematic colours) by an indirect pressure from a mimicking
species (Franks et al. 2009; Holmgren and Enquist 1999 and implied by Franks and Noble
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2004). Batesian mimicry is one of many possible mechanisms by which warning colours
can become stronger. Although I focus on Batesian mimicry here, the qualitative differ-
ence between the colour forming mechanisms of pigments and structures is no doubt an
important part of many evolutionary scenarios.
7.1 Introduction
The study of the evolution of coloured traits is frequently focused on one of two major
scenarios: sexual selection - where colour is used in the communication between females
and males of the same species; and aposematism - where the colour serves as a warning
to predators that eating the colour bearing organism will be costly. This chapter focuses
on aposematism (warning colouration) and the related phenomenon of mimicry.
7.1.1 Aposematism
Aposematism is a communication between a prey and predator species. The prey are toxic
and they advertise this to the predator. There are numerous examples of aposematism
within the specific domain of colour: the strong yellow stripes of the common wasp Vespa
vulgaris (e.g. Hauglund, 2006), the variously coloured and patterned poison arrow frogs of
the Dendrobatoidea superfamily (e.g Summers and Clough, 2001), numerous butterflies,
notably those in the family Heliconius (e.g. Naisbit et al., 2007b) and many Meloidae
or blister beetles (Nikbakhtzaseh and Tirgari, 2002, e.g.) to name a few well studied
examples.
We can say a feature of a prey species is aposematic with varying degrees of confidence.
Most minimally, we can assert aposematism when both the prey is toxic and it is reasonable
to claim that the predator can identify the feature with which the toxicity is correlated. We
can be more confident in our assertion when in addition we can show that the predator’s
behaviour is aversive and contingent upon the presence of the feature.
7.1.2 Mimicry
Mimicry is often classified into two types: Batesian and Mu¨llerian, which are exploitative
and cooperative respectively. However, the classification is a little complex. First of
all, mimicry is discussed in terms of a mimic and a model, the model by definition, is
less palatable to predators than the mimic. The model is always unpalatable, in the
sense that the predators will on average learn to avoid it. This definition of palatability
leads quite naturally to the identification of a surface in ‘palatability space’ to which the
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predator is indifferent. In other words, there is a set of attributes of the prey that upon
being discovered during predation do not effect the subsequent attack/avoid decision of
the predator. This is a natural point to call zero in the palatability scale. The simplest
distinction between Mu¨llerian and Batesian mimicry is on this basis: Batesian when the
mimic’s palatability is less than zero; Mu¨llerian when the palatability is greater than zero.
Figure 7.1: Diagram of the palatability scale with Mu¨llerian and Batesian mimicry shown. This
is a simplification of figure 7.2
But this simple picture is complicated by a number of factors, such as population
size and the details of the learning mechanism of the predator. This leads to the current
classification amongst biologists in terms of both palatability and model survival rate (or
some similar parameters) (Balogh et al., 2008).
Whilst, the complexities alluded to in figure 7.2 are important for understanding of
mimicry. The discussion here assumes a priori a Batesian or quasi-Batesian scenario.
7.2 Evolutionary Pursuit in a Colour Solid
An evolutionary chase is exactly what it sounds like: One species is trying to catch up
with a second species and the second species is trying to get away from the first.
In the case of Batesian mimicry there is a pressure for the first species (the chaser, the
mimic) to resemble the second (the chasee, the model). Likewise, there is an evolutionary
pressure for the model to be unlike the mimic. In the case of mimicry, it is assumed that
the chase takes place in a perceptual space defined by a third party: the predatory species.
Within this feature space, the trajectories of the species is controlled by a multitude of
factors including the details of the evolutionary scenario (reproduction, variation), the
mapping from genotype to phenotype including environmental factors. All these factors
combine to produce a topologically complex network embedded in the predators perceptual
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Figure 7.2: A more in depth classification of mimicry (a modification of the diagram in Balogh
et al., 2008). Here, both the palatability and the survival rate of the model are are used to produce
the diagram. The palatability falls into two sections like in figure 7.1. The survival rate is naturally
trichotomous: At the bottom, there is a section where the survival rate is less than it would be
were the mimic not present. At the top, there is a section where the survival of the model is
greater than it would be if the mimic was exactly as palatable as the model. Then there is the
area between these two. The super- and quasi- mimicry zones are those that are not covered by
the original theories of Mu¨ller and Bates, they are however, at least theoretically possible given
the appropriate learning mechanisms and population sizes.
space.
When modelling the evolution of coloured signals one may be tempted to assume that
some colour space coordinates (RGB for example Holmgren and Enquist, 1999) correspond
to continuous traits. This has the effect of removing the complexity of the phenotypic
network.1 The evolutionary landscape becomes featureless, except for the boundary of
the colour space.
In the cases where this assumption is made, the boundary of the colour space deter-
mines the limiting behaviour of the evolutionary chase. There is a tendency for species
to get stuck in the corners. We can explain this with the idea of momentum. The idea is
1Instead there is just the standard topology on Rn generated by the euclidean metric.
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simple: the best way for the mimic species to get closer to the model species is by moving
directly towards it, the best way for the model species to evade the mimicking species is
to move directly away from it. Thus, all things being equal, in a given period of time both
species will move the same amount in the same direction. Or more precisely, it is very
unlikely that the mimic will move further than its distance to model plus the distance the
model moved, thus the direction of the vector from mimic to model is preserved. So, with
the direction from mimic to model is staying the same during the next time step they both
move in the same direction again. Of course, the actual direction and speed of mutation is
influenced by many factors. But as a rule of thumb, the evolutionary chase has momentum
because once the two species start moving in a given direction in perceptual space they
will continue to do so to the degree that physical constraints allow.
7.3 Not Just a Colour Cube
Now that I have discussed the qualitative aspects of how the model and mimic species
move though a feature space we can move on to look at the structure of the space itself. To
do this I use a model of reflectance spectra as determined by physical parameters. This is
intended to highlight the complexities that structural colours might add to the dynamics
of mimicry scenarios.
7.3.1 Modelling Reflectance Spectra
There are three components to the model of reflectance spectra. The totality of a re-
flectance is modelled as a structural reflectance, an absorption due to pigmentation and
a potentially imperfect, uniform reflection from a backing layer. This model is only ap-
proximate, a full ray based model would include repeated reflections and would still not
be as accurate as a full solution to Maxwell’s equations. A solution to Maxwell’s equation
would account for interference effects more realistically, as would be necessary when such
small structures are considered. In addition, there would be dependencies on the angle of
viewing (iridescence) which will only add complications to the basic point I wish to argue.
In total, the reflectance spectrum r(λ) is given by the equation:
r(λ) = s(λ) + b (1− s(λ)) t(λ) (7.3.1)
Let me break this down a bit.
The first term defining r(λ) is a structural reflectance s(λ). This reflects light to the
observer in a wavelength dependant manner, leaving the transmitted light with a spectrum
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Structural
Pigment
Backing
Figure 7.3: Diagram of the physical model used in calculating reflectance spectra. The light
incident to the surface is partially reflected by the structural layer. The remaining light then
passes through the pigment layer where it absorbed by the medium. It is partially reflected by a
backing layer and then passes through the pigment layer again.
given by (1− s(λ)). This remaining light passes though an absorbing pigment layer and is
partially reflected back (with fraction b), adding to the light reflected by structural layer.
At this point in the model we can see that we need the term bt(λ) to be different from
unity for any of structural colours to make a difference (this reflects the observations of
Shawkey and Hill, 2005).
This, as I have indicated above, is a fairly heavy handed simplification of the actual
optical phenomenon. For this reason, I will spend some time justifying the simplifications
that I have used.
Structural Reflectances
There are a number of features that I have omitted from the model presented here. Struc-
tural colours are formed using one of three broad classes of mechanism. Firstly, there
are thin films, like in the reflectance from oil on water - a surface can be covered by a
thin layer of refractive index different to that of air and the layer beneath - producing an
optical cavity that selectively reflects light of different wavelengths. An example of this
is the a giant tropical wasp Megascolia procer javanensis. It wings appear blue due to a
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chitin-melanin2 backed chitin monolayer of approximately 300nm (Sarrazin et al., 2008).
Photonic crystals have a similar mechanism, but their structure does not have the
planar symmetry of a film. The three dimensional periodic structure of the material
causes a wavelength dependant reflectance - where the period of the structure is a integer
multiple of the crystals unit cell size light will be preferably reflected. This is the most
common form of structural colouration, it can be see throughout the animal kingdom (see
e.g. Welch and Vigneron, 2007, for a brief review).
The bird of paradise Lawes’ parotia, (Parotia lawesii) uses both a thin film and crys-
talline photonic structure to produce a startling angle dependant reflectance (Stavenga
et al., 2010). Which brings me to the first omission in this model: structural colouration
usually appears iridescent - the reflected spectrum is angle dependant. Such effects are
impossible to model without providing a the physical relationship between the observer,
the observed and the illumination - for this reason I will take it that the spectrum that
is modelled is an averaged effect. I also consider the structural layer to be non-absorbing
(real refractive indices), all absorbance happens after the initial structural reflection. This
single initial reflection is also only an approximation to the real physical scenario.
This means that the structural colours can be removed by taking the maximal wave-
length to an extreme on the real line, in effect, becoming a very thick or very thin mono-
layer. Similarly, it can be thought of as varying the period of the lattice of a photonic
crystal (we see this mechanism in peacock feathers for example Zi et al., 2003). This aspect
of the model is of vital importance, the inability to modulate the amount of transmittance
independently from the reflectance of the structural layer without radically changing a
physical property is a constraint that necessitates non-linearity in the evolutionary land-
scape. Although it is not considered here, this would remain true if the degree of reflection
was allowed to change as long as it cannot be completely removed and replaced - I as-
sume here that such a case is unlikely as structural colours are intimately related to other
physical properties of the surfaces they colour.
I have taken structural reflectances to be given by a Gaussian of unit height centred
on µ with constant width (set by σ).
s(λ) = e
−12
(
λ−µi
σ
)2
(7.3.2)
Clearly this lacks formally derived and exacting quantitative realism, but it does have the
qualitative features I have mentioned above. This said, they do nonetheless bear some
2A structure formed of a composite of chitin and melanin has a broad absorption spectrum as well as
differing in (real) refractive index to pure chitin.
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resemblance to recorded reflectance spectra - the major difference being the lack of extra
peaks. Were they included, these extra peaks only make the evolutionary landscape more
complex.
Pigment Absorptions
The general fractional transmittance of an absorbing medium is given by the Beer-Lambert
law (Atkins and de Paula, 2001):
t(λ) = e−ca(λ) (7.3.3)
where c is proportional to the number of absorbing particles found along the path of a
given ray. c is therefor proportional to the thickness of, and the concentration of pigment
within, the absorbing layer. a(λ) is an absorbance spectrum given in appropriate units
to render the term ca(λ) dimensionless. Here I take the absorption spectrum a(λ) to
be representative carotenoid pigments. These pigments are ubiquitous in nature (see for
example Faivre et al. 2003; Kodric-Brown 1985 for carotenoids in animals; Armstrong and
Hearst 1996 for bacteria; Grotewold 2006 for plants). These pigments generally feature a
high absorbance in the short wavelengths and a low absorbance in the long wavelengths.
A simple curve with this feature is 1+tanh(x). If we allow it to be ‘stretched’ and ‘moved’
relative to wavelength, λ, we can write it in the form:
c(λ) =
(
1 + e−kg(λ−kc)
)−1
(7.3.4)
where kg and kc are parameters that control the gradient at the inflection point and the
wavelength of the inflection point respectively. For the purposes here, I keep kg constant.
Backing Layer
I take the final layer of figure 7.3 to have a spectrally uniform reflectance between zero
and one. This corresponds, I argue, to melanin based backing layer (see Mundy, 2005, for
a comprehensive review). Though the spectra of melanins are not technically uniform, the
approximation as such is not far from the truth for eumelanin - which appears black or deep
brown, but it less so for pheomelanin which appears red or orange. However, the backing
constant b also represents a reflectivity - in general the amount of light that manages to
get reflected back from the internal structure independently of pigment absorption and
structural reflectance.
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Constant Inflection Point
Constant Optical Density
Constant 'Backing' Reflectance
Constant Structural Colour
Figure 7.4: A set of colours formed by different physical parameters. The left hand side shows the
colours of the pigment over a range of parameters. The right hand shows the structural colour and
backing reflectance. The right hand diagram is folded over on itself showing how the structural
colours lead to a complex relationship between physical parameters and colour.
Pigment and Backing Layer Features
The pigment and backing layer produce a geometry with nice properties: the space of
parameters is projected such that were one to choose a point in colour space, the way one
would change the parameters to move in a particular direction in colour space would be
well defined. This is not the case with the model stuctural colours. The direction that
one moves in colour space given a parameter depends on the value of the parameters to
the point where we may need to change a given parameter one way in one case and in the
opposite way in another. The parameter for the stuctural colour changes its orientation
with respect to the colour space at the edges of the cone in the right hand side of figure
7.4.
As I have discussed in chapter 6, the effect of changing pigment concentration is ap-
proximately linear. But more importantly, when considered on their own, their parameters
keep their orientation with respect to colour.
This means that if we have pigments alone, it is possible to move in a line from any
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colour to any other colour - moving locally in the right direction is moving globally in the
right direction. The structural colours in this model prevent this property from holding; to
get from one colour to another, one may have to begin by going in the opposite direction.
7.4 Continuous Traits
To make any sense of this model as describing part of an evolutionary scenario we are
required to make certain assumptions about the relationship between an organisms genes
and the colours it displays. Here I assume that the physical parameters of the pigments
are continuous traits. We cannot be assured that the physical parameters vary smoothly
and mutate linearly in the parameter space, but we could not say this in the case of colour
either.
However, with a physical relationship established we can say one thing which depends
only on the assumption that the change in physical parameters proceeds via small incre-
ments: We can say that in the scenario above, when given only the information about the
local increase in fitness it is impossible for a species to ‘know’ whether it is going in the
right direction to find a global maximum in fitness. This aspect will be essential for the
argument that I will make.
7.5 Analysis of the Genotype-Phenotype Mapping
The mapping from genotype to phenotype in this model, whilst a great simplification of the
real physical situation, is still complicated and non-linear. The best way of understanding
these systems is through visualisation. This allows important features to be observed and
explained intuitively. Before I talk about the space, I will explain how I have produced
the visualisations so as to provide you with an understanding of their meaning and scope.
7.5.1 Visualising the Genotype-Phenotype Mapping
With the aim of making the features of the geometry clearer I have used a model of a
dichromat with Gaussian photoreceptor response functions. The same functions are used
for all the visualisations herein. Although different predators will have different types and
numbers of visual pigment classes this should not change the gross features of the model.
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Figure 7.5: Spectra and components used in visualising the evolutionary landscape. The simpli-
fied photoreceptor functions are shown on the left. Treating these as vectors, we can find their
corresponding null space - i.e. a set of vectors which do not affect the colour - called metameric
blacks in colour theory. After uniformly sampling the genetic space and getting the corresponding
spectra as n = 501 dimensional vectors, projection into the n − 2 dimensional null space gives
a distribution of the components that leave colour unchanged. The principal components of this
space are then used to visualise neutral mutations/metameric changes. To visualise the principal
components in the spectrum space the inverse of the transformation into the null space is used,
setting the photoreceptor values to zero. See text.
Initial Transformations
The first task is to separate the colour data from the rest of the data present in the spectra.
To do this, we take the matrix of the form:
MT =

...
...
...
...
...
Null W W
...
...
...
...
...
 (7.5.1)
where W is 2-by-n matrix representing the two photoreceptor spectral sensitivities, Null
represents an operator providing a matrix of vectors that span the null space of a matrix.
This means that this operation on a spectrum S gives a n-vector whose first n− 2 compo-
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nents do not have any role in determining their corresponding colour (metameric blacks)
and whose last two components of the vector are the two colour components, q1 and q2.
That is to say:
MS =
[
Metameric Black | q1 q2 ]T = [B|Q]T (7.5.2)
The two colour components were used to make the histogram in figure 7.6 and the
two photoreceptor components of 7.8, F.1, F.2 and F.3. To look at the structure of
the part of the space which is not involved in determining the colours I have taken the
first two principal components of the spectra generated by a small 3 uniform sampling
of the parameter space (P). The spectra are transformed according to equation 7.5.2 to
yield values in the space with basis vectors given by B. It is in B that the principal
components are calculated. Because of the procedure used here, the principal components
of B are guaranteed to be orthogonal to the photoreceptor vectors in W, providing an
efficient representation of the spectrum space. The principal component matrix is then
used to reduce Null W to a 2-dimensional matrix which was used to calculate the values
in histograms 7.7 as well as one component of 7.8, F.1, F.2 and F.3. The visualisations
herein summarise these principal components p1, p2 and quantum catch values q1 and q2:

p1
p2
q1
q2
 =

(Null W) ·P
W


...
S
...
 (7.5.3)
Technicalities of Histogram Production
The two dimensional histograms were calculated using a grid of 640-by-640 bins over the
rectangle [0, 1]× [0, 1] in the case of the quantum catches (figure 7.6) and [−6, 11]× [−10, 4]
in the case of the principal components (figure 7.7). These histograms are a result of 2×107
simulated spectra. The histogram values are mapped to the luminance channel of an 8-bit
image after contrast enhancement using a quadratic weighting (L→ L2).
The three dimensional histograms of 7.8, F.1, F.2 and F.3 use the two colour channels
and the first principal component p1. A similar method on a grid of 100-by-100-by-100 bins
3The size of this sample is limited by computer memory. We must keep all the spectra in all their detail
to perform a principal component analysis.
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spanning the [0, 1]× [0, 1]× [−6, 11] rectangle in (q1, q2, p1) was used to make a histogram
of 6× 107 spectra. The histograms were then converted into a surface by placing a point
in between the centres of any two histogram cells for which the value of one was zero and
the other non-zero. These points were then triangulated using the alpha hull procedure of
MeshLab4 with a radius of just greater than
√
3 unit cells. The surface was then simplified
to less than 35000 faces using MeshLab’s quadric edge collapse decimation algorithm and
duplicated faces culled (there are many of them).
7.5.2 Visualising the Physiology-Colour Mapping
I have already spoken briefly about the features of the mapping from physiology to colour.
But now we have a means of visualising this mapping it is easier to make a few points
concerning this space.
Figure 7.6 shows the colour space of the predator as sampled uniformly in the parameter
space. Here we see two important features, we see both the triangle on the left hand side
of figure 7.4, and the cone on the right. In this histogram it is difficult to resolve the
relationship between the two surfaces, but we can see that colours in the bottom left of
the image in figure 7.6 can be produced by both pigments and structural colours. Figure
7.7 shows the complexity of the dimensions that have been omitted in figure 7.7.
When we render this in a three dimensional plot, such as 7.8, F.1, F.2 and F.3, we can
see two distinct zones (a font zone mostly obscuring a back zone) giving the same colour,
but for radically different parameters. The parameter space is embedded in colour space
such that there are no possible values for the parameters for areas between the two zones.
This means that the colour is not free to change directly from the front zone to the back
zone. Figure 7.9 shows two metameric spectra the correspond to each of these zones.
7.6 The Implication for Mimicry and Aposematism
As I discussed earlier, in Batesian mimicry the evolutionary chase between species causes
them to have a kind of momentum in colour space (or, more generally, feature space). The
consequence of momentum is that both species will, in general, head in a given direction in
colour space until they reach the edge of the gamut of possible colours. By this mechanism
the aposematic colouration of the model is driven to higher colourfullnesses (see 2). This
has been reported in other theoretical studies (Franks et al., 2009; Holmgren and Enquist,
4MeshLab is a collection of routines for computations involving triangulated surfaces and is “a tool
developed with the support of the 3D-CoForm project”.
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Figure 7.6: A histogram of the quantum catch of the predator’s photoreceptors when the genetic
space is uniformly sampled. This fits exactly into the unit square [0, 1] × [0, 1]. The values of
long wavelength sensitive photoreceptor (red in figure 7.5) span the horizontal axis and short
wavelength sensitive (blue in 7.5) the vertical. Here we can see evidence of a complex structure in
the genotype-phenotype mapping. It can be seen in figure 7.6 that this corresponds to the folded
embedding of the genetic space into it.
1999, e.g.).
However, in the case I present here, the change physiological parameters leading to a
particular colour are underdetermined. This means that it is possible for a model species
to be similar in appearance to a mimicking species but have rather different underlying
physiology (though the possibility for them to be the same is allowed). Indeed, there is
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Figure 7.7: The space of neutral mutations - axes are the two principal components described
in section 7.5.1. Like before (figure 7.6) we see a complex pattern. Also, we see what appears to
be an intersection of two surfaces which forms a concave shape. This concavity will be important
later on when we discuss the mechanisms of aposematic colour formation in this model.
neutral drift between all parameters that give the same colour. Because the physiologies
may be very different, the change in one physiological parameter that corresponds to a
given change in colour may be very different for the two prey species, even if they have
the same colour to the predator. Thus, as the model chases the mimic is it very possible
that their physiologically diverges instead of converging. As the chase reaches the edge of
the colour space the exaggerated difference in physiologies force slightly different extremal
colours. The only way of escaping this trap is to make it possible to have large mutations
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Short Wavelength
Long Wavelength
Figure 7.8: Rendering showing the evolutionary trap where one species may be on the front ‘leaf’
and one on the rear. See appendix F for more renderings.
Figure 7.9: Two spectra which have approximately the same colour to the predator. We can see
the speak for the structural colour on the left for the red spectrum and on the right for the green
spectrum. For the red spectrum to become the same as the green spectrum we would have to move
via a desaturated colour and thus, locally, further away from the colour of the green spectrum.
in the physical parameters.
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7.7 Discussion
The diversity of physical mechanisms responsible for structural colour is great (Welch and
Vigneron, 2007), even before we start combining structural colours (as in Biro` et al., 2007;
Seago et al., 2009). When this is considered along with the potential complexity of the
evolutionary landscapes they create, it is not surprising that where we find structural
colouration we find great diversity in colouration. Navigating the landscape of structural
colours is necessarily difficult. When it comes to the complexities of the physical basis of
colour formation the model presented here is only the tip of the iceberg. The varied visual
pigments of different predators, the vast biochemical networks and ecological parameters
that affect pigments and high number of possible photonic structures means that there is
likely far more potential for finding stable imperfect mimicry.
But as we allow more and more mechanisms, the gamut of colours that can be achieved
broadens. With increased mechanistic diversity it becomes easier and easier to produce
colours that lie near the middle of the colour solid. The places where models can escape
their mimics are pushed further and further to the edges of the colour space.
The difficulty of moving from one part of a colour space to a near by part of the colour
space provides a role for “supergenes” (Joron and Mallet, 1998; Mallet, 1989; Mallet and
Joron, 1999; Naisbit et al., 2007a) - genetic units that produce a simultaneous change in a
large number of physical properties. Although the situation described by these authors is
a little different from the one here, the ability to radically switch from one set of physical
parameters to others would be expected in a mimic that has evolved to be efficient in
modelling other species.
The additive mixing scheme found in tiger beetles (Seago et al., 2009) and butterflies
(Biro` et al., 2007; Welch and Vigneron, 2007) can be considered as an adaptation to avoid
these complexities - an evolution of evolvability (see e.g. Wagner and Altenberg, 1996).
By varying the size of mesoscopic zones of structural colours these organisms can linearise
the relationship between physiology and colour.
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“It never got weird enough for me.”
Hunter S. Thomson
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Appendix A
Notation
A.1 Notation and Conventions
There are a number of specific symbols as well a some conventions for the notation in this
document.
A.2 Specific Objects
The following are symbols that have a specific meaning, although they may be overload
in some contexts:
188
Symbol Meaning
H(·) Entropy
D(KL) ( · || · ) Asymmetric Kullback-Leibler Divergence
D(α) ( · || · ) α-divergence
D(f) ( · || · ) f -divergence
Rφ (·) Risk
R∗φ Optimal Risk
λ Wavelength
w Spectral Sensitivity Function
gij Indexed Metric Tensor
Γijk Cristoffel Symbol
∂i (subscript index) Equivalent to
∂
∂ξi
∂ Equivalent to ∂∂ξ
∂τ (subscript coordinate) Equivalent to
∂
∂τ
[·] Matrix of...
Eξ [·] Expectation of ... at point ξ
` Log probability density
Table A.1: Special Symbols
A.2.1 Common objects
There are a number of conventions that I have tried to stick to throughout, it is not always
possible, so the following is in effect a set of ‘guidelines’ which I have done my best to stick
to. I use Latin letters f, g, h for general functions, c, k, A,B,C . . . are used for constants.
Sets
I write sets in calligraphic script, such as:
A,B, C,X (A.2.1)
I will often describe them using set builder notation:
{ elements : condition } (A.2.2)
and ∅ denotes the empty set.
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Probability Theory
I use Pr(·) to represent probabilities and p(·) or q(·) to represent probability densities. I
will use Latin letters for the elements of the support, with the preference:
x, y, z, a, b, c . . . (A.2.3)
The corresponding supports are sets with the same letters
X ,Y,Z,A,B, C . . . (A.2.4)
I use σ for standard deviations and avoid using µ for the mean.
Measures
I use Σ to denote a σ-algebra, E and element of it (event), and µ and λ as measures.
Coordinates on a Differential Manifold
I use Greek letters for specific coordinates on a differential manifold, with preference left
to right:
ξ, ρ, ζ . . . τ, σ, µ, γ (A.2.5)
and the upper case version for the set of all possible coordinates:
Ξ, P, Z, . . . T,Σ,M (A.2.6)
I use γ for curves (but also for discriminant functions). I use the following letters as indices
(in order of preference):
i, j, k, l, a, b, c, d, α, β . . . (A.2.7)
A.3 Einstein Notation
Einstein notation is used throughout this thesis. Often we wish to sum products of a
number of variables, for example, we might wish to calculate an inner product between
vectors X and Y , which would be:
X1Y1 +X2Y2 +X3Y3 . . . (A.3.1)
or ∑
i
XiYi (A.3.2)
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The power of linear algebra lies in the ability to write this succinctly:
XY T (A.3.3)
however, linear algebra becomes problematic. It only works with vectors or matrices: We
can have at most two dimensional arrays of objects.
In Einstein’s notation there are two types of index: covariant, as in the i in xi and
contravariant, as in the i in xi. The distinction usually reflects certain geometric proper-
ties, but also gives a simple way of writing summations. This notation is centred around
inner products, and makes such things very easy to write - when working in the geometric
setting for which it is intended, it works very well.
Applying it is pretty simple, when terms with the same index in different locations are
multiplied together - assume a sum. Some examples:
xiyi → xiyi (A.3.4)
xiyi →
∑
i
xiyi (A.3.5)
aibjcij →
∑
i
∑
j
aibicij (A.3.6)
aibjckdijk →
∑
i
∑
j
∑
k
aibjckdijk (A.3.7)
aibjckd
k
ij →
∑
i
∑
j
∑
k
aibjckd
k
ij (A.3.8)
aijbij →
∑
i
∑
j
aijbij (A.3.9)
A.3.1 Bracketed Indices
When an index is bracketed, as in x(i) this is to be treated like either upper or lower index
in as much as summation should be assumed no matter what its relation is (in terms of
upper and lower) to the corresponding indices.
A.3.2 Special Vector Constants
There a number of special objects that will be used throughout, firstly there are two
‘constants’ 1 and 0. Which are defined as 1 or 0 respectively, for whatever choice of
indexing used. Often it will be used as shorthand for:
1ix
i =
∑
i
xi (A.3.10)
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A.3.3 Generalised Delta
I will also use a generalisation of the Kronecker delta function δ. This is defined as:
δb1b2...;d1d2...;f1f2...;...a1a2...;c1c2...;e1e2...;... =

1,

∀aibj : ai = bj and
∀cidj : ci = dj and
∀eifj : ei = fj and
etc
0, otherwise
(A.3.11)
The use of the semicolon distinguishes between the logical form1 ((i = j) ∧ (k = l))
represented by ij; kl and (i = j = k = l) represented by ijkl. In the former it does not
necessarily hold that, for example j = k.
For this δ, the following two identities hold. Firstly we can concatenate indices (sepa-
rating by “;”) when two δs are multiplied(
δb1b2...;d1d2...;...a1a2...;c1c2...;...
)(
δf1f2...;h1h2...;...e1e2...;g1g2...;...
)
= δb1b2...;d1d2...;f1f2...;h1h2...;...a1a2...;c1c2...;e1e2...;g1g2...;... (A.3.12)
and, we can remove a “;” by contracting across it, here the contracting index is x.
δb1b2...; xd1d2...;...xa1a2...; c1c2...;... = δ
b1b2...d1d2...;...
a1a2...c1c2...;... (A.3.13)
An example application of these identities:
δalij δ
b
kl = δ
al; b
ij; kl (A.3.14)
= δabijk (A.3.15)
A common use of this delta function is in situations like:
δabcx
aybzc =
∑
i
xiyizi (A.3.16)
1∧ represents logical conjunction - “AND”
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Appendix B
Binary Choice and Linear
Discriminants
We have a score for behaviours (ω) and (α): s(α, ω). We wish to show that maximising the
expectation (over a Borel set) of this score given two probability distributions (Pr(x, α) =
Pr(α) Pr(x |α), α = α1, α2) gives a choice function where:
ω =
 ω1, Pr(x, α1) > kPr(x, α2)ω2, otherwise (B.0.1)
where
k =
s(2, 2)− s(2, 1)
s(1, 1)− s(1, 2) (B.0.2)
The total score for a choice (determined by a proposition φ) can be written as
S(φ) =
∫
s¯φ(x)dx (B.0.3)
= s(1, 1)
∫
Φ
Pr(x, α1)dx
+s(1, 2)
∫
Ψ
Pr(x, α1)dx
+s(2, 1)
∫
Φ
Pr(x, α2)dx
+s(2, 1)
∫
Ψ
Pr(x, α2)dx (B.0.4)
where φ(x) = ¬ψ(x) are propositions about x, which go on to define the disjoint sets
Φ = {x : φ(x)} and Ψ = {x : ψ(x)} (B.0.5)
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A corollary of which is that x ∈ Φ =⇒ ω = ω1 and x ∈ Ψ =⇒ ω = ω2. We can
maximise S in a point-wise manner, by considering the two possibilities for a particular x:
φ(x) = true : s¯φ(x) = s(1, 1) Pr(x, α1) + s(2, 1) Pr(x, α2)
φ(x) = false : s¯φ(x) = s(1, 2) Pr(x, α1) + s(2, 2) Pr(x, α2)
So, one just chooses the bigger one if we want to maximise S or the smaller if one wants
to minimise. For maximisation:
φ(x) = Js(1, 1) Pr(x, α1) + s(2, 1) Pr(x, α2)
> s(1, 2) Pr(x, α1) + s(2, 2) Pr(x, α2)K (B.0.6)
= J(s(1, 1)− s(1, 2)) Pr(x, α1)
> (s(2, 2)− s(2, 1)) Pr(x, α2)K (B.0.7)
and assuming s(1, 1) > s(1, 2):
φ(x) = JPr(x, α1) > s(2, 2)− s(2, 1)
s(1, 1)− s(1, 2) Pr(x, α2)K (B.0.8)
as required.
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Appendix C
Divergences
This appendix contains the supplementary material associated with calculations involving
divergences.
C.1 Expansion of f-divergences
The following is a straight forwards Taylor expansion of f -divergences. Due to it’s length
and triviality it has not been reported in the literature. Performing the expansion and
checking the results for errors does however require a significant amount of work - even
with infernal newfangled contraptions capable of advanced symbolic manipulation. For
this reason it is included here. The f -divergence:
D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) =
∫
χ
pξf
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x) (C.1.1)
will be expanded as (see 4.5.1):
D(h) ( ξ || ξ + ∆ξ ) = D(h) ( ξ || ρ )
∣∣∣
ρ=ξ
+
∂
∂ρi
D(h) ( ξ || ρ )
∣∣∣
ρ=ξ
∆ξi +
1
2
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρj
D(h) ( ξ || ρ )
∣∣∣
ρ=ξ
∆ξi∆ξj +
1
6
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρj
∂
∂ρk
D(h) ( ξ || ρ )
∣∣∣
ρ=ξ
∆ξi∆ξj∆ξk +
o(∆ξ4) (C.1.2)
assuming continuity (to third order) of f(u) at u = 1. Here there is no other assumption
about the nature of f . The following uses non-normalised probabilities, with∫
χ
pξdµ(x) = τ (C.1.3)
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which allows for a more general result. We also need to recognise that:
∂
∂ρi
f
(
pρ
pξ
)
=
∂
∂ρi
f(u)
=
∂u
∂ρi
f ′ (u)
=
(
1
pξ
)(
∂
∂ρi
pρ
)
f ′ (u) (C.1.4)
which is used throughout. As usual, I will use the notation of `ξ = log pξ and ∂i =
∂
∂ξi
.
From here I will take each term of the expansion shown in C.1.2 in order.
Zeroth order in ∆ξ
D(f) ( ξ || ρ )
∣∣∣
ρ=ξ
=
∫
χ
pξf
(
pξ
pξ
)
dµ(x) (C.1.5)
= f(1)
∫
χ
pξdµ(x) (C.1.6)
= τf(1) (C.1.7)
First order in ∆ξ
First the differential, beginning with the product rule and noting ∂
∂ρi
pξ = 0:
∂
∂ρi
D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) =
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ρi
pξ
)
f
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x) +∫
χ
pξ
∂
∂ρi
f
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x) (C.1.8)
=
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ρi
pρ
)
f ′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x) (C.1.9)
evaluating at ρ = ξ:
∂
∂ρi
D(f) ( ξ || ρ )
∣∣∣
ρ=ξ
=
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ξi
pξ
)
f ′ (1) dµ(x) (C.1.10)
= f ′(1)
∫
χ
∂
∂ξi
pξdµ(x) (C.1.11)
= f ′(1)∂iτ (C.1.12)
Second order in ∆ξ
Beginning with equation C.1.9:
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρj
D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) = ∂
∂ρj
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ρi
pρ
)
f ′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x)
=
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρj
pρ
)
f ′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x) +∫
χ
(
∂
∂ρi
pρ
)
∂
∂ρj
f ′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x)
(C.1.13)
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=∫
χ
(
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρj
pρ
)
f ′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x) +∫
χ
1
pξ
(
∂
∂ρi
pρ
)(
∂
∂ρj
pρ
)
f ′′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x)
(C.1.14)
evaluating at ρ = ξ:
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρj
D(f) ( ξ || ρ )
∣∣∣
ρ=ξ
= f ′(1)
∫
χ
∂
∂ξi
∂
∂ξj
pξdµ(x)
+ f ′′(1)
∫
χ
(
1
pξ
∂
∂ξi
pξ
)(
1
pξ
∂
∂ξj
pξ
)
pξdµ(x)
= f ′(1)∂i∂jτ + f ′′(1)
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ξi
`ξ
)(
∂
∂ξj
`ξ
)
pξdµ(x)
= f ′(1)∂i∂jτ + f ′′(1)τgij (C.1.15)
where gij is the Fisher metric (we must remember that expectations are taken over nor-
malised distributions):
gij = Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ] dµ(x)
=
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ξi
`ξ
)(
∂
∂ξj
`ξ
)
pξ∫
χ pξdµ(x)
dµ(x)
=
1
τ
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ξi
`ξ
)(
∂
∂ξj
`ξ
)
pξdµ(x)
Third order in ∆ξ
Beginning with equation C.1.14:
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρj
∂
∂ρk
D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) =
∂
∂ρk
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρj
pρ
)
f ′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x)
+
∂
∂ρk
∫
χ
1
pξ
(
∂
∂ρi
pρ
)(
∂
∂ρj
pρ
)
f ′′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x)
(C.1.16)
Taking each part of the sum separately gives for the left hand summand:
∂
∂ρk
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρj
pρ
)
f ′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x) =
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρj
∂
∂ρk
pρ
)
f ′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x)
+
∫
χ
1
pξ
(
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρj
pρ
)(
∂
∂ρk
pρ
)
f ′′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x)
(C.1.17)
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evaluating at ρ = ξ:
LH = f ′(1)∂i∂j∂kτ + f ′′(1)
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ξi
∂
∂ξj
pξ
)(
∂
∂ξk
`ξ
)
dµ(x) (C.1.18)
Now, it is possible to write:∫
χ
(
∂
∂ξa
∂
∂ξb
pξ
)(
∂
∂ξc
`ξ
)
dµ(x)
as ∫
χ
pξ
(
1
pξ
∂
∂ξa
∂
∂ξb
pξ
)(
∂
∂ξc
`ξ
)
dµ(x)
and also, we can see that:
∂
∂ξa
∂
∂ξb
`ξ =
∂
∂ξa
(
1
pξ
∂
∂ξb
pξ
)
=
−1
p2ξ
∂
∂ξa
pξ
∂
∂ξb
pξ +
1
pξ
∂
∂ξa
∂
∂ξb
pξ
= − ∂
∂ξa
`ξ
∂
∂ξb
`ξ +
1
pξ
∂
∂ξa
∂
∂ξb
pξ
(C.1.19)
so
1
pξ
∂
∂ξa
∂
∂ξb
pξ =
∂
∂ξa
∂
∂ξb
`ξ +
∂
∂ξa
`ξ
∂
∂ξb
`ξ (C.1.20)
and ∫
χ
pξ
(
1
pξ
∂
∂ξa
∂
∂ξb
pξ
)(
∂
∂ξc
`ξ
)
dµ(x)
becomes ∫
χ
pξ
∂
∂ξa
∂
∂ξb
`ξ
∂
∂ξc
`ξdµ(x)
+
∫
χ
pξ
∂
∂ξa
`ξ
∂
∂ξb
`ξ
∂
∂ξc
`ξdµ(x) (C.1.21)
which can be written as the sum of expectations:
τEξ [∂a∂b`ξ∂c`ξ] + τEξ [∂a`ξ∂b`ξ∂c`ξ] (C.1.22)
This means equation C.1.18 can be written:
LH = f ′(1)∂i∂j∂kτ +
τf ′′(1)Eξ [∂i∂j`ξ∂k`ξ] +
τf ′′(1)Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ∂k`ξ] (C.1.23)
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Now, Taking the right hand part of the sum in C.1.16:
∂
∂ρk
∫
χ
1
pξ
(
∂
∂ρi
pρ
)(
∂
∂ρj
pρ
)
f ′′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x) =
∫
χ
1
pξ
(
∂
∂ρi
∂
∂ρk
pρ
)(
∂
∂ρj
pρ
)
f ′′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x)
+
∫
χ
1
pξ
(
∂
∂ρi
pρ
)(
∂
∂ρj
∂
∂ρk
pρ
)
f ′′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x)
+
∫
χ
1
p2ξ
(
∂
∂ρi
pρ
)(
∂
∂ρj
pρ
)(
∂
∂ρk
pρ
)
f ′′′
(
pρ
pξ
)
dµ(x)
(C.1.24)
evaluating at ρ = ξ:
RH = f ′′(1)
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ξj
∂
∂ξk
pξ
)(
∂
∂ξi
`ξ
)
dµ(x) + (C.1.25)
f ′′(1)
∫
χ
(
∂
∂ξi
∂
∂ξk
pξ
)(
∂
∂ξj
`ξ
)
dµ(x) + (C.1.26)
τf ′′′(1)Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ∂k`ξ] (C.1.27)
which can also be completely written in terms of expectations:
RH = τf ′′(1)Eξ [∂j∂k`ξ∂i`ξ] +
τf ′′(1)Eξ [∂i∂k`ξ∂j`ξ] +
2τf ′′(1)Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ∂k`ξ] +
τf ′′′(1)Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ∂k`ξ] (C.1.28)
adding the left and right sides gives:
LH +RH = f ′(1)∂i∂j∂kτ +
τf ′′(1)Eξ [∂i∂j`ξ∂k`ξ] +
τf ′′(1)Eξ [∂j∂k`ξ∂i`ξ] +
τf ′′(1)Eξ [∂i∂k`ξ∂j`ξ] +
3τf ′′(1)Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ∂k`ξ] +
τf ′′′(1)Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ∂k`ξ] (C.1.29)
Next, we note that:
∂kgij = ∂kEξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ]
= Eξ [∂i∂k`ξ∂j`ξ] +
= Eξ [∂j∂k`ξ∂i`ξ] +
= Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ∂k`ξ] (C.1.30)
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so
LH +RH = f ′(1)∂i∂j∂kτ + τf ′′(1)∂kgij +
τf ′′(1)Eξ [∂i∂j`ξ∂k`ξ] +
τ(2f ′′(1) + f ′′′(1))Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ∂k`ξ]
= f ′(1)∂i∂j∂kτ + τf ′′(1)∂kgij +
τf ′′(1)
(
Eξ [∂i∂j`ξ∂k`ξ] +(
2 +
f ′′′(1)
f ′′(1)
)
Eξ [∂i`ξ∂j`ξ∂k`ξ]
)
= f ′(1)∂i∂j∂kτ + τf ′′(1)∂kgij +
τf ′′(1)Eξ
[(
∂i∂j`ξ +
(
2 +
f ′′′(1)
f ′′(1)
)
∂i`ξ∂j`ξ
)
(∂k`ξ)
]
(C.1.31)
remembering that the definition of the Cristoffel symbols of the α-connection are given
by:
Γ
(α)
ij,k = Eξ
[(
∂i∂j`ξ +
1− α
2
∂i`ξ∂j`ξ
)
(∂k`ξ)
]
(C.1.32)
we see that if we let −α = 3 + 2f ′′′(1)/f ′′(1) then:
LH +RH = f ′(1)∂i∂j∂kτ + τf ′′(1)∂kgij + τf ′′(1)Γ
−(3+2f ′′′(1)/f ′′(1))
ij,k (C.1.33)
Final Expansion
D(f) ( ξ || ξ + ∆ξ ) = τf(1) +
f ′(1)∂iτ∆ξi +
1
2f
′(1)∂i∂jτ∆ξi∆ξj +
1
2τf
′′(1)gij∆ξi∆ξj +
1
6f
′(1)∂i∂j∂kτ∆ξi∆ξj∆ξk +
1
6τf
′′(1)∂kgij∆ξi∆ξj∆ξk +
1
6τf
′′(1)Γ−(3+2f
′′′(1)/f ′′(1))
ij,k ∆ξ
i∆ξj∆ξk +
o(∆ξ4) (C.1.34)
This can be cleaned up by subtracting f ′(1)τ(ξ + ∆ξ) from the expanded function:
D(f) ( ξ || ξ + ∆ξ )− f ′(1)τ(ξ + ∆ξ) =
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τf(1) +
1
2τf
′′(1)gij∆ξi∆ξj +
1
6τf
′′(1)∂kgij∆ξi∆ξj∆ξk +
1
6τf
′′(1)Γ−(3+2f
′′′(1)/f ′′(1))
ij,k ∆ξ
i∆ξj∆ξk +
o(∆ξ4) (C.1.35)
h-divergences
For an h-divergence we have f(1) = f ′(1) = 0 so:
D(h) ( ξ || ξ + ∆ξ ) = 12τf ′′(1)gij∆ξi∆ξj +
1
6τf
′′(1)
(
∂kgij + Γ
−(3+2f ′′′(1)/f ′′(1))
ij,k
)
∆ξi∆ξj∆ξk +
o(∆ξ4) (C.1.36)
C.2 Preservation of Symmetry under the Geometrising Trans-
form
This appendix demonstrates that the geometrising transform
f(u)→ f(u) + (1− u)f ′(1)− f(1) (C.2.1)
preserves the relationship (symmetry)
D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) = D(f) ( ρ || ξ ) (C.2.2)
in the general case of different prior probabilities.
Let us consider two possibilities ξ and ρ with prior probabilities piξ = Pr(ξ) and
piρ = Pr(ρ) and distributions conditional on them, ηξ = Pr(x | ξ) and ηρ = Pr(x | ρ). The f -
divergences corresponding to the difference between the two outcomes - prior probabilities
considered - is given by:
D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) =
∫
X
piρηρf
(
piξηξ
piρηρ
)
dµ(x) (C.2.3)
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Letting h be the transformed function h(u) = f(u) + (1− u)f ′(1)− f(1) then:
D(h) ( ξ || ρ )
=
∫
X
piρηρ
(
f
(
piξηξ
piρηρ
)
+
(
1− pi
ξηξ
piρηρ
)
f ′(1)− f(1)
)
dµ(x)
=
∫
X
piρηρf
(
piξηξ
piρηρ
)
+ (piρηρ − piξηξ)f ′(1)− piρηρf(1) dµ(x)
= D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) + f ′(1)piξ
∫
X
ηξdµ(x)
−f ′(1)piξ
∫
X
ηξdµ(x) + f(1)piρ
∫
X
ηρdµ(x)
noting that
∫
X η
ξdµ(x) =
∫
X η
ρdµ(x) = 1 we have:
D(h) ( ξ || ρ ) = D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) + (piρ − piξ)f ′(1)− piρf(1) (C.2.4)
Imposing the symmetry constraint in equation C.2.2 onto this transformed divergence
gives:
0 = D(h) ( ξ || ρ )−D(h) ( ξ || ρ )
= D(f) ( ξ || ρ )−D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) +
(
piξ − piρ
)
(2f ′(1)− f(1)) (C.2.5)
Now, since we know that the relationship holds for D(f) ( ξ || ρ ) then we have the require-
ment that:(
piξ − piρ
) (
2f ′(1)− f(1)) = 0 (C.2.6)
we also know that this symmetry implies that the following relationship holds for f :
f(u) = uf (1/u) (C.2.7)
Differentiating this:
f ′(u) = f(1/u)− f
′(1/u)
u
(C.2.8)
and evaluating at u = 1:
2f ′(1)− f(1) = 0 (C.2.9)
leads to a condition where by necessity equation C.2.6 holds, therefor the geometrising
transform preserves this symmetry.
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Appendix D
Specific Values of the Fisher
Metric
The following is the derivation of the Fisher metric for some of the distributions used
in this thesis. I will show them for the one dimensional case, as generalisation to the
multidimensional case is trivial.
D.1 Poisson Distribution
If
X ∼ Poisson (λ) (D.1.1)
then
Pr(X = x) =
λxe−λ
x!
(D.1.2)
The log probability is:
`(x;λ) = −λ+ x log λ− log x! (D.1.3)
and
∂
∂λ
`(x;λ) =
x
λ
− 1 (D.1.4)
(
∂
∂λ
`(x;λ)
)2
=
(x
λ
− 1
)2
(D.1.5)
So the Fisher information g is given by:
g =
∞∑
x=0
(x
λ
− 1
)2 λxe−λ
x!
=
1
λ
(D.1.6)
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D.2 Gamma Distribution
Here I only consider the case of a fixed population size, where k is a constant.
If
X ∼ Gamma (k, θ) (D.2.1)
then
Pr(X = x) = γ(x, k, θ) =
xk−1e−x/θ
Γ(k)θk
(D.2.2)
where Γ : C→ C is the gamma function:
Γ(z) =
∫ ∞
0
tz−1e−tdt (D.2.3)
for n ∈ N we have the relation:
Γ(n) = (n− 1)! (D.2.4)
and similarly:
Γ(x+ 1) = xΓ(x) (D.2.5)
which holds for all x ∈ R+. Now, we have a statistical manifold with log probability given
by:
`(x; k, θ) = (k − 1) log x− x/θ − log Γ(k)− k log θ (D.2.6)
so
∂
∂θ
`(x; k, θ) =
x
θ2
− k
θ
(D.2.7)
(
∂
∂θ
`(x; k, θ)
)2
=
1
θ2
(x
θ
− k
)2
(D.2.8)
and the Fisher information g is:
g =
∫ ∞
−∞
1
θ2
(x
θ
− k
)2 xk−1e−x/θ
Γ(k)θk
dx (D.2.9)
=
1
θ2
∫ ∞
−∞
(x
θ
− k
)2 xk−1e−x/θ
Γ(k)θk
dx (D.2.10)
=
1
θ2
∫ ∞
−∞
(
x2
θ2
− 2kx
θ
+ k2
)
xk−1e−x/θ
Γ(k)θk
dx (D.2.11)
=
1
θ2
(A− 2B + C) (D.2.12)
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where, as
∫∞
−∞ γ(x, k, θ)dx = 1:
A =
∫ ∞
−∞
x2
θ2
xk−1e−x/θ
Γ(k)θk
(D.2.13)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
k(k + 1)γ(x, k, θ)dx = k(k + 1) (D.2.14)
B =
∫ ∞
−∞
kx
θ
xk−1e−x/θ
Γ(k)θk
=
∫ ∞
−∞
k2γ(x, k, θ)dx = k2 (D.2.15)
C =
∫ ∞
−∞
k2
xk−1e−x/θ
Γ(k)θk
=
∫ ∞
−∞
k2γ(x, k, θ)dx = k2 (D.2.16)
so
A− 2B + C = k(k + 1)− 2k2 + k2 = k (D.2.17)
thus:
g =
k
θ2
(D.2.18)
D.3 Binomial Distribution
Here I only consider the case of a fixed population size, where n is a constant.
If
X ∼ Binomial (n, p) (D.3.1)
then
Pr(X = x) =
n
x
 px(1− p)n−x (D.3.2)
so the log probability is:
`(x;n, p) = log
n
x
+ x log p− (n− x) log(1− p) (D.3.3)
and
∂
∂p
`(x;n, p) =
x− np
p(1− p) (D.3.4)
205
so that the Fisher information is given by the sum:
g =
n∑
x=0
n
x
 (x− np)2
p2(1− p)2 p
x(1− p)n−x (D.3.5)
=
n∑
x=0
n
x
 (x− np)2px−2(1− p)n−x−2 (D.3.6)
=
n∑
x=0
n
x
x2px−2(1− p)n−x−2 (D.3.7)
−
n∑
x=0
n
x
 2nppx−2(1− p)n−x−2 (D.3.8)
+
n∑
x=0
n
x
n2p2px−2(1− p)n−x−2 (D.3.9)
which can be written as expectations of powers of x, then in terms of the mean and
variance:
g =
1
p2(1− p)2)
(
Ep
[
x2
]− 2npEp [x] + n2p2)) (D.3.10)
=
1
p2(1− p)2)
(
σ2 + (µ− np)2) (D.3.11)
and it is known that the mean of a binomial distribution is np and the variance is np(1−p)
so we have:
µ− np = 0 (D.3.12)
so
g =
σ2
p2(1− p)2 (D.3.13)
and finally
g =
np(1− p)
p2(1− p)2 =
n
p(1− p) (D.3.14)
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Appendix E
Sexual Selection Simulation
E.1 Model
The model of signal production though sexual selection consists of two collections of
species, the ‘signallers’ and the ‘drifters’, labelled S and D respectively. They contain
nS and nD species so that:
S = {s1, s2 . . . snS}, D = {d1, d2 . . . dnD} (E.1.1)
Each species si or di contains nO organisms which have variables corresponding to pigments
that define their appearance A and their visual systems V and the colour of their preferred
mate T . In addition there is an integer identifier for the organism I, and its species S. The
members of each species are each then defined by a tuple (A, V, T, I, S). The appearance,
A, is a vector with np elements (where np is the number of samples that the spectrum
is recorded at) and the visual pigment genes V is a ne vector which defines an ne-by-np
matrix M (where ne is the number of visual pigment types), so that the colour of an
organism a as seen by an organism b (cb(a)) is given by the usual inner product:
cb(a) = M(Vb) ·Aa (E.1.2)
where subscripts denote the organism to which the variables are associated. The function
M is given by
Mij(V ) =
1 + sin(pi(12 i+ 2Vj))
2 + 12
∑
i sin(pi(
1
2 i+ 2Vj))
(E.1.3)
Though it is rather arbitrary, it is chosen to have a single peak and symmetry, as well as
being normalised (the normalising factor leading to the complexities of the denominator).
Members of both classes of species produce recombinant offspring by randomly choos-
ing a parent for each gene (in this case, a gene is a single double precision floating point
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number found in A, V or T ). These are used to produce a new organism x, along with
a new target mate appearance - its own colour, cx(x) - it is assigned a new unique ID.
The inherited values also gain mutations in the form of the addition of a normally dis-
tributed random number with standard deviation σSV , σSA or σDV , σDA, depending on
the class and variable type. Resultant values outside of the interval [0, 1] are brought back
into range by applying either f : x > 1 → 1, x < 0 → 0, x ∈ [0, 1] → x or f : x → x
mod 1 1. Mutations are applied with frequencies mD and mS to the drifters and signallers
respectively.
E.1.1 Selection Rules
The species in each class have different selection rules, the ‘drifters’ D merely drift, their
visual pigments and target colours are largely irrelevant. The populations of each drifter
species are modified at each generation by applying the following rules a given number
(rD) of times:
1: Select a random member of the population for a drifter species
2: Select a random mate from the same population
3: Recombine their genes and mutate
4: Replace a random member of the population with the new offspring
The ‘signallers’, S are evolved by rules chosen to mimic sexual selection. Instead of
knowing the species to mate with, they are required to judge it by their appearance from
all of S ∪D. To do this they use a psychometric function tanh(kd), where k is a constant
and d is the euclidean distance between the colour (c) of their potential mate and their
target mate (T ). This function fits into the following evolutionary schema, which is applied
to rS organisms each time step:
1: Select a random member from the population of a signaller species
2: Choose a potential mate from any species
3: Find the value of the psychometric function
4: Choose a uniform random variable from [0,1]
5: If the random variable is greater than value from the
psychometric function, go back to 2
6: If the mate is not of the same species, do nothing, otherwise
1 mod 1 is the floating point modulo operation in base 1, setting the value before the decimal place to
zero.
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7: Recombine genes and mutate
8: Replace a random member of the population with the new offspring
E.1.2 Establishing Convergence
The convergence of the simulation was judged by means of a perceiver independent proxy
for colourfulness, H. This is fast to calculate and allows a simulations progress to be
tracked. It is the sum of a log a over all elements of the appearance for each organism in
each species:
H =
∑
s∈S∪D
∑
x∈s
∑
a∈Ax
ai log ai (E.1.4)
The fixation of this value to within an interval the size of 5% of its deviation from the
start, over a period of 100 generations, was taken to be sufficient for the simulation to be
ended. Though generally simulations continued beyond this point.
E.1.3 Analysis
The appearance of the species was summarised in terms of colourfulness (see chapter 2), the
fractional distance of a point from the centre to the edge of the colour space. The frequency
of colourfulness was summarised by taking the colourfulness of each organism within S
(or D) as judged by every organism in S (or D), producing n2S (or n2D) values which are
then used to create histograms. The histograms are then corrected so that they would be
uniform were the organisms uniformly distributed across the colour space, the histogram
thus represents the organisms density on the colour space. To perform this correction we
note that the locus of equal colourfulness is the boundary of the colour space scaled by
the colourfulness, the volume (area) with colourfulness less than a c is proportional to
cne , in the case of the dichromatic species in this simulation ne = 2. So the volume of
colour space corresponding to a histogram bin corresponding to the colourfulness interval
[c, c+ ∆c] is k∆c(c+ ∆c), where k is equal to the total volume (area) of the colour space.
The normalised histogram is invariant with respect to the value of k, and determination
of its value is not required. Because of this we only need to multiply each bin by c+ ∆c.
E.2 Behaviour of the Model
The first thing to consider in the model is the behaviour of the species that are not under
selective pressure for appearance. The lack of pressure on appearance causes the species to
distribute uniformly across the space of spectra. When these are projected to form colours
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Figure E.1: Data from the sexual simulation model with 42 species (plus 42 drifting species
when present). These plots show the frequency that a part of the colour space with colourfulness
of a particular value is contains a member of a species of a given type. The data is corrected
for the increased sampling of colourfulness values at higher colourfullnesses (e.g. there is more
area for a colourfulness of 0.1 than 0.9). In both graphs the lines represent median values for
ten simulations and the filled area indicates the full range of the simulated results. The red lines
show the colourfulness under selective pressure from drifting species; green, the colourfulness of the
drifting species themselves; and blue is the sexually selected species but without the presence of the
drifters. The simulation was performed with a psychometric constant of 4, spectral dimensionality
of 4, 2 visual pigments, standard deviations of Gaussian mutation sizes of 0.1. The probabilities
of mutation is 0.05 for spectra, 0 for visual pigments (these generally fixate within 100 generations
to a pair of fairly orthogonal pigments). There are 30 organisms per species and 5 are potentially
replaced per generation.
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we see that more of them project to the centre of the space. This then presents itself as
a net movement towards the centre of the colour space. This can be seen in figure E.1 as
the high probability density for low colourfullnesses in the green curve. It is represented
in figure E.2 parts a and b.
a
b
c
Figure E.2: A caricatured representation of the causal mechanism of strong colour formation in
the sexual selection model. Multicoloured dots represent the species under sexual selection, i.e.
those required to identify their conspecifics using colour cues. The white dots represent species
with no selective pressure upon their appearance. (a) The species begin at random points in colour
space. (b) The species that are not under selective pressure for colour show a net drift towards
the centre of the colour space. (c) in response to the increased number of competing signals in the
centre of the space the species required to communicate using colour move towards the outskirts
of the colour space. In reality the two processes happen near simultaneously, the arrows represent
the causal relationship only.
The response of the organisms under sexual selection is a net movement away from
high species density (see red curves in figure E.1), which is towards the colourful edges
of the colour space. There are a couple of other features that can be seen in the data.
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There is a slight tendency towards the edges of the colour space due to the bias induced
from truncating the reflectance genes when a mutation takes it outside of the range [0, 1],
this can be seen in the blue curve in figure E.1. In addition there is also a bump induced
from the regularity of what is effectively an approximate packing of species from the
edge inwards. Some species move right to up to the edge of the space, then there is an
area of lower density. Following this there is then a higher density again. This is just a
manifestation of requiring a particular separation between species and aligning them with
the edge of the space.
This behaviour happens across a range of parameters. Whilst it is clearly unreason-
able to expect to find a real word situation where there are a large number of species only
differing by their colour, it is useful to consider such a system for the purposes of demon-
strating the selective pressure from the the non-selected organisms. When the physiology
responsible for colour formation is not closely modelled (like it is in chapter 7) and a di-
rect Gaussian mutation scheme with truncated boundaries is used, there is a tendency for
species to ‘stick’ to the edge. The probability of being exactly at the edge is greater than at
any other position2 biasing the results with magnitude negatively correlated with species
number. The addition of extra sexually selected species allows this effect to be diluted
to the point of making reasonable comparisons, and in addition, easing the production of
good quality histograms.
E.3 Algorithmic Calculation of the Object Colour Solid
The following algorithm is a ‘fast’ way of performing the accurate calculation of the colour
solid without any constraint relating to the convexity of the spectral line (unlike the
extreme spectrum method). The direct calculation of the convex hull of the spectrum
space is intractable for highly resolved spectra, as the number of extreme points to consider
#T grows exponentially with the number of samples of the spectrum, m:
#T = 2m (E.3.1)
So, even for a 2D colour solid being calculated on a PC with 4GB of free memory, rep-
resenting each point as a pair of double precision floating point numbers, we are limited
2All the positions beyond the edge map exactly to the edge. i.e. the probability moving onto the
edge (of one spectral dimension) from position x is erf(−|x− 1|/σ) + erf(−|x|/σ), all other positions have
infinitesimal probabilities.
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to 28 samples, simply by what we can represent in memory.3. This says nothing about
how long it will take to run; there is no convex hull algorithm with complexity less than
n log n, so this na¨ıve method is clearly at least4 exponential time in number of samples.
Often, this kind of problem is solved using quadratic programming methods (Ohta and
Wyszecki, 1975; Wyszecki and Stiles, 2000), but here I propose a different solution, whose
accuracy is limited by how accurately we represent the photoreceptor sensitivities, not by
how many points we calculate.
It works by calculating the projection of the reflectance spectrum hypercube directly,
at every step increasing the number of points twofold. However, at each step a convex hull
algorithm is used to prune as many points as possible, preventing what would otherwise
be a combinatorial explosion. An optimisation is also possible at line 6: in addition to the
black point (the origin), the starting set can be made to include the white point (1). This
significantly enhances the efficiency of the pruning.
1 function solidCalculator(photoreceptor_response_vectors)
2 # Create a matrix of photoreceptor responses
3 let columns of response_matrix = photoreceptor_response_vectors
4
5 # Create a starting hypercube
6 let point_list = [point at origin]
7 let i = 1
8 while i <= number of photoreceptors
9 translated_points = point_list + ith row of response_matrix
10 point_list = point_list union translated_points
11 increment i
12
13 # Iteratively apply convex hull algorithm
14 while i <= number of elements in response vector
15 translated_points = point_list + ith row of response_matrix
16 point_list = point_list union translated_points
17 point_list = convex_hull(point_list)
18 increment i
3A pair of double precision floating point numbers requires 16 = 24 bytes of memory. 4GB = 232 bytes.
So solve 2m · 24 = 2m+4 = 232.
4A rough calculation suggests that it is greater than exponential time, limn→∞ n2
n
2n
= ∞, but slower
than factorial time limn→∞ n2
n
n!
= 0.
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Figure E.3: Data based on A1 pigment templates (Stavenga et al., 1993) used in the calculation
in figure E.4. Each curve represents a vector of seven elements with values of each element given
by the y-axis.
How can we be sure this works? To assure this algorithm is correct we need only to
argue that it will necessarily visit every point on the hull, as the convex hull algorithm can
never remove a point that is actually on the final hull. Let us denote the solid represented
in the calculation at step i by si, and the value of the photoreceptor sensitivities at step
i by vi. With some calculation
5 it can be shown that:
si+1 = C (si ∪ {x+ vi : x ∈ si}) = C
(
H
(
H(si) ∪ {x+ vi : x ∈ H(si)}
))
(E.3.2)
implying that we do not ‘loose’ any points by iterating using the hulls, H(si), rather than
the full set si. So at each stage of the iteration, even though we are removing points that
were on the hull in previous steps, we are still keeping a full representation of the full
colour solid up to that point.
5This can be achieved by writing the convex coverings and hulls explicitly in their summation form.
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Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Step 4 Step 5 Step 6
Step 7 Step 8 Result
Figure E.4: Calculating a 2D colour solid. We begin with a single point (Step 1) then create a
projected m-cube (a square) by successively duplicating the number of points by making a copy
and adding a vector (arrows). After the shape has the same dimensionally as the space it lies in,
we begin pruning points after each duplication (Steps 4-8 inclusive). Points that will be removed
are shown in red. This makes the algorithm possible. The dotted lines show the coordinates of
the ‘extreme spectra’. We can see that one branch of algorithm follows the same path as these,
however, this path does not lie on the convex hull, so some of the points on it get pruned away
(all of them that do are removed are red in step 5). The light black lines are all the edges of the
hypercube, most of which do not get traversed due to the pruning.
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Appendix F
More Renderings of the
Phenotypic Space
Short Wavelength
Long Wavelength
FirstPrincipal Component
Figure F.1: Rendering showing some of the complexities of the relationship between the physical
parameters, the colour, and the hidden space.
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Figure F.2: A rendering showing the two different zones that can achieve the same colour.
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Short Wavelength
Long Wavelength
Figure F.3: Another rendering showing how non-linear the space is.
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